



# THE LIMITS OF ALTRUISM IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS

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# THE LIMITS OF ALTRUISM IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS

Athenians in the classical period (508–322 B.C.) were drawn to an image of themselves as a compassionate and generous people who rushed to the aid of others in distress, both at home and abroad. What relation does this image bear to actual Athenian behavior? This book argues that Athenians felt little pressure as individuals to help fellow citizens whom they did not know. Democratic ideology called on citizens to refrain from harming one another rather than to engage in mutual support and emphasized the importance of the helping relationship between citizen and city rather than among individual citizens. If the obligation of Athenians to help fellow citizens was fairly tenuous, all the more so was their responsibility to intervene to assist the peoples of other states; a distinct pragmatism prevailed in the city's decisions concerning intervention abroad.

Matthew R. Christ is Professor of Classical Studies at Indiana University. He is author of *The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens* (2006) and *The Litigious Athenian* (1998).



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*To Sophia C. Goodman*





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Two of the chapters in this book are based on my earlier published work. Chapter I is an expanded and revised version of my article “Helping Behavior in Classical Athens” in *Phoenix* 64.3–4 (2010) 1–37. Chapter III is adapted from “Helping and Community in the Athenian Lawcourts” in *Valuing Others in Classical Antiquity*, edited by R. Rosen and I. Sluiter, 205–32, Leiden, 2010.

Translations in the text are adapted from those found in the Loeb Classical Library (Harvard University Press), the *Oratory of Classical Greece* series (University of Texas Press), Connor (1971), Freeman (1948), Krentz (1995), MacDowell (1990 and 2000), Todd (2007), and Whitehead (2000). Greek texts are from the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (University of California at Irvine).

In this book, ancient passages that are cited on specific points are given *exempli gratia* rather than as comprehensive listings of all testimonia unless otherwise indicated. Abbreviated references to ancient authors and works are based primarily on those used in H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (ninth edition; revised by H. S. Jones and R. McKenzie), Oxford, 1996. Abbreviated references to modern scholarship are to the works cited in the bibliography at the end of this book. Abbreviations of periodicals in the bibliography follow the system of *L'Année philologique*.

# INTRODUCTION

## *The Philanthropic Athenian?*

Athenians in the classical period (508–322 B.C.) were drawn to an image of themselves as a compassionate and generous people who rushed to the aid of others in distress, at home and abroad. Litigants in the popular courts appeal to this ideal when they call on large panels of jurors collectively to intervene and help them against their unjust opponents with a favorable verdict. Speakers delivering funeral orations for the state's war dead portray Athenians as valiant rescuers of their Greek neighbors from mythical times on. Tragedians bring on stage mythical instances of Athenians helping desperate suppliants from other states. Orators addressing the Assembly sometimes invoke this tradition of helping others when urging their audiences to vote in favor of intervention abroad. In light of how prominently this heroic image of Athenians as noble helpers figures in public discourse, we can have little doubt that this was a central element of civic ideology. It is reasonable to ask, however, what relation this image bears to actual Athenian behavior at home and abroad and to what extent it simplifies or distorts Athenian attitudes toward helping others.

This study focuses on how helping figured in Athenians' relations with their fellow citizens, their city, and other Greek city-states rather than on the role of helping in the more intimate relationships of family members and friends. The latter subject has drawn considerable scholarly attention in recent decades in work on the Athenian family and friendship, and there is a general consensus that Athenians, like other Greeks, were under strong pressure to help their family members and friends.<sup>1</sup> When family members or friends helped one another, they acted in accord with the affectionate nature of these relationships and with the high level of reciprocity they entailed. The place of helping outside these intimate circles, however, is more problematic and controversial. I argue, contrary to much recent

<sup>1</sup> The bibliography on helping among friends and family is collected at the start of Chapter I.

scholarship, that Athenians felt little pressure as individuals to help fellow citizens whom they did not know and, consistent with this, did not feel strongly obliged as a group to help peoples of other states through collective action.

In exploring helping and its limits in an Athenian context, I propose that Athenians distinguished sharply between their obligations to help their kin and personal friends on the one hand, and their responsibilities to fellow citizens outside this intimate group on the other. Although Athenians viewed the helping of strangers as noble and laudable, for the most part, they did not see this as obligatory, and in practice they were pragmatic and cautious in extending help to fellow citizens. I argue that this is, in fact, consistent with a democratic ideology of citizenship that placed a premium on citizens leaving each other alone as free and equal persons rather than on their engaging in mutual support and that emphasized the importance of the helping relationship between citizen and city rather than among individual citizens. In addition, I seek to show that, if the obligation of Athenians to help fellow citizens was fairly tenuous, their responsibility to intervene to assist the peoples of other states was even more tenuous. Notwithstanding Athenians' attraction to an ideal image of themselves as noble helpers of other states, a distinct pragmatism prevailed in the city's decisions concerning whether and how to intervene even in support of its closest friends and allies.

In advancing these arguments, my goal is not to paint a dark picture of the Athenian character but rather to come to a more nuanced understanding of it. It is doubtful, in fact, that other Greeks were any more benevolent than Athenians toward their fellow citizens or those of other states.<sup>2</sup> The relatively large body of source material for ancient Athens, however, allows us to study helping in an Athenian context closely and to explore the interplay of ideals and realities, as well as the tensions and contradictions between these. Rather than view disjunctions between ideal and reality in these matters as evidence simply of hypocrisy on the part of Athenians, I suggest that these attest to the complexity of their attitudes toward helping and the circumstances in which it was called for and to an ongoing conflict for Athenians between generous impulses and more selfish ones. By examining how Athenians, individually and collectively, responded to this conflict in practice and how they conceptualized and represented their responses, we can come to better understand the place of

<sup>2</sup> I also do not mean to suggest that Athenians failed to live up to some modern standard of charity or altruism; the scholarship of helping behavior in modern societies (see note 5) attests to the complexity of helping and the motivations behind this in a contemporary context.

helping in the Athenian experience. If, as we shall see, Athenians tended to err on the side of caution when it came to intervening on behalf of others in the areas on which this book focuses but nonetheless thought the best of themselves as helpers of others, this is itself significant for understanding Athenians and how they came to terms with problematic aspects of their shared experience.<sup>3</sup>

Consideration of this topic is timely in light of recent scholarship that makes the case from various vantage points that Athenians were kinder and gentler at home and abroad than previously thought. Three works in particular have advanced an optimistic view of Athenian attitudes toward helping and their impact on Athenian behavior.<sup>4</sup> Rachel Sternberg in *Tragedy Offstage: Suffering and Sympathy in Ancient Athens* (2006), building on a growing body of scholarship concerning the history of emotions in antiquity, investigates helping behavior in several spheres and advances the case that Athenians were more compassionate than scholars have acknowledged. In her view, Athenians were under considerable pressure to help not only their kin and friends but also, within certain parameters, fellow citizens, with whom they enjoyed friendly relations (*philia*) (177, 180). Gabriel Herman, in *Morality and Behaviour in Democratic Athens: A Social History* (2006), goes much further than this, portraying Athens as a close-knit and harmonious community in which citizens, behaving in a manner similar to family members in other societies, acted altruistically toward one another (347–59; 375) and mutually supported each other as individuals and as households to “a remarkable degree” (389). Polly Low, in *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power* (2007), takes up the question of helping and ideals of helping in Athens’ relations with other states as part of her broader inquiry into the nature of Greek interstate relations. She observes that the ideal of “helping the wronged,” which Athenians invoke sometimes in connection with life within their city (173, cf. 25), appears prominently in the Athenian and Greek discourse of international relations (183–5). Low takes this as evidence of a norm of helping others outside as well as inside the polis (186) and suggests that this had a real impact on interstate relations (210; 254–5).

<sup>3</sup> This disjunction may also reflect a common human tendency of people to overestimate their own generosity toward others; social psychologists speak of this as a “holier than thou” effect (see Epley and Dunning 2000 and Balcetis, Dunning, and Miller 2008). On the limits of self-assessment in general, see Epley and Caruso 2004; Dunning 2005; and Alicke, Dunning, and Krueger 2005.

<sup>4</sup> Earlier general discussions of the role of helping and charity in the Greek world include Bolkestein 1939 and Hands 1968.



Although I take up and challenge these positions in detail through the course of this book, a few preliminary observations are in order here concerning the problematic nature of these claims. First, their empirical basis is in my view questionable. It is difficult to find in our sources much substantial evidence of Athenians helping fellow citizens outside their circle of family and friends; it is even more difficult to find evidence of Athenians exposing themselves to any great risk or sacrificing their collective interests to help other states. Second, the idea that Athenians were, as fellow citizens, bound to one another by friendship (Sternberg) or kinship (Herman) and therefore were under pressure to engage in mutual support is open to challenge. Where Athenian sources envision such connections among citizens, they present these as a reason for social harmony and the pursuit of common objectives, not as a basis for fraternal helping among citizens. Third, the rather limited nature of helping among fellow citizens within the city argues for caution in assessing the significance of the language of “helping others” in interstate rhetoric; if Athenians were not inclined to go out of their way to help fellow citizens, were they likely collectively to be drawn to do so for citizens of other states in peril?

The study of helping and altruism in classical Athens presents numerous challenges. An initial hindrance is that “altruism” is a vexed term in modern debates concerning human nature and behavior and is all the more so in the discussion of ancient Athens. A standard dictionary definition of “altruism” is “devotion to the welfare of others, regard for others, as a principle of action; opposed to egoism or selfishness” (*OED*, 2nd ed.); however, scholars in diverse fields continue to debate whether truly unselfish behavior is possible because, arguably, one can find regard for direct or indirect benefit to self in any action.<sup>5</sup> Given the challenges inherent in proving the existence of “pure altruism,” some scholars set themselves the more modest goal of identifying behavior that is relatively unselfish – that is, more other-oriented than selfish; indeed, one can view “behavior as running along a continuum, with pure self-interest and pure altruism as the two poles and modal or normal behavior, including quasi-altruistic acts, distributed between them” (Monroe 1996: 7).<sup>6</sup> Some scholars argue, however, that we do not need to take into account an agent’s motivations

<sup>5</sup> On this debate, see Sober and Wilson 1998: 1–13; Batson, Ahmad, and Stocks 2010; Batson 2010. For recent discussions of “prosocial” behavior in its diverse facets and the motivations behind this, see Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, and Penner 2006; Stürmer and Snyder 2009; Mikulincer and Shaver 2010.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Dover 1974: 224 and Zanker 1998: 76.

in identifying altruistic behavior because outcomes are more important than motivations.<sup>7</sup>

In light of the conflicting views of scholars working outside the field of classics concerning what constitutes altruism, it comes as no surprise that classicists diverge in their application of the term to ancient Athens. Gabriel Herman (2006: 348), for example, minimizes the importance of motivation, maintaining that any act involving self-sacrifice for others qualifies as altruistic and thus “an act may be called altruistic whether or not it is performed in the expectation of some form of reward.”<sup>8</sup> More frequently, however, classicists have taken altruism in its more common sense of selfless helping and asked whether there is evidence for this in Greek culture.<sup>9</sup> Christopher Gill (1998), for example, observes: “In Stoicism . . . there are, on the face of it, strong grounds for characterizing their thinking about other-benefiting motivation in terms of altruism, and of a sort which, like some modern forms of altruism, is directed at *anyone*, not just those specially connected with oneself” (325). Gill stresses, however, that the Stoics viewed helping others within a framework of solidarity and reciprocity (325–7; cf. 314).<sup>10</sup> David Konstan argues that we can find evidence of an ancient concept of altruism before the Stoics in the sphere of friendship, which he describes as a primarily affective relationship in which “*philoí* are presumed to act out of an altruistic desire to be of benefit to each other” (1997: 82; cf. 2010: 236). According to Konstan, Aristotle, in his view of *philia* and of friendship in particular, has “a full-fledged concept of altruism comparable to the modern ideal” even though it does not entail universal charity; Konstan posits that “it is enough for altruism that we behave unselfishly in regard to some people” (2000: 5).<sup>11</sup>

In this scholarly discussion, the problem of what constitutes altruism in the eyes of moderns makes it difficult to reach any consensus concerning

<sup>7</sup> Evolutionary biologists, for example, employ a concept of altruism that focuses on self-sacrificing behavior that benefits others: see Ridley and Dawkins 1981 and Sober and Wilson 1998: 17–54.

<sup>8</sup> In Herman’s view, therefore, wealthy Athenians who perform liturgies for the city qualify as altruists, even if they carry these out in pursuit of personal honor (347–52, 395).

<sup>9</sup> On the difficulties involved in seeking selflessness in a Greek context, see Dover 1974: 224; cf. Bolkestein 1939: 156–70; Hands 1968: 26–31.

<sup>10</sup> Gill concludes that “Greek thinking about the social norms of reciprocity and solidarity provides the primary context for understanding Greek thinking about other-benefiting motivation” (328). For an optimistic view of the place of “other-concern” in ancient ethical theories, see Annas 1993: 223–6.

<sup>11</sup> Konstan is arguing here against Gill 1998: 307; cf. Zanker 1998: 80. Altruism directed only toward certain persons might be termed “particularistic altruism,” that is, “altruism limited to particular people or groups deemed worthy because of special characteristics, such as shared ethnicity or family membership” (Monroe 1996: 7).

the presence or absence of altruism in an ancient context. There is some risk that the debate may become one over modern terminology and that this may hinder our inquiry into ancient attitudes and behaviors. This study therefore speaks more of “helping behavior” and the diverse motivations behind it than of “altruism.” This has two advantages. First, “helping behavior” is a more neutral designation than “altruism,” which carries so much scholarly baggage, and it is also a broader term: it seems reasonable to say that altruistic action represents a special subcategory of helping behavior (Dovidio and Penner 2004: 247; cf. Dovidio et al. 2006: 22–7). Second, this terminology avoids the possible anachronism that may be inherent in the application of “altruism” to an ancient context; after all, altruism is not a Greek word but a modern coinage that may reflect modern ways of thinking better than Greek ones.<sup>12</sup> To speak of “helping,” in contrast, is in keeping with the Athenian vocabulary of assistance, which focuses on the action of rendering help without implying much about the motivations behind this.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, as we shall see, Athenians appear to be less interested than moderns in the purity of motivations behind helping, and seem relatively untroubled by such action arising from a blend of selfish and noble considerations.<sup>14</sup>

On occasion, however, this study does invoke the term “altruism,” in the most common modern sense of selfless (or nearly selfless) behavior. I do so in the title of this book because the idea of selfless helping is not completely alien to Athenians. Indeed, we shall see that Athenians sometimes envision the possibility of helping that is unselfish, notably when public figures characterize their generous behavior in these terms and when Athenians speak of their extraordinary collective helping of other Greeks. Although these claims are self-aggrandizing and do not accord well with what we know about Athenian behavior, they are significant as evidence of at least an idea of what moderns might label “altruism.” In these contexts, my practice is to note the similarity of the special sort of helping behavior claimed to modern notions of altruism but not to press the connection further.

Another challenge to assessing the place of helping in classical Athens is that our ancient sources are limited and problematic. First, most of

<sup>12</sup> “Altruism,” which was coined by Auguste Comte (1798–1857), first appears in English in 1853 (*OED*, 2nd. ed.); cf. Gill 1998: 308 n. 5; Dixon 2008.

<sup>13</sup> On the Greek vocabulary of “helping,” see Bolkestein 1939: 95–102. βοηθῆω and ὠφελέω and their cognates are especially common to denote “helping” in Athenian sources, as we shall see.

<sup>14</sup> Athenians were highly attuned to the role of self-interest in individual and group decision-making; see Christ 2006: 15–44. On the readiness of Greeks to acknowledge a multiplicity of motivations behind generous action, see Dover 1974: 224–6.

the relevant source material is literary, including texts of orations that were originally delivered before popular audiences and circulated later in written form, and historical and philosophical works composed primarily for an elite reading audience. Every statement in these sources has to be evaluated in light of the constraints of genre, authorial intent and bias, and accommodation to audience expectations. Oratory provides us with our best access to popular attitudes and ideologies because orators were under pressure, in seeking to win over mass audiences in the Assembly, law courts, and at state commemorations of the war dead, to adapt their message to their audiences' political and social assumptions.<sup>15</sup> Historical and philosophical works are more idiosyncratic and frequently tell us more about the perspectives of their elite producers, many of whom are critical of the Athenian democracy, than of widely held beliefs and values.<sup>16</sup> Nonetheless, they provide an interesting and often instructive counterpoint to the stances taken by orators before mass audiences.

Second, our source material for classical Athens is largely confined to the period ca. 430–322 B.C., and even within this period, there are significant gaps in the coverage of the sources. Although this makes it difficult to write a comprehensive political history of Athens for this period, chronological gaps in the record present less of a challenge to studying Athenian values and beliefs, which do not appear to have changed dramatically in this relatively stable period for the city. While we must remain sensitive to how specific historical circumstances may shape elements of the record, it is legitimate to treat our sources for Athens from 430 to 322 synchronically as we seek out general patterns in Athenian values, attitudes, and ideologies.<sup>17</sup>

This study begins by looking closely at the evidence for helping behavior among fellow citizens in classical Athens (Chapter I). Five representative areas in which citizens might engage in helping are considered: help rendered to wounded hoplites in the field, assistance to the poor, care of the sick, bystander intervention in violent episodes, and helping in litigation. This body of material suggests that although Athenians could feel concern for others in a variety of circumstances, feelings of pity and compassion

<sup>15</sup> On the invocation and exploitation of social norms in Athenian oratory, see Dover 1974: 8–14; Ober 1989: 43–9; Christ 1998a: 6; Roisman 2005: 1–6; Hunt 2010: 7–10. The fact that orators were largely members of the elite may skew the types of benefactions that they parade before popular audiences, but they were still under pressure to take into account popular norms in presenting these.

<sup>16</sup> On ancient critics of the Athenian democracy, see Ober 1998.

<sup>17</sup> On this general methodological principle, see Dover 1974: 30; Ober 1989: 36–8; Hunter 1994: 6–7; Christ 1998a: 4–6; Roisman 2005: 1.

did not necessarily translate into action. Athenians, in fact, appear to have felt little obligation to help fellow citizens outside their circle of kin and friends. Although Athenians no doubt sometimes helped strangers who sought them out and needed only limited assistance, they were reluctant to become involved in others' problems where this might expose their persons or property to substantial risks. Consequently, individuals looked first and primarily to their own family members and friends for support in time of need. The city provided support for some needy persons, but this was fairly limited, and those without a strong personal support network might well find themselves left to their own devices.

Although this low expectation of helping among fellow citizens may seem surprising and at odds with the apparent cohesion and solidarity of Athenians as a people under the democracy, this is consistent with the place of helping in democratic citizenship (Chapter II). Public discourse in Athens has little to say concerning mutual helping among citizens. It insists that democratic citizens refrain from doing harm to each other, but it does not suggest that they are obliged to help fellow citizens in distress or hardship; it calls on citizens to get along with one another in a spirit of concord (*homonoia*) but does not expect them to go so far as to engage in mutual support. Athenian public discourse makes it clear, in fact, that the primary locus for democratic helping is in the mutual helping relationship of citizen and city. The city not only encouraged citizens but required them to assist the fatherland by carrying out their basic civic obligations, including military service and, in the case of wealthier individuals, performance of liturgies and payment of the war tax. Other citizens – frequently members of the elite – voluntarily took on the more exceptional helping roles of public speaker (*rhētōr*) in the Assembly or volunteer prosecutor in the courts. The city for its part helped its citizens by providing them with the conditions under which they could thrive as individuals, and it could also be called on to pay back its citizen helpers with reciprocal support in the form of honors or other manifestations of gratitude (*charis*); the latter is most striking in the Athenian courts where litigants vaunt their record of helping the city and call on large panels of jurors, as representatives of the city, to render them help in the form of a favorable verdict.

This helping relationship between jurors and litigants is the focus of the next part of our study (Chapter III). Litigants regularly call on jurors as members of the Athenian community to intervene and help them in their time of legal need and rescue them from the wrongs they have suffered. In so doing, they represent the courts themselves as venues in which Athenians can collectively help individuals in their distress. Litigants, drawing on the language and imagery of bystander intervention in street violence in

Athens, vividly represent their trials as crimes-in-progress to which jurors are witnesses and plead that they should not just stand by and do nothing but rather “run to their rescue” (βοηθέω) and save them with their votes. If Athenians, as individuals, were reluctant to intervene in street violence against fellow citizens, jurors through their collective verdicts in the courts could enjoy the idea that they were playing a heroic role without having to put themselves at any real risk. This popular way of representing the law courts as venues for helping among citizens tells us something important about how Athenians conceptualized the role of law courts and also how they envisioned their democratic community as one that supports and protects individuals.

Finally, this study turns to the question of helping in Athens’ relations with other Greek states (Chapter IV). Athenians frequently asserted in public discourse that a distinctive feature of their city was its readiness to come to the rescue of wronged Greeks. Yet even the Attic funeral orations, which enthusiastically advance this image of the city in the remote mythical past, find it challenging to apply this paradigmatic view of the city to more recent history and betray at times that helping others is closely linked with the city’s advancement of its own reputation and power abroad. A survey of historical writers in the classical period suggests that the Athenian history of helping other states was a checkered one in which the city exercised considerable caution and prudence even when it came to supporting close friends and allies. This picture of the city is confirmed by Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory, which invokes the Athenian ideal of helping the wronged but stops well short of suggesting that the city should sacrifice its own interests to help others; indeed, pragmatic considerations, rather than humanitarian ones, dominate Demosthenes’ arguments in favor of Athenian intervention abroad.

How we assess Athenian attitudes toward helping bears directly on our understanding of many facets of the Athenian experience: personal ethics and behavior, the responsibilities of democratic citizenship, the city’s support of individuals under the democracy, and Athenians’ collective relations with the peoples of other states. In exploring helping both as ideal and reality in an Athenian context, this book seeks to illuminate democratic Athens and the values and experience of its people. At the same time, it hopes to contribute to the study of the role of helping in other historical societies by drawing attention to helping and its representation as reflections of a culture’s social and political circumstances.

# I

## HELPING BEHAVIOR IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

An initial and fundamental question for assessing the place of helping in the Athenian experience is how much citizens actually assisted one another in time of need, distress, or crisis. To answer this, we must examine our fragmentary ancient record carefully and distinguish between often broad and vague public claims concerning acts of helping and documented instances of helping behavior; the former attest that helping might be deemed admirable by a broad public, which is not surprising in Athens or in any human society, whereas the latter provide evidence of social practices and a context for evaluating public claims and posturing concerning these. This chapter explores the extent and limits of helping behavior in Athens and argues, contrary to the claims of some recent scholarship, that this was largely confined to relatives and friends and did not extend much to fellow citizens outside this intimate circle. This has important implications for understanding not only Athenian social values and behavior but also, as we see in the next chapter, democratic citizenship and the responsibilities that went with it.

Most scholars would agree that within the family, Athenians were expected as a matter of course to provide mutual support in daily life and in times of crisis, and to do so (ideally at least) without stopping to reckon the costs and benefits of this.<sup>1</sup> It is also widely accepted that outside the family, friends were expected to help each other, in keeping with both the affectionate and reciprocal nature of their relationship.<sup>2</sup> A guiding principle of behavior for Athenians and other Greeks was “Help friends, Harm enemies,” with particular emphasis on the former: failure to help friends in need was more likely to draw social condemnation than failure

<sup>1</sup> See Dover 1974: 273–6 and Millett 1991: 127–32. On inability to help one’s own family as intolerable, see Isoc. 14.55 and Pl. *Grg.* 483b.

<sup>2</sup> See Blundell 1989: 31–3 and Konstan 1997: 56.

to seek out opportunities to hurt one's enemies.<sup>3</sup> Because friends could provide security against life's challenges, it could be said to be advantageous to have numerous friends as "treasure houses" (θησαυρούς) to draw on (Men. Mon. 810 Jaekel; cf. Dys. 805–12),<sup>4</sup> and those without friends might be viewed as likely to suffer wrong at the hands of others (Arist. Rh. 1373a5).

If Athenians were expected to help family members and friends, what responsibilities or obligations did they have to help fellow citizens who were not personal friends or even acquaintances?<sup>5</sup> This question is important because Athens was not a face-to-face society, and most Athenians were strangers to one another.<sup>6</sup> Two recent books have argued that Athenians were more compassionate and generous toward one another than has previously been acknowledged. In *Tragedy Offstage: Suffering and Sympathy in Ancient Athens* (2006), Rachel Sternberg engagingly explores helping behavior in everyday life in Athens and finds evidence for compassionate behavior in four areas: home health care, the ransoming of Athenians, intervention by bystanders in street crime, and the long-distance transport of sick and wounded soldiers. Although Sternberg acknowledges that family and friends were under the strongest obligation to engage in helping behavior toward one another, she argues that Athenians were also expected to help fellow citizens outside their immediate circle of family and friends: "Toward kin, friends, and fellow citizens, many of them probably were helpful – or tried to be – because that sort of behavior was expected" (179–80).<sup>7</sup> In advancing this thesis, Sternberg (179) rejects the darker assessment of Kenneth Dover, who observes: "In certain important

<sup>3</sup> On this general precept, see Dover 1974: 180 and Blundell 1989: 26–59 (with sources), contra Herman 2006: 94–5, 278; on the priority placed on helping friends over harming enemies, see Blundell 56–9.

<sup>4</sup> On the "value" of friends, see Blundell 1989: 32 (with additional passages).

<sup>5</sup> As we see in Chapter II, Athenians do not seem to have been very drawn to conflate the categories of personal friends and fellow citizens. In contrast, Athenians often speak of their fellow demesmen, whom they knew as neighbors and with whom they frequently had close ties, as "friends" (Whitehead 1986: 223, 226, 231–2; cf. Ober 2008: 135–6), and consistent with this could view them as potential sources of aid in time of crisis (Ar. Nu. 1322–3; Lys. 684–5; Ec. 1023–4; Lys. 27.12; cf. Ehrenberg 1962: 214–16; Osborne 1985a: 138–51; Whitehead 1986: 232–3). We should not assume, however, a high level of helping among demesmen who did not share intimate ties of *philia* (friendship) with one another, as was likely the case with most fellow demesmen – as Aristotle observes, demesmen generally share only a limited *philia* (EN 1160a18–30).

<sup>6</sup> For the position that Athens was not a face-to-face society, see E. Cohen 2000: 104–29.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Liddel (2007: 320), who includes "the duty to help others in need" among the obligations that "in an Athenian context are construed as being an important aspect of the citizen's duty to the wider community."



respects we may judge the Athenians lacking in compassion, notably in the individual's reluctance to involve himself in the . . . misfortunes of another" (1974: 201). Sternberg, however, stops short of idealizing Athenian helping behavior:

A streak of pragmatism runs throughout the material. Not surprisingly, popular morality set sensible Aristotelian limits for compassion: a person nursing the sick must guard his own health; a man should not give his neighbor too much money; a bystander to crime need not risk his life to save a stranger; retreating soldiers should help their incapacitated comrades if possible, yet keep on going. Nevertheless, Athenians embraced high standards for helping behavior. (180)

Sternberg's Athenians thus are humane and compassionate toward others even outside the circle of kin and friends, if within certain parameters. Although I agree with Sternberg that Athenians sometimes acted compassionately toward those outside their intimate circle, I believe she is mistaken in suggesting that Athenians "embraced high standards for helping behavior" toward fellow citizens whom they did not know. In my view, our sources attest to much more than just a streak of pragmatism on the part of Athenians when it comes to helping strangers; they point to a fundamental caution, reserve, and restraint and an aversion to taking significant personal risks for the benefit of others.<sup>8</sup>

If Sternberg's picture of helping behavior in Athens is a largely positive one, Gabriel Herman's image of Athens in *Morality and Behaviour in Democratic Athens: A Social History* (2006) verges on the utopian.<sup>9</sup> Herman, who draws heavily on modern social theory, argues that Athenians not only refrained to a high degree from violence against one another but actively sought to help each other, asserting that there was "a remarkable degree of mutual support between individuals and between households" (389; cf. 375).<sup>10</sup> How, in his view, can we explain this extraordinary orientation toward other-regarding behavior? Herman argues that Athenians acted altruistically toward one another in a way most commonly found in human societies among family members, and that this reflects several features of their *polis*: Athenians were residents of a small and intimate city-state, were in contact with each other through myriad social

<sup>8</sup> For further reaction to Sternberg's thesis, see Christ 2008.

<sup>9</sup> For a critical evaluation of Herman's claims, see Christ 2007b.

<sup>10</sup> According to Herman, consistent with this other-regarding behavior is the fact that Athenians zealously supported the community as hoplites and liturgists (351–2, 395). In Christ 2006, I argue that Athenians were not always such zealous hoplites and liturgists and that draft evasion and liturgy avoidance were common.

and religious gatherings, and were, as members of a highly egalitarian society, inclined to look to their similarities rather than differences (356–9). Herman, however, provides little evidence to support his assertion that Athenians engaged substantially in mutual support and overestimates their sense of obligation toward one another. A very different picture of Athens and Athenians emerges, as we shall see, from a close examination of our sources.

The following analysis sets forth the limited scope of helping behavior among fellow citizens in the following areas: 1) help rendered to wounded hoplites in the field, 2) assistance to the poor, 3) care of the sick, 4) bystander intervention in violent episodes, and 5) legal assistance. Although this is hardly an exhaustive list of the spheres in which citizens might lend help to one another, this covers a range of important areas and points to general patterns of behavior.

## HELPING FELLOW SOLDIERS

A situation in which we might expect to find evidence of helping behavior among fellow citizens is military expeditions abroad, in which hoplites depended on one another for survival on and off the battlefield. Mutual support in this context could arise from a range of relationships, old and new. Hoplites might find themselves serving side by side with kin, friends, and acquaintances from prior campaigns or military training as *ephebes*.<sup>11</sup> Those who did not already know one another might develop ties of friendship as comrades-in-arms living and working together in hostile environments often far from the city. Although solidarity among fellow soldiers presumably fostered mutual support of various sorts on campaign, we should not overestimate the willingness of hoplites to take significant risks to help others, especially those outside their circle of intimates.

Hoplites in the thick of battle may sometimes have risked injury or worse to help a comrade or kinsman,<sup>12</sup> but once a rout began and the manifest risks of attempting a rescue escalated, this was probably not common.

<sup>11</sup> Athenian hoplites served with their tribesmen, which included fellow demesmen with whom they might have prior bonds of friendship (see Whitehead 1986: 231–2 and Christ 2006: 99). Wealthy Athenians sometimes assisted fellow demesmen going on campaign by providing them with arms (Lys. 31.15–16) or financial support (Lys. 16.14). On the development of the *ephebeia* in the classical period, see Christ 2001: 416–17 (with earlier bibliography).

<sup>12</sup> See, e.g., Pl. *Alc.* 115b, where Socrates posits that “Many men in battle have gone to the rescue of a comrade or kinsman and received wounds and died” (πολλοὶ ἐν πολέμῳ βοηθήσαντες ἑταίρῳ ἢ οἰκείῳ τραύματα ἔλαβον καὶ ἀπέθανον). He immediately goes on to acknowledge, however,

It was standard behavior for hoplites, when the tide of battle turned against them, to turn and run as fast as possible from the enemy, and in such cases, the seriously wounded, if not trampled to death (cf. Thuc. 5.72.4), were regularly left to fend for themselves.<sup>13</sup> To the extent that individuals risked their lives to help a wounded fellow hoplite in these circumstances, this was probably most common in the case of intimates. Thus, for example, Plato's Alcibiades lauds his close friend Socrates for his valor in battle at Potidaea, where "no other man than he saved my life: I was wounded, and he would not abandon me, but helped me to save both my armor and myself" (οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐμὲ ἔσωσεν ἀνθρώπων ἢ οὗτος, τετρωμένον οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ συνδιέσωσε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέ).<sup>14</sup> That this sort of heroism may not have been common even among friends, however, is suggested by Alcibiades' statement that after the battle, he urged the generals to award Socrates a prize for valor (ἄριστεία), an extraordinary reward for courage in battle (*Smp.* 220d-e).<sup>15</sup> Consistent with this picture of the exceptional nature of soldiers risking their lives to rescue fellow citizens from the battlefield is the assertion of Plato's Phaedrus that an army composed of lovers (ἐρασταί) and their beloveds would be a formidable force because of their strong desire not to act shamefully before one another (*Smp.* 178e); an ἐραστής would not "abandon his beloved or fail to assist him in his danger" (ἐγκαταλιπεῖν γε τὰ παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ βοηθῆσαι κινδυνεύοντι) (179a). Individuals who lacked exceptionally brave friends or lovers probably could not count on being rescued by fellow citizens fleeing in a rout.

In the relative calm after a battle, fellow hoplites no doubt helped tend the wounded, with kin and friends attending especially to their own. Sternberg (2006: 104–45) argues that, in general, Athenians and other Greeks on military campaigns were expected to assist fellow soldiers who were wounded and help transport them to safety: "Some of the able-bodied pitied the sick and wounded and felt a strong moral obligation to

that this is not ubiquitous: "But those who did not go to the rescue, as they should have, got off safe" (οἱ δ' οὐ βοηθήσαντες, δέον, ὑγιεῖς ἀπήλθον).

<sup>13</sup> On the dynamics of battlefield routs, see Hanson 1989: 177–84; van Wees 2004: 192; Christ 2006: 103–9; Lee 2007: 243–4. On the trampling of the wounded by friend and foe, see Hanson 1989: 199–200, 214; cf. Sternberg 2006: 108.

<sup>14</sup> The rout of part of the Athenian forces at Potidaea described by Thucydides (1.62.5–6) is the likely context for this tale of Socrates' heroism (see Gomme 1945: 1.219).

<sup>15</sup> Likewise, in the Roman army the "shielding and saving" of a fellow soldier was uncommon enough to warrant special recognition and reward (Plb. 6.39.6–7). On ἄριστεία, see Pritchett 1974: 2.276–90; Hamel 1998: 64–70; van Wees 2004: 194, with 302 nn. 50 and 51; Christ 2006: 110–11.

preserve their lives and carry them home if they could” (145; cf. 117).<sup>16</sup> It is not clear, however, how strong any such obligation was and how far it extended to the care and transport of strangers. Indeed, if personal survival took precedence over the helping of wounded fellow hoplites in the course of a rout, this might also be the case after a rout when a defeated army set about moving camp. Thucydides plausibly describes the priority of concern for self in the face of defeat in his moving account of the aftermath of the battle in the Great Harbor at Syracuse.<sup>17</sup> After the Athenian fleet was defeated and the ships that had not been captured were driven to shore, the Athenians in the army on land reacted as follows:

οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς παρεβοήθουν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ τείχους ἐς φυλακὴν, ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἤδη περὶ σφᾶς αὐτοῦς καὶ ὅπη σωθήσονται διεσκόπουν.  
(7.71.6)

Some went to lend assistance to the ships, others to what was left of the wall for guarding it, while still others – and these the greatest number – were now concerned only about themselves and how they might be saved.

Consistent with this instinct for personal survival in a crisis, when the Athenians departed from their camp a few days later to retreat overland, they left the dead unburied and abandoned the wounded and the sick despite their entreaties and lamentations (7.75.3–4). It is noteworthy in Thucydides’ account that those left behind do not appeal to strangers for help but rather to their comrades (ἑταῖροι), kinsmen (οἰκεῖοι), and tent-mates (ξύσκηνοι) (75.4), who were most likely to assist them.<sup>18</sup> Thucydides describes the whole army as “filled with tears” (δάκρυσι . . . πλησθέν) (75.4) and speaks of the retreating troops reproaching themselves (75.5) as they departed, yet they nonetheless kept on moving to save themselves.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Although Sternberg seems to envision this moral obligation as extending to fellow soldiers generally (see esp. 130–43), she acknowledges that the wounded looked especially to personal attendants and comrades for help (116) and that generals were not usually held accountable for the loss of sick and wounded (115; but cf. 129).

<sup>17</sup> Although Thucydides’ account is highly rhetorical and emotional, I doubt that he distorts the basic dynamics of the retreat, including the scramble on the part of individuals to save themselves.

<sup>18</sup> Thucydides’ collocation of these three groups of persons suggests that they constitute a man’s intimates on campaign; for ἑταῖροι used of a man’s friends, see E. Or. 804–6; cf. Isoc. 8.112; Konstan 1997: 31–3; 58–9, 61; Foxhall 1998: 58–9; for σύσκηνοι as a small and intimate group of friends, see Lee 2007: 96–9, 279–80. Thucydides also emphasizes the primacy of concern for friends on campaign in speaking of the grief and fear felt “whenever a man saw one of his friends lying dead” (ὅποτε τις ἴδοι τινὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων κείμενον) (7.75.2–3).

<sup>19</sup> Sternberg (2006: 128–30) is rightly skeptical of Diodorus Siculus’ account (13.18.6) in which the Athenians bring the incapacitated with them in their retreat.

Although this episode suggests that hoplites were generally expected to support their wounded associates (Sternberg 2006: 118) – especially kin and friends, it also attests that in exigent circumstances, hoplites did not risk their own survival to fulfill this expectation. Because the circumstances of defeated forces were often dire, the abandonment of the sick and wounded was probably not uncommon in Greek armies (see, e.g., X. *HG* 6.2.26).<sup>20</sup>

We get a further glimpse of this in the *Anabasis*, in which Xenophon defends himself before his fellow Greek mercenaries for striking a muleteer in his force, whom he had ordered to convey an incapacitated soldier (5.8.8–11). According to Xenophon, when he discovered “a man was being left behind because he was unable to keep going any longer” (ἀνὴρ κατελείπετο διὰ τὸ μηκέτι δύνασθαι πορεύεσθαι), he ordered a muleteer to convey him, which he did for awhile; later, however, when Xenophon came upon the man digging a hole in which to bury his human cargo – although he was not yet dead – he struck the muleteer. Xenophon, in focusing on his own laudable behavior in assisting the disabled soldier,<sup>21</sup> refers to the soldier’s abandonment without providing details concerning this. John Lee (2007: 246–7) argues plausibly that Xenophon’s fellow soldiers, as the pressures on them mounted, abandoned the wounded with some regularity, although Xenophon prefers not to draw attention to this.<sup>22</sup> In this case, when Xenophon reports that the soldiers hearing his defense agreed that the muleteer deserved to be struck, this is most directly explained by their horror at the muleteer’s premature burial of another human being rather than outrage at his failure to convey a wounded comrade; after all, none of them had stopped to aid the injured man.<sup>23</sup> Although one could argue that Greek mercenaries on campaign were less likely than hoplites in a citizen force to assist one another, Thucydides’ description of the Athenian flight from Syracuse suggests that, under pressure, citizen armies also abandoned the wounded, even their own kin and friends.

The mutual support of citizen soldiers for one another may, in any event, constitute a special case that tells us as more about the solidarity of hoplites on campaign often far from home than of the obligation of

<sup>20</sup> Sophocles’ *Philoctetes* can be read, in part, as an exploration of the problematic status of the sick and wounded on campaign. Sophocles, who served as general in 441/0 B.C. (Androt. *FGrH* 324 F 38), likely experienced the problem firsthand.

<sup>21</sup> On Xenophon’s idealized presentation of himself here and elsewhere in the *Anabasis* as a compassionate commander, see Sternberg 2006: 139, 141–3.

<sup>22</sup> Lee (2007: 246) notes how Xenophon apparently elides the abandonment of the wounded in 3.4.32–7, where he speaks initially of the army’s struggle to convey the wounded and then of its rapid movement up the Tigris. Cf. 4.5.4, 11.

<sup>23</sup> Lee (2007: 247) proposes that the muleteer served as a useful scapegoat for the soldiers, who had themselves abandoned wounded comrades.

citizens to lend assistance to one another in everyday life in Athens.<sup>24</sup> The rest of the evidence to be considered concerns the question of helping among fellow citizens on the home front.

## AIDING THE POOR

One broad area of interest is Athenian assistance to the poor and needy. As in other spheres of helping, Athenians expected kin and friends to help each other in time of financial need or exigency, although there were practical limits as to how much a man might lean on his intimates.<sup>25</sup> A common way for friends to support one another in emergencies, which lessened the financial burden on any one individual, was to contribute, along with others, to an interest-free *eranos* loan (Millett 1991: 153–9).<sup>26</sup> What, however, were Athenian attitudes toward helping poor and needy individuals whom they did not know personally?

In Athens, as in many societies, there was some expectation of at least minimal assistance to strangers in need.<sup>27</sup> We hear, for example, of curses invoked annually by the priestly *Buzygai* on anyone who refused to provide basic assistance, including sharing fire or water or providing directions (cf. Diph. fr. 62 K-A), and Athenians, like other Greeks, were supposed to

<sup>24</sup> Bonds of solidarity formed among hoplites on campaign could carry over to the home front, but these were more likely to be manifested in friendships between individuals than in any enduring group solidarity among veterans. The hoplites serving in a particular campaign disbanded upon returning home and maintained no regimental identity (see Christ 2006: 116); the next time the city needed soldiers for a campaign, it conscripted a fresh group of individuals (see Christ 2001). Although Xenophon's Cleocritus appeals to the adherents of the Thirty to be mindful of all the things they share in common with their democratic opponents, including their service together as fellow soldiers (σοστρατιῶται) (HG 2.4.20–1), this clearly did not prevent them from treating them as enemies in the first place.

<sup>25</sup> Even among friends, asking for help could be a sensitive matter: see Arist. EN 1171b15–29. A poor man might find himself short of friends in his time of distress: see E. Med. 561; Democr. fr. 101 D-K; cf. Rosivach 1991: 192.

<sup>26</sup> As Millett (1991: 155–7) suggests, the *eranistai* providing these loans appear to have been ad hoc groupings rather than formal associations. Millett proposes that although friends were most likely to contribute toward these loans (1991: 158), Athenians viewed the provision of *eranos* loans ideally at least as a civic duty that extended more broadly to one's fellow citizens (157–8). The forensic passages that he cites in support of this (Ant. 2.2.12; Dem. 45.69–70; cf. Thphr. Char. 23.5–6), however, stop well short of articulating such an ideal. When Athenians envision their contributions to the city as an *eranos* loan (e.g., Thuc. 2.43.1–2; Ar. Lys. 648–55; Dem. 25.22; Lyc. 1.143; cf. Millett 154–5), they are idealizing their friendly reciprocal relationship with the city rather than a relationship of mutual support among fellow citizens; Chapter II explores this feature of democratic ideology in more detail.

<sup>27</sup> On Athenians' responsibilities to "neutrals," who were neither friends nor enemies (for example, foreigners visiting the city), see Blundell 1989: 48–9; cf. Bolkestein 1939: 87–8, 90–3, 128–33.

show hospitality (*xenia*) to strangers, which could entail providing food and lodging.<sup>28</sup> Although the impact of these pressures on individual behavior is not known, we have no reason to doubt that Athenians sometimes gave handouts to the needy and extended hospitality to strangers. In general, however, it does not appear that Athenians were expected to go much beyond such occasional and inexpensive acts of decency toward those whom they did not know.<sup>29</sup>

Wealthy Athenians sometimes helped poorer citizens, but our evidence suggests that they were much more likely to assist friends and neighbors than strangers and that they did not lose sight of their own interests in rendering assistance. The nature and form of this interclass assistance changed substantially as the city's political and social circumstances evolved from the archaic to the classical period, but at no time does it appear to have provided reliable security to the city's less well-off citizens.

Before the rise of democracy in Athens (508 B.C.), aristocrats likely preserved and enhanced their status and power through patronage of poorer men in their immediate locale, providing support in the form of food or money in hard times and earning in return prestige and political clout.<sup>30</sup> This aristocratic patronage appears to have survived at least initially under democratic rule to judge from anecdotes concerning the directed generosity of one of Athens' wealthiest citizens, Cimon, who was active in public life in the decades after the Persian Wars.<sup>31</sup> According to the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians*,

Κίμων ἄτε τυραννικὴν ἔχων οὐσίαν, πρῶτον μὲν τὰς κοινὰς λητουργίας ἐλητούργει λαμπρῶς, ἔπειτα τῶν δημοτῶν ἔτρεφε πολλούς. ἐξῆν γὰρ τῷ βουλομένῳ Λακιάδων, καθ' ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν ἔλθοντι παρ' αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὰ μέτρια. ἔτι δὲ τὰ χωρία πάντα ἄφρακτα ἦν, ὅπως ἐξῆν τῷ βουλομένῳ τῆς ὀπώρας ἀπολαύειν. (27.3)

Since Cimon had an estate large enough for a tyrant, in the first place he discharged the public liturgies in a brilliant manner, and furthermore he supplied maintenance to many of the members of his deme; for anyone of the Laciadae who wished could come to his house every day and have a moderate supply. In addition, all his land was unfenced, to enable anyone who wished to avail himself of the harvest.

<sup>28</sup> On the ἀραι Βουζύγιοι, see Bolkestein 1939: 69–71; Hands 1968: 46–7; Parker 1996: 286–7.

<sup>29</sup> Only Theophrastus' ἀλαζών would claim that “during the food shortage his expenses in giving to destitute citizens amounted to more than five talents – he just can't bring himself to say no” (καὶ ἐν τῇ σιτοδείᾳ δὲ ὥς πλείω ἢ πέντε τάλαντα αὐτῷ γένοιτο τὰ ἀναλώματα διδόντι τοῖς ἀπόροις τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀνανεύειν γὰρ οὐ δύνασθαι) (*Char.* 23.5).

<sup>30</sup> See Millett 1989: 18–25; Ober 1989: 55–68, 228–9; Forsdyke 2005a: 81–2, 94, 104–6.

<sup>31</sup> On Cimon's enormous wealth, see Davies 1971: 310–11.

According to Theopompus, however, Cimon's generosity was not limited to the provision of food to his demesmen but took diverse forms and extended more broadly to Athenians at large:

Κίμων ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς καὶ τοῖς κήποις οὐδένα τοῦ καρποῦ καθίστα φύλακα, ὅπως οἱ βουλόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσιόντες ὀπωρίζονται καὶ λαμβάνωσιν εἴ τινας δέοιντο τῶν ἐν τοῖς χωρίοις. ἔπειτα τὴν οἰκίαν παρεῖχε κοινὴν ἅπασιν· καὶ δειπνον αἰεὶ εὐτελὲς παρασκευάζεσθαι πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους {προσιόντας} τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰσιόντας δειπνεῖν. ἐθεράπευεν δὲ καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν αὐτοῦ τι δεομένους, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς περιήγετο μὲν ἅει νεανίσκους δὴ ἢ τρεῖς ἔχοντας κέρματα τούτοις τε διδόναι προσέταττεν, ὁπότε τις προσέλθοι αὐτοῦ δεόμενος, καὶ φασὶ μὲν αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς ταφὴν εἰσφέρειν. ποιεῖν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο πολλάκις, ὁπότε τῶν πολιτῶν τινὰ ἴδοι κακῶς ἡμφιεσμένον, κελεύειν αὐτῷ μεταμφιένυσθαι τῶν νεανίσκων τινὰ τῶν συνακολουθούντων αὐτῷ. ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἀπάντων ἡὺδοκίμει καὶ πρῶτος ἦν τῶν πολιτῶν. (*FGrH* 115 F 89)

Cimon the Athenian stationed no guard over the produce in his fields or gardens so that any citizen who wished might go in and harvest and help himself if he needed anything on the estate. Furthermore, he made his house open to all so that he regularly supplied an inexpensive meal to many men, and the poor Athenians approached him and dined. He tended also to those who day by day asked something of him, and they say that he always took around with him two or three youths who had some small change and ordered them to give some whenever someone approached and asked him. And they say that he contributed to burial expenses. Many times he also did this: whenever he saw one of the citizens ill-clothed, he would order one of the youths who accompanied him to change clothes with him. From all these things he won his reputation and was first of the citizens.

Theopompus regularly embellishes and exaggerates, and thus it seems likely that the shorter description of Cimon's behavior found in the *Constitution of the Athenians*, with its depiction of generosity on a less grand scale, is the more accurate one.<sup>32</sup>

The account in the *Constitution of the Athenians* plausibly depicts how patronage might operate on the local level. Cimon for his part supported his fellow demesmen, with whom he was likely personally acquainted and on friendly terms, especially given the small size of this deme;<sup>33</sup> in return, he presumably expected political support. Although Plutarch, who draws

<sup>32</sup> Whitehead (1986: 305–8) argues that [Aristotle] and Theopompus share a common source that presented Cimon as generous only toward his fellow demesmen, and Theopompus has embellished this account in describing him as generous to all Athenians.

<sup>33</sup> On the small size of Cimon's deme and his family's prominence within it, see Whitehead 1986: 309. On this as a natural locale for patronage, see N. Jones 2004: 73–6.



on both versions of this story (*Cim.* 10, with Whitehead 1986: 305–8), credits Cimon with extraordinary hospitality (φιλοξενία) and humanity (φιλανθρωπία), Robert Connor (1971: 20) aptly observes that “this is the politics of largess, wherein generosity to city and to citizen wins the gratitude of its beneficiaries and is converted into political support.” The self-serving dimension of Cimon’s generosity is pithily expressed by Gorgias (82 B 20 D–K), who states that “Cimon acquired money so as to use it, and used it so as to be honored” (τὸν Κίμωνα τὰ χρήματα κτᾶσθαι μὲν ὡς χρῶτο, χρῆσθαι δὲ ὡς τιμῶτο). Before the rise of democracy, this sort of aristocratic patronage was probably common, if not normally on the same scale as Cimon’s practice of it.<sup>34</sup> Susceptible as it was to the calculations and strategies of wealthy patrons, however, it is doubtful that aristocratic patronage provided reliable support to poorer citizens.

The dearth of evidence for personal patronage after the time of Cimon in the classical period, as scholars have observed, suggests that this was incompatible with the political and social ethos of democratic Athens and that Athenians were uncomfortable with this sort of manifest dependence on handouts from the wealthy. An alternative to handouts from the rich under the democracy was state support of citizens in diverse forms, including pay for a variety of civic services to a large number of citizens ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.2) and direct subsidies to war orphans and the disabled.<sup>35</sup> The needy, however, could not count on receiving state pay (jurors, for example, were selected by lottery, as were most state officeholders), and direct subsidies were restricted to the special groups noted and were very modest.<sup>36</sup> Many of those in need, therefore, probably had to rely

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Andocides’ claim (1.147) concerning his family’s tradition of generosity: “Our house is among the oldest of all, and always open to anyone in need” (οἰκία δὲ πᾶσων ἀρχαιοτάτη καὶ κοινοτάτη ἀεὶ τῷ δεομένῳ).

<sup>35</sup> On Athenian aversion to patronage under the democracy and state payments to citizens as an alternative to patronage, see Millett 1989; Arnaoutoglou 1994; Dillon 1995; but cf. Zelnick-Abramovitz 2000 and N. Jones 2004: 68–85. On state pay as a form of support, see Rosivach 2011. For payments to war orphans, see esp. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.3, with Rhodes 1981: 308 and Dillon 1995: 28–9; for those to the disabled, see Lys. 24; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 49.4; Aeschin. 1.103–4; Rhodes 1981: 570; Dillon 1995. It is no accident that these two groups received special attention from the city, given that support of both was important for maintaining citizen commitment to Athens’ military endeavors: those risking their lives for the city in war may have been reassured that their survivors would not be destitute and that they would themselves receive state support if seriously injured – many of the disabled were probably war casualties. On “subsidization” and its ideological dimensions in Athens, see Burke 2005.

<sup>36</sup> The payment to war orphans was apparently one obol per day in 403/2 B.C. (Stroud 1971: 287–8). Stroud (289–90, with 289 n. 23) takes Aeschin. 3.153–5 as evidence that “public support for war-orphans was discontinued sometime in the mid-fourth century,” but this passage only indicates that the city no longer publicly recognized in the Theater of Dionysus war orphans

primarily on the generosity of family and friends to get through difficult times.<sup>37</sup> There is no evidence that strangers regularly stepped in to fill this gap in the social safety net.<sup>38</sup>

Although aristocratic patronage of the Cimonian variety appears to have largely disappeared under the mature democracy, helping the poor – or claiming to have done so – still held some attraction for the rich. Wealthy men addressing the popular law courts or Assembly were under pressure, as they attempted to persuade mass audiences, to demonstrate their commitment to the democratic city.<sup>39</sup> Although they often sought to do this by parading their history of performing liturgies for the city and of paying the war tax (*eisphora*) to it, on occasion they also found it useful in pursuit of the public's goodwill to assert that as private citizens they had helped poorer men. The relative infrequency of these claims of private charity and the manner in which they are framed, however, suggest that this type of helping was limited.<sup>40</sup>

who had come of age. At the time of Lys. 24 (early fourth century B.C.), the payment to the disabled was only one obol per day (24.13, 26); by the time of [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.*, it was two obols a day (49.4). In contrast to these modest payments to war orphans and the disabled, jurors received three obols per day from at least 424 B.C. on (Loomis 1998: 16–17).

<sup>37</sup> The city occasionally made grain distributions to citizens, as in 445/4 B.C. (Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F 119; Plu. *Per.* 37.3–4; cf. Ar. V. 717–18; Stadter 1989: 336–9; Moreno 2007: 235–6), and Solon's first *axōn* apparently charged the archon with giving food to widows and orphans (Harp., Phot., and *Suda* s.v. σῖτος, Stroud 1968: 32; Dillon 1995: 28). On the distribution of funds to support attendance at festivals, which may date back in some form to the fifth century, see Roselli 2009.

<sup>38</sup> Although Isocrates' claim (7.83) that the destitute outnumber those who have means in the Athens of his day and in the good old days beggars did not trouble passersby is no doubt tendentious, many individuals in Athens probably fell through the social safety net. Note the situation at the opening of Aristophanes' *Wealth*, in which good men are destitute and left to their own devices to get by (28–9, 218–19; cf. 340–2); cf. Dem. 57.45, with Lape 2010: 207–8. Cf. Herodotus' description (8.51.2; cf. 8.41.1) of how poor men were left behind when the Athenians evacuated the city in 480 B.C. as the Persian forces approached (Plu. *Them.* 10.5–6 speaks of elderly persons and dogs being left behind).

<sup>39</sup> See Ober 1989.

<sup>40</sup> Claims of private charity appear in conjunction with claims of public service in the three passages discussed subsequently in the text and in the following instances: And. 1.147 (helping those in need); Lys. 12.20 (ransoming); Is. 5.42–5 (ransoming); Dem. 8.70 (ransoming and other *philanthrōpia*); 19.230 (ransoming); cf. Ant. 2.2.12; Millett 1991: 26; MacDowell 2000: 272; Sternberg 2006: 52–3. Sternberg (2006: 53) notes that “Many speakers who boast of liturgies make no mention of ransom”; in fact, the vast majority of liturgical boasts (see Hunt 2010: 279–82 for a catalogue of these) are not accompanied by claims of private charity of any kind. Claims of private charity occasionally appear independently of claims of public service: see, e.g., Lys. 16.14 and 31.15, both concerning assistance to fellow demesmen going on military campaign; cf. Lys. 31.19 (alluding to men who provided support to poor old citizens); Dem. 45.69–70 (rebuking Stephanus for failing to help those in need except through interest-bearing loans).

Consider, for example, how a client of Lysias vaunting his father’s generosity, documents his performance of liturgies and payment of the war tax (19.57–9) and then asserts:

ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ἰδίᾳ τισὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀποροῦσι συνεξέδωκε θυγατέρας καὶ ἀδελφάς, τοὺς δ’ ἐλύσατο ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων, τοῖς δ’ εἰς ταφὴν παρέιχεν ἀργύριον. καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐποίηε ἡγούμενος εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς μέλλοι εἴσεσθαι· νῦν δὲ πρέπον ἐστὶ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀκοῦσαί μου. (19.59)

And furthermore as a private citizen he helped some of the citizens who were in need by contributing to their daughters’ and sisters’ dowries, ransomed others from the enemy, and provided money to others for burial expenses. He did these things in the belief that an honorable man should help his friends even if nobody would know about it. But now it is fitting that you too should hear about it from me.<sup>41</sup>

Although the speaker initially gives the impression that his father was generous to needy fellow citizens indiscriminately (τισὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀποροῦσι), he goes on to make it clear that the needy citizens assisted were, in fact, “friends” (τοὺς φίλους).

An advocate for the banker Phormio invokes a similar view of model citizenship, as he highlights Phormio’s generosity to both the city and to poorer men. In praising Phormio’s benevolence (*philanthrōpia*), the speaker asserts that he “has voluntarily done good to many” (πολλοὺς δ’ εὖ πεποιηκώς ἐκῶν) (Dem. 36.55) and calls witnesses in support of this (this testimony does not survive in our text), and then has a list of Phormio’s services to the city read out (36.56); all of this, he concludes, shows how in so many respects Phormio “has been useful to both the city and to many of you” (χρήσιμος γεγὼνώς καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ πολλοῖς ὑμῶν) (36.57). The speaker goes on to amplify Phormio’s generosity in the latter sphere:

ὁρᾶτε γὰρ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀκούετε τῶν μαρτύρων, οἷον ἑαυτὸν τοῖς δεηθεῖσι παρέχει. καὶ τούτων οὐδὲν εἵνεκα τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος εἰς χρήματα πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ φιланθρωπία καὶ τρόπου ἐπιεικείᾳ. (36.58–9)

For you see for yourselves and you hear from the witnesses, how he shows himself to be to those in need. And not one of these acts has he done with

<sup>41</sup> Herman (2006: 351) mistranslates ἰδίᾳ in this passage as “secretly,” and therefore construes these as anonymous donations. ἰδίᾳ here means “in his capacity as private citizen,” in contrast to his public role in performing liturgies, which the speaker has just recounted (cf. Dem. 18.268). The individuals who were helped presumably knew of the assistance (Athenians, as far as I am aware, were not inclined to do good deeds anonymously) and may be among the witnesses the speaker immediately calls on (thus Rosivach 1991: 195); it is the jurors, with whom the speaker shares this information, who are assumed not to know of it yet.

a view to profiting in money, but from benevolence (*philanthrōpia*) and kindness of disposition.

Although it is possible that Phormio may have been exceptionally generous to others, his advocate's insistence that profit was far from this banker's mind is suspect, and we may reasonably wonder whether the benevolence in question took the form of loans on terms he regarded as generous to men with whom he was on friendly terms.<sup>42</sup> It is hard to imagine this highly successful entrepreneur forgoing profit altogether in his relations with others.<sup>43</sup>

If wealthy men in general could hope to win the public's goodwill by claiming to have helped poorer men, this may have been especially true for those active as public speakers (*rhētores*) in the Assembly. Consider, for example, how Demosthenes in his *On the Crown* (330 B.C.) highlights his good citizenship, first by reminding his audience of the liturgies he has performed for the city (18.267) and then by parading before them his private charity:

ἐν μὲν τοίνυν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τοιοῦτος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις εἰ μὴ πάντες ἴσθ' ὅτι κοινὸς καὶ φιλόανθρωπος καὶ τοῖς δεομένοις ἐπαρκῶν, σιωπῶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποιμι οὐδὲ παρασχοίμην περὶ τούτων οὐδεμίαν μαρτυρίαν, οὐτ' εἴ τινας ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων ἔλυσάμην, οὐτ' εἴ τισιν θυγατέρας συνεξέδωκα, οὐτε τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πῶς ὑπέληφα. ἐγὼ νομίζω τὸν μὲν εὖ παθόντα δεῖν μεμνησθαι πάντα τὸν χρόνον, τὸν δὲ ποιήσαντ' εὐθύς ἐπιλελῆσθαι, εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν χρηστοῦ, τὸν δὲ μὴ μικροψύχου ποιεῖν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου. τὸ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας εὐεργεσίας ὑπομιμνήσκειν καὶ λέγειν μικροῦ δεῖν ὁμοίον ἐστὶ τῷ ὀνειδίζειν. οὐ δὴ ποιήσω τοιοῦτον οὐδέν, οὐδὲ προαχθήσομαι, ἀλλ' ὅπως ποθ' ὑπέλημμαι περὶ τούτων, ἄρκεϊ μοι. (18.268–9)

Such has been my character in public life. In private life, if any of you are not aware that I have been accessible<sup>44</sup> and generous, and helpful to those in need, I do not mention it. I will never say a word, or tender any evidence about such matters as any captives I have ransomed, or the dowries I have helped to provide to anyone's daughters, or any such acts. It is a matter of principle with me. My view is that the recipient of a benefit ought to remember it all his life, but that the benefactor ought to put it out of his mind at once, if the one is to behave decently, and the other with

<sup>42</sup> On bankers and their clients downplaying the financial nature of their relationships and presenting them in terms of *philia*, see Christ 1998a: 180–4; cf. E. Cohen 1992: 62–6.

<sup>43</sup> If there is any truth to the claims in Dem. 36 concerning Phormio's benevolence, this may reflect his efforts, as a former slave who had been granted Athenian citizenship, to maintain public goodwill toward him and thus does not attest to typical behavior on the part of wealthy Athenians; cf. how the metic Lysias (12.20–1) makes much of his ransoming of Athenians.

<sup>44</sup> For this translation of κοινός, see Millett 1991: 118; cf. de Romilly 1979: 49 n. 1.

magnanimity. To remind a man of the good turns in private you have done to him and to speak of these is very much like a reproach. Nothing shall induce me to do anything of the sort; but whatever my reputation may be in that respect, I am content.

Although Demosthenes is clearly seeking to project an image of himself as a generous and indiscriminating benefactor of those in need, an examination of the two vague claims he advances in this *praeteritio* concerning his helping of others suggests that the charity in question was more limited than he acknowledges.

Demosthenes' first claim, that he ransomed captives, gives the impression that he may have ransomed men on more than one occasion (cf. Dem. 8.70), but he may well be referring to a single episode of ransoming that he details in his earlier speech *On the False Embassy* (343 B.C.),<sup>45</sup> and one in which his generosity may have been limited. In this speech, Demosthenes describes how, while serving on an Athenian embassy to Philip's court, he "saved" (19.166, 171–2) some of the Athenian prisoners whom Philip was holding in Pella.<sup>46</sup> Demosthenes asserts that when he found some of these men out on bail, he agreed to lend them money to win their release but later forgave their debt when Philip released all the Athenian prisoners for free (169–70).<sup>47</sup> As Vincent Rosivach (1991: 194) notes, Demosthenes may have felt he had little choice but to forgive the debt because the men in question may have been reluctant to repay him once Philip had released the other prisoners without ransom. In this case, circumstances forced Demosthenes to be more generous than he had planned to be.<sup>48</sup> A further limitation to Demosthenes' benefaction is that, although he casts the Athenians whom he assisted as "poor men" (170) and "citizens in distress" (171–2; cf. 230), they may in fact have been wealthy Athenians with whom he was on friendly terms (171–2; cf. 40).<sup>49</sup> That they were wealthy is suggested by the fact that they had the resources to get out on

<sup>45</sup> On the likelihood of this, see Wankel 1976.2.1170–1; Rosivach 1991: 194; Yunis 2001: 260.

<sup>46</sup> At 19.230, Demosthenes casts himself in this context as a rescuer who could not stand by and look on (περιορῶν) while a fellow citizen was in distress. Litigants frequently apply this same imagery to jurors when they call on them to intervene and save them from their legal misfortunes; see Chapter III.

<sup>47</sup> On the sequence of events in this episode, see MacDowell 2000: 272.

<sup>48</sup> One may wonder if Demosthenes is inadvertently revealing his own surprise at the outcome when he repeatedly asserts that he spent "his own money" on the ransoming (166, 170, 171, 230).

<sup>49</sup> Demosthenes' vagueness about the number of individuals he helped would be consistent with the hypothesis that he had assisted a small group of friends. We do not have to believe Aeschines (2.100) that Demosthenes only ransomed one person, but the number of prisoners he helped may well have been very small (cf. MacDowell 2000: 272). Demosthenes does not hesitate to

bail, and if they were friends of Demosthenes, this would help explain why he was willing to return to Athens to fetch money to help release them. In this case, Demosthenes' assistance would be part of the normal extension of help to friends rather than evidence of the helping of strangers as he implies.<sup>50</sup>

Demosthenes' second claim, that he was generous in providing dowries, resembles his first claim in that it gives the impression that he extends this sort of help generously and indiscriminately, but there are clues that his helping was of a more limited nature. First, Demosthenes is vague concerning the identity of the men whose daughters he assisted in this way, and we have reason to suspect that he is alluding to help given not to the daughters of strangers but to those of relatives and perhaps friends; as Demosthenes indicates elsewhere (27.69), even to extend this kind of assistance beyond the daughters of relatives to those of friends would be noteworthy.<sup>51</sup> Second, Demosthenes may not have provided this assistance entirely on his own but rather in collaboration with others (cf. συνεξέδωκα);<sup>52</sup> indeed, he may be referring to an *eranos* loan (cf. Aeschin. 2.41), to which a number of men contributed, rather than to an outright gift of money.<sup>53</sup>

Taken together, this evidence of wealthy men, including politicians, sometimes making public claims of private charity attests to the fact that they thought they had something to gain through this in the eyes of mass audiences, and this suggests that generosity on the part of the rich toward the poor was viewed positively by Athenians.<sup>54</sup> It is important to appreciate, however, that these claims of assistance to private citizens are, as noted

speak of rich men as poor when this suits him: note his mischaracterization of less well-off liturgists as "poor men" at 18.108–9.

<sup>50</sup> As noted earlier in the text, the ransoming mentioned in Lys. 19.59 was on behalf of friends; in a barb at Is. 5.43, it may also be assumed that ransoming would be a service to friends (it is listed under the heading of expenditures on the city or friends). The primary burden of ransoming individuals likely fell on family members, as Sternberg (2006: 74) argues.

<sup>51</sup> On relatives and friends helping out in this way, see Millett 1991: 62–3.

<sup>52</sup> This may also be the context for the use of συνεξέδωκε in Lys. 19.59 (quoted above in the text). In each case, συν- could refer to joint support of a poor man by several individuals rather than help from a single person as LSJ<sup>9</sup> s.v. συνεκδίδωμι I.2 apparently assumes.

<sup>53</sup> As Millett (1991: 63) observes, "Although the sources give the impression that much of this assistance took the form of outright gifts, loans are not to be ruled out."

<sup>54</sup> Generosity on the part of the rich may have been encouraged in Athens and elsewhere in Greece through ritual practice, for example, when groups of young men visited the houses of the rich and sang songs that demanded food and drink from them: see especially Theognis FGrH 526 F 1 = PMG 848 = Ath. 8.360, with Forsdyke 2005b: 79, who gathers earlier bibliography (I am grateful to Sara Forsdyke for this reference). One may wonder, however, how far such occasional rituals affected the day-to-day behavior of the wealthy.

earlier, relatively infrequent in the orators in comparison with the ubiquitous claims by wealthy men that they have helped the city through the performance of liturgies and payment of the war tax; one may infer from this that it might be useful for a wealthy man to be able to make claims of private charity, but this was not nearly as important as his being able to cite benefactions to the city.<sup>55</sup> When we look closely at these claims, moreover, significant doubts arise concerning the nature and scope of the generosity in question. To the extent that wealthy men helped less fortunate men, this may have most commonly taken the form of loans rather than outright gifts, and even this limited form of help may have been confined largely to their intimates.

## NURSING THE SICK

As Sternberg (2006: 21–41) argues, family members were expected to assist sick relatives and apparently did so regularly, and this expectation could extend to friends of the sick. In these and other circumstances involving kin and friends, although the benefactor might well expect reciprocity should a need arise at some future date, he or she may well have lent assistance primarily out of a sense of decency and affection. This sort of mutual support among family members and close friends, however, is unremarkable in human societies (cf. Herman 2006: 348). More interesting for our purposes is the question of whether Athenians went out of their way to help sick strangers.

Although the record is largely silent concerning this, Thucydides' famous account of the plague of 430 B.C. suggests that the Athenians who risked their lives to nurse the sick were those with close bonds to them:

δεινότατον δὲ παντὸς ἦν τοῦ κακοῦ ἢ τε ἀθυμία ὁπότε τις αἰσθοίτο κάμνων (πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀνέλπιστον εὐθὺς τραπόμενοι τῇ γνώμῃ πολλῶν μᾶλλον προΐεντο σφῶς αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐκ ἀντεῖχον), καὶ ὅτι ἕτερος ἀφ' ἑτέρου θεραπαίας ἀναπτιμπλάμενοι ὥσπερ τὰ πρόβατα ἔθνησκον· καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον φθόρον τοῦτο ἐνεποίει. εἴτε γὰρ μὴ θέλοιεν δεδιότες ἀλλήλοις προσιέναι, ἀπώλλυντο ἐρῆμοι, καὶ οἰκίαι πολλαὶ ἐκενώθησαν ἀπορίᾳ τοῦ θεραπεύσοντος· εἴτε προσίοιεν, διεφθείροντο, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀρετῆς τι μεταποιοῦμενοι· αἰσχύνῃ γὰρ ἡφείδουν σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐσιόντες παρὰ τοὺς φίλους, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰς ὀλοφύρσεις τῶν ἀπογιγνομένων τελευτῶντες καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι ἐξέκαμνον ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ κακοῦ νικώμενοι. (2.51.4–5)

<sup>55</sup> On claims on the part of the wealthy to have helped the city, see further in Chapter II.

And the most dreadful thing about the whole malady was not only the despondency of the victims, when they once became aware that they were sick, for their minds straightway yielded to despair and they gave themselves up for lost instead of resisting, but also the fact that they became infected by nursing one another and died like sheep. And this caused the heaviest mortality; for if, on the one hand, they were restrained by fear from visiting one another, the sick perished uncared for, so that many houses were left empty through lack of anyone to do the nursing; or if, on the other hand, they visited the sick, they perished, especially those who made any pretensions to goodness. For these made it a point of honor to visit their friends without sparing themselves at a time when the very relatives, overwhelmed by the magnitude of the calamity, were growing weary even of lamenting the dying.

Only relatives and friends figure in this account of attending to the sick; Thucydides indicates that the infectiousness of the disease deterred many friends from attempting visitation of the sick, and thus “many houses were left empty through lack of anyone to do the nursing.”<sup>56</sup>

It is noteworthy too that Thucydides (2.52.2) makes no mention of passersby lending assistance to dying strangers when he describes how “Bodies of dying men lay one upon another, and half-dead people rolled about in the streets and, in their longing for water, near all the fountains” (ἀλλὰ καὶ νεκροὶ ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοις ἀποθνήσκοντες ἐκείντο καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλινδοῦντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἀπάσας ἡμιθνήτες τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιθυμία).<sup>57</sup> No one sought to ensure that dead strangers receive proper burial (2.52.3), and family members disposed of their relatives’ corpses in any way that they could (2.52.4).

Although plague provides an extreme test case of helping behavior in Athens because it was risky to help the sick and dying, it also confirms

<sup>56</sup> It would be a mistake to infer from Thuc. 2.51.4–5, as Herman (2006: 349) does, that “Most of the people who died of the plague that struck Athens in 430 caught it . . . by nursing the sick.” When Thucydides states, “And this (τοῦτο) caused the heaviest mortality,” he is likely referring to the entire previous clause (“the fact that they became infected by nursing one another and died like sheep”); he goes on to explain (γάρ) in the next sentence that this lethal infectiousness deterred some altogether from lending help to sick households, which led to death for the infected, and in the case of those friends who did come to visit, led to their infection and death. Although Thucydides does indicate that nursing of the sick led to numerous deaths (“they died like sheep”), he does not offer any information on the relative numbers of those who died from nursing the sick and those who died because no one stepped forward to nurse them. Cf. his vagueness at 2.51.2: “Some died from lack of care; others died though cared for much” (ἐθνήσκον δὲ οἱ μὲν ἀμελείᾳ, οἱ δὲ καὶ πάνυ θεραπευόμενοι).

<sup>57</sup> This episode casts doubt on Herman’s claim (2006: 47) that “When Attica’s inhabitants were forced to move inside the city walls during the Spartan invasions the sense of community must have become even stronger, while any differences blurred into insignificance.”



the bottom line of Athenian assumptions about helping behavior: in a crisis, only family and friends can truly be relied on for assistance, and under duress, even they may fall short. So too, as we noted earlier, in the crisis of military defeat wounded soldiers knew it was their intimates, if anyone, who might help them to safety, and they could not always rely on these.

## BYSTANDER INTERVENTION

That helping behavior among citizens who did not know one another was limited in Athens is well illustrated by the reluctance of bystanders to intervene physically in violent episodes that they witnessed. Virginia Hunter speaks of “the importance and prevalence of bystanders who, faced with altercations or violence, did not hesitate to take sides, offer advice, or even join in the fray” (1994: 138); she argues that “passersby felt obligated to intervene and did so voluntarily, perhaps in the knowledge that they might expect the same help in a similar situation” (139; cf. Spatharas 2008: 178–9).<sup>58</sup> Although Sternberg argues that the most common role of bystanders was to act as witnesses who might be called on later to testify in the event of litigation (2006: 97–100; cf. Lintott 1982: 21; Christ 1998a: 124),<sup>59</sup> she believes there was substantial pressure on them to intervene as long as this did not endanger their lives: “although bystanders were encouraged to intervene, and might well behave heroically, they were not on the whole expected to risk their lives for strangers” (102). In concluding her study, Sternberg embraces Hunter’s optimistic view of bystanders as concerned upholders of communal values: “In the context of street life in Athens, a sense of shared citizenship and shared humanity proves important, and these are all facets of *philia*” (177).<sup>60</sup>

A close examination of the evidence – most of which comes from forensic oratory – suggests, however, that both Hunter and Sternberg overestimate the pressures on Athenians to help fellow citizens in

<sup>58</sup> Christ (1998a: 257 n. 18) challenges Hunter on the grounds that “Evidence of physical assistance is scarce.”

<sup>59</sup> The most common role of bystanders may indeed have been to serve as witnesses at trial, but it is difficult to know how frequently they did so because litigants may have cast witnesses as chance bystanders when they were actually acquaintances or friends (see Humphreys 1985: 330–3; Fisher 1998: 88). On the challenges involved in getting reluctant witnesses to appear in court, see Harrison 1971: 2.138–45; Todd 1993: 96–7; Sternberg 2006: 81.

<sup>60</sup> Fisher (1998: 88) is more cautious: “the ideal . . . of the honest citizen prepared to intervene to defend the obvious victim of unjust violence did affect social practice to some extent. It cannot easily be assessed, however, how far it produced calming action in the streets, and assisted prosecutions and judgments later” (cf. *ibid.* 1999: 67–8).

distress.<sup>61</sup> Although we do not have a large body of information about bystander intervention in Athens, what we do have suggests that Athenians tended to keep their distance from violent episodes involving strangers, and if they chose to intervene physically, they tended to do so in situations in which the risk was small.<sup>62</sup> Indeed, there is little, if any, documentation of heroic intervention, and considerable evidence of wariness concerning getting involved in others' business. In cases where bystander intervention is said to have occurred, moreover, this is presented as if it is a possible course of action, but not as obligatory or motivated by "shared citizenship" or *philia*. Let us consider first accounts in which bystanders keep a safe distance from violence, and then those that assert or imply that bystanders intervened physically to help a victim.

Forensic oratory provides a number of instances in which bystanders are represented as staying aloof from violent episodes or at most engaging verbally with assailants. These episodes are of interest because they provide not only evidence of Athenian cautiousness but also clues as to why Athenians may often have refrained from getting involved in others' problems.

*Lysias, Against Teisis, fr. 279 Carey (before ca. 380 B.C.)*

The speaker, an advocate (*sunēgoros*) for the plaintiff Archippus (fr. 278 Carey), narrates how Teisis, who had quarreled with Archippus, pretended to be reconciled with him and lured him into his house one night on the pretext of joining in a party. Teisis and others proceeded to tie Archippus to a pillar, and Teisis whipped him repeatedly and then confined him in a room; when morning came, Teisis bid his slaves to tie Archippus once more to the pillar and to whip him. Although neighbors may have heard the noisy whippings of Archippus, no one came to intervene (cf. Aeschin. 1.58–9, discussed later in the chapter).<sup>63</sup> Neighbors may have been deterred from

<sup>61</sup> Sternberg's discussion (2006: 76–103) of bystander intervention in Athens is the most comprehensive to date. See especially her useful Table 3 (77), which collects evidence from oratory and historiography, although some of this refers to episodes outside of Athens.

<sup>62</sup> Studies of bystander intervention in modern America have found that many factors can affect the willingness of bystanders to intervene on behalf of others, for example, the degree of risk involved; the gender, age, and race of the victim; and the presence or absence of others who might lend assistance (Dovidio and Penner 2004; cf. Dovidio et al. 2006: 65–105). Sternberg (2006: 82–8; cf. 101–3) provides a good survey of some of the factors that may have affected bystander response in Athens, including "time, place, the composition of the crowd, and the perception of the event" (83).

<sup>63</sup> The speaker goes on to relate (fr. 279.5–6 Carey) how Teisis summoned a friend Antimachus and claimed that Archippus had drunkenly intruded into his home; Antimachus then summoned

becoming involved because the abuse took place behind closed doors in a private home; they may also have dismissed the noise as arising from the drunken fisticuffs of a wealthy neighbor.<sup>64</sup>

### *Demosthenes 47: Against Euergus and Mnesibulus*

*(after 356 B.C.)*

a. §§34–40: The unnamed plaintiff in this suit recounts how he approached Theophemus at his home to collect overdue trierarchic equipment. When Theophemus refused to return the equipment, the speaker had his slave call from the street “any citizens who might be passing by” (τινας . . . τῶν πολιτῶν παριόντας, 36) as witnesses. The individuals who appeared did not intervene in any way when the speaker, who began to enter Theophemus’ house to seize goods as security, was struck by Theophemus and then responded in kind (38; cf. 41). The witnesses, who apparently did not know either man, may have sympathized with the homeowner for defending his personal space, even though the collector claimed to be acting on the authority of the Council.<sup>65</sup> Prudent Athenians may also have known better than to intervene actively for one side or another when witnessing the exercise of legal self-help, which was common in Athens; the legality of its exercise was open to dispute at the time and after the fact in the courts.<sup>66</sup>

b. §§52–61: After Theophemus won a judgment against the speaker for assault, he and two of his relatives came to the speaker’s property while he was absent and entered his house to seize property in payment of the judgment. When his neighbors’ slaves witnessed the “pillaging” of the house (τὴν οἰκίαν προθουμένην τὴν ἐμήν), they called on passersby to come (60).

Among the passersby was a certain Hagnophilus, who watched the episode from the safe remove of Anthemion’s land, which adjoined that of

witnesses in whose presence he interviewed Archippus, who presented his version of events; upon the urging of the witnesses, who viewed what had happened as “outrageous” (δαινά), Archippus was released to his brothers, who carried him to a market to show his wounds to passersby – the speaker alleges that they were outraged.

<sup>64</sup> As Todd (2000: 348) observes, all the involved parties appear to be well-off.

<sup>65</sup> On Athenian sensitivity to incursions into the home as evident in this speech and elsewhere, see Christ 1998b. This may have helped Theophemus win a verdict against the speaker for assault (Dem. 47.45–8), although the latter attributes this to his rival’s false witnesses.

<sup>66</sup> As Sternberg (2006: 98) notes, it must have sometimes been difficult for bystanders to distinguish between legitimate acts of legal self-help and criminal behavior. On legal self-help in Athens, see Hunter 1994 and Christ 1998b.

the speaker (the slave of Anthemion, who was witness to the proceedings, had hailed him). The speaker claims that Hagnophilus did not enter the house because he thought it wrong to do so when its master was absent (60), but it looks as though Hagnophilus, who could have stepped onto the property and approached the doorway to register concern without intruding into the speaker's house, simply chose to maintain a safe distance from the proceedings.<sup>67</sup>

A neighbor, Hermogenes, however, when he saw the distrainers about to lead away the speaker's son because they had mistaken him for a slave, met up with them and informed them who the boy was and thus prevented the illegal seizure of a free person (61). Hermogenes' intervention, which was strictly verbal and not aggressive, involved little or no risk to him, and in fact may have been appreciated by the distrainers who otherwise might have inadvertently committed an actionable offense (cf. [Dem.] 53.16). Although Hermogenes was clearly acquainted with the speaker and his family and Hagnophilus may also have been, the speaker does not refer to them as friends; the clear caution of the latter and the limited intervention of the former, suggests that because they were not intimates of the speaker, they did not feel compelled to put themselves at any great risk for his family or property.<sup>68</sup> Another reason for caution on the part of the bystanders here, as in the case of those who witnessed the speaker's confrontation with Theophemus earlier, was the difficulty of evaluating the legitimacy of the legal self-help being exercised.

### *Aeschines 1: Against Timarchus (345 B.C.)*

a. §§58–9: Timarchus and his lover Hegesandrus, tired of being bothered by Timarchus' previous lover Pittalacus – who was apparently a freedman<sup>69</sup> – got drunk and, joined by others, burst into Pittalacus' home and gambling establishment, smashed his gaming equipment and threw it into the street, killed his gaming birds, and “then tied Pittalacus himself to a pillar and gave him an inhuman whipping for such a long time that even the neighbors heard the outcry” (τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον δήσαντες πρὸς τὸν

<sup>67</sup> The speaker seeks to give Hagnophilus an honorable reason for staying aloof from what he describes as rapacious pillaging and to contrast Hagnophilus' respect for the speaker's home with the audacity of the distrainers, who entered it in his absence.

<sup>68</sup> Sternberg (2006: 85) goes too far in stating, “The immediate neighborhood . . . springs to the defense of the threatened household.”

<sup>69</sup> Although Aeschines characterizes Pittalacus as a public slave (1.54), scholars have reasonably believed him to be a freedman because he had the legal status to bring a lawsuit (1.62) (see Fisher 2001: 190–1).

κίονα αὐτὸν τὸν Πιττάλακον ἐμαστίγουν τὰς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πληγὰς οὕτω πολλὸν χρόνον ὥστε καὶ τοὺς γείτονας αἰσθέσθαι τῆς κραυγῆς). Although the neighbors may have heard not only the cries of Pittalacus as he was beaten but also the considerable noise earlier from the gaming equipment being tossed into the street and the distressed birds, apparently no one came to Pittalacus' rescue. This may be a special case, however, as neighbors may have generally steered clear of the raucous environment of Pittalacus' gaming house and not been inclined anyway to intervene on behalf of a former slave.

b. §60: When Pittalacus in anger over his beating went on the next day to sit as suppliant at the altar of the Mother of the Gods, a crowd quickly gathered, and Pittalacus' assaulters, fearing that their behavior would become known to all (a meeting of the Assembly was imminent), persuaded him to leave the altar with promises of recompense. The crowd gathered at the spectacle ("as typically happens" [οἷον εἶωθε γίγνεσθαι], Aeschines notes; cf. Lys. fr. 279.6 Carey), but apparently only observed the situation; no mention is made of intervention, verbal or other. The crowd's presence, however, induces Pittalacus' assailants to feign reconciliation with him.

### *Demosthenes 54: Against Conon (355 or 341 B.C.?)*

a. §§3–6: A young man, Ariston, recounts how when he and Conon's sons were on garrison duty together, the latter got drunk and abused the slaves of Ariston and his messmates; he and his comrades went and reported this to the general, who rebuked Conon's sons.<sup>70</sup> The same evening, however, they burst into Ariston's tent, abused him verbally and beat him, and

καὶ τοσαύτην κραυγὴν καὶ θόρυβον περὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ἐποίησαν ὥστε καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν καὶ τοὺς ταξιάρχους ἐλθεῖν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στρατιωτῶν τινάς, οἵπερ ἐκώλυσαν μὴδὲν ἡμᾶς ἀνήκεστον παθεῖν μὴδ' αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι παροινουμένους ὑπὸ τουτωνί. (5)

they made such a clamor and din about the tent, that both the general and the taxiarchs came, and some of the other soldiers, and prevented us from suffering, or ourselves doing, some damage that could not be repaired, being victims as we were of their drunken violence.

The intervention of the general in both instances, which was apparently only verbal (cf. Sternberg 2006: 99), is clearly *ex officio*, and not indicative

<sup>70</sup> On the problem of dating this speech, see Carey and Reid 1985: 69.

of the willingness of Athenian bystanders to intervene.<sup>71</sup> In the second instance, “some of the other soldiers” are said to have been drawn by the noise, but no claim is made that they actively intervened.

b. §§7–9: In the sequel to this episode, Ariston claims that he was assaulted by Conon and others back in the city. Ariston and his friend Phanostratus were walking innocently one night in the Agora, when one of Conon’s sons, Ctesias, came upon them drunk and yelled something unintelligible; he then fetched his father and numerous cronies from a drinking party nearby. When they came upon Ariston and Phanostratus, one of them pinned Phanostratus, while Conon, Ctesias, and a comrade stripped Ariston of his cloak and beat him up; then Conon crowed like a cock over him and flapped his elbows like wings. Ariston states: “After this I was carried home, stripped as I was, by some people who had chanced along, while these men took off, having taken my cloak with them” (καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ’ ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπεκομίσθην ὑπὸ τῶν παρατυχόντων γυμνός, οὗτοι δ’ ὥχοντο θοῖμάτιον λαβόντες μου) (9). Although these passersby clearly lent assistance to Ariston after his assault, it is not clear at this point in the speech whether they were witnesses to the assault itself.<sup>72</sup> Later, however, this is precisely what Ariston claims, when he scoffs at Conon for believing that the jury would believe the witness testimony of his cronies,

τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς οὐ λογιούμενους, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν οὐδέποτ’ ἂν οὔθ’ ὁ Λυσίστρατος οὔθ’ ὁ Πασέας οὔθ’ ὁ Νικήρατος οὔθ’ ὁ Διόδωρος, οἱ διαρρήδην μεμαρτυρήκασιν ὁρᾶν ὑπὸ Κόνωνος τυπτόμενον ἐμὲ καὶ θοῖμάτιον ἐκδυόμενον καὶ τᾷλλ’ ὅσ’ ἔπασχον ὑβριζόμενον, ἀγνώτες ὄντες κάπτο ταῦτομάτου παραγενόμενοι τῷ πράγματι τὰ ψευδῆ μαρτυρεῖν ἠθέλησαν, εἰ μὴ ταῦθ’ ἑώρων πεπονθότα. (32)

and would have no regard for the truth of the matter that, to begin with, Lysistratus, Paseas, Niceratus, and Diodorus, who have expressly testified that they saw me being beaten by Conon, being stripped of my cloak, and suffering outrage in all the other forms I experienced – men, remember, who were unacquainted with me and who happened by chance on the affair – that these men, I say, would never have consented to give testimony that they would have known to be false, if they had not seen what I suffered.

Although Carey and Reid (1985: 70–2) doubt the veracity of the speaker’s paraphrase here of his earlier deposition (9), which does not survive in our text, and argue that the passersby only appeared after the

<sup>71</sup> Sternberg (2006: 77) includes this episode in her table of evidence for bystander intervention, but the military context and official role of the general and taxiarchs make it a special case.

<sup>72</sup> Carey and Reid (1985: 71) note that ὥχοντο is ambiguous: it could have a pluperfect sense, in which case the assailants left before the passersby appeared, but it could also be aoristic or even imperfective, in which case the passersby were present at the assault.

assault,<sup>73</sup> it is plausible that Ariston's information is accurate and its postponement simply reflects his rhetorical strategies.<sup>74</sup>

If this analysis is correct, we have an instance of bystanders not intervening during an assault but providing help after the fact. That the bystanders behaved in this way is not surprising. Whereas conveying Ariston to his home after the assault carried no risk for them, intervening during the assault would have been hazardous because there were numerous assailants.<sup>75</sup> The bystanders, moreover, acted prudently in staying aloof from the violence they witnessed because they did not know its context and specifically whether the participants had a history of violent relations of which this was just one more episode.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, in this case, there was a history of enmity between the parties that dated back to the episode in the camp, and Ariston, notwithstanding his version of events, may have provoked Ctesias when they encountered one another in the Agora (Carey and Reid 1985: 72–3). Another reason for the bystanders in this situation to keep their distance was that intervention might have drawn the reproach that they were meddling in others' business; Theophrastus' "overzealous man" (ὁ περίεργος) "tries to stop fights even between those whom he does not know" (καὶ διείργειν τοὺς μαχομένους, καὶ οὓς οὐ γινώσκει) (*Char.* 13.5; cf. Fisher 1998: 88). That the bystanders' behavior under these circumstances was in keeping with Athenian norms is suggested by the fact that Ariston does not complain about their inaction or seek to explain it away (cf. Sternberg 2006: 103).

Although litigants sometimes insinuate or directly claim that bystanders intervened physically on behalf of a victim, these representations do not add up to compelling evidence of Athenian readiness to intervene substantially on behalf of strangers. Questions arise in these instances, as we shall

<sup>73</sup> Carey and Reid (1985: 71) take the perfect participle πεπονθότα in §32 (which they translate as "in this condition") as evidence that the passersby appeared only after the assault, but the three present participles that precede this (τυπτόμενον, ἐκδύόμενον, ὑβρίζόμενον) make it clear that Ariston is claiming the passersby were present during the assault. Carey and Reid also suggest that Conon would not have been so foolish as to beat up Ariston in the presence of witnesses, but it should be remembered that Conon had been drinking and that fear of witnesses did not stop his drunken sons from beating up Ariston at camp (54.3–7).

<sup>74</sup> It makes sense for Ariston to elaborate at §32, rather than in §9, on the presence of the passersby as witnesses to the assault itself because this is relevant to his attack here on the credibility of Conon's cronies as witnesses.

<sup>75</sup> Although there were four bystanders (32), there were four assailants (8), and many (πολλοί τινες) of their drinking buddies were also present (7).

<sup>76</sup> On recurring violence among enemies in Athens, see D. Cohen 1995: 119–42. Cf. Sternberg (2006: 98), who observes of the bystanders in Dem. 54, "how could bystanders . . . have known for sure whether to interpret what they saw as a crime in progress or as mere horseplay?"

see, concerning the nature of the assistance actually rendered, the level of risk this entailed for the supposed interveners, and the motivations that may have led them to become involved.

[*Demosthenes*] 53: Against Nicostratus (*after* 368 B.C.)

Apollodorus claims that Nicostratus' brother Arethusius, when facing a lawsuit from Apollodorus,<sup>77</sup>

τηρήσας με ἀνιόντα ἐκ Πειραιῶς ὅψὲ περὶ τὰς λιθοτομίας παίει τε πύξ καὶ ἄρπάζει μέσον καὶ ἐώθει με εἰς τὰς λιθοτομίας, εἰ μὴ τινες προσιόντες, βοῶντός μου ἀκούσαντες, παρεγένοντο καὶ ἐβοήθησαν. (17)

lay in wait for me near the stone quarries as I was coming back late from the Piraeus, and struck me with his fist, and seizing me around the waist was on the point of pushing me into the quarries, had not some people approaching heard me shouting, and come and helped.

It is noteworthy that Apollodorus does not explicitly claim that the bystanders physically intervened, only that they came and “helped.” βοηθέω, the verb he uses, need not entail physical assistance; for example, litigants use the same verb in appealing to jurors to help them against their opponents with a favorable judgment.<sup>78</sup> Apollodorus may be choosing his words carefully here, for the mere presence of witnesses (cf. παρεγένοντο) or words of disapproval from them deterred Arethusius from persisting in his assault.<sup>79</sup> If, however, Apollodorus means to imply that there was physical intervention, the circumstances would have made this low risk for the putative helpers: there were at least two passersby (Apollodorus refers to his helpers vaguely in the plural), who could intervene and restrain the solitary assailant with little danger to themselves.<sup>80</sup> The fact that no others

<sup>77</sup> For doubts concerning the reliability of Apollodorus' account of his relations with Nicostratus and Arethusius, see Jordan 2003.

<sup>78</sup> On βοηθέω, which literally means “run to a shout,” and its use by litigants, see Chapter III.

<sup>79</sup> For the presence of witnesses inhibiting assailants, see Ant. 2.3.2; Dem. 54.5; Sternberg 2006: 99. When Apollodorus calls witnesses “of all these things” (τούτων . . . πάντων) at §18, these may include the witnesses of the vandalism of his garden (16) and of his prosecution of Arethusius for false citation (17–18), but not necessarily the unnamed strangers who saved him from being thrown into the quarries.

<sup>80</sup> Sternberg (2006: 58, 84) is mistaken in believing that there were two assailants, Nicostratus and Arethusius. Only Arethusius, whom Apollodorus was indicting for false citation (cf. 15 and 17–18), was involved in the assault; A. T. Murray, *Demosthenes VI: Private Orations* (Cambridge, MA, 1939), wrongly inserts the name of Nicostratus in his English translation of §17. It should be noted, in addition, that the single assailant apparently was brandishing no weapon (he was simply using physical force to push Apollodorus into the quarry); Athenians



were present to step forward to help in this isolated locale and the gravity of the assault may also have encouraged these passersby to lend a hand.<sup>81</sup>

### *Lysias 3: Against Simon (after 394 B.C.)*

The speaker, who is being prosecuted by Simon before the Council of the Areopagus for wounding with premeditation, makes several colorful claims concerning bystander intervention against his violent opponent and his cronies. The fact that the events in question occurred four years earlier (19–20, 39) gives him plenty of freedom to embellish if not invent. Because optimistic readings of bystander intervention in Athens rely heavily on the claims made by this speaker, his account deserves especially close scrutiny.<sup>82</sup>

a. §§6–7: The speaker describes how Simon, who was his rival for the love of a boy, Theodotus,<sup>83</sup> invaded his home:

πυθόμενος γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μειράκιον ἦν παρ' ἐμοί, ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν ἐμὴν νύκτωρ μεθύων, ἐκκόψας τὰς θύρας εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὴν γυναικωνίτιν, ἔνδον οὐσῶν τῆς τε ἀδελφῆς τῆς ἐμῆς καὶ τῶν ἀδελφιδῶν, αἱ οὕτω κοσμίως βεβιώκασιν ὥστε καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ὀρώμεναι αἰσχύνεσθαι. οὗτος τοίνυν εἰς τοῦτο ἦλθεν ὕβρεως ὥστ' οὐ πρότερον ἠθέλησεν ἀπελθεῖν, πρὶν αὐτὸν ἡγούμενοι δεινὰ ποιεῖν οἱ παραγενόμενοι καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐλθόντες, ἐπὶ παῖδας κόρας καὶ ὀρφανὰς εἰσιόντα, ἐξήλασαν βίᾳ. (6–7)

Hearing that the boy was at my house, he came there at night in a drunken state, broke down the doors and entered the women's rooms; within were my sister and my nieces, whose lives have been so well-ordered that they are ashamed to be seen even by their kinsmen. This man, then, carried insolence to such a pitch that he was not willing to go away until the people who appeared on the spot and those who had accompanied him, considering it an awful thing that he should intrude on young girls and orphans, drove him out by force.

The speaker's assertion that the unnamed bystanders and the men who had come with his drunken rival (presumably his drinking buddies, who had

normally moved around their city unarmed (Thuc. 1.6.3; cf. Herman 2006: 207–12). This is not, therefore, a “high-risk intervention,” as Sternberg (99–100) labels it.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Dovidio and Penner 2004: 249: “when a bystander believes that other people are also witnessing the event and that these other people can help, *diffusion of responsibility* may occur” (emphasis in original).

<sup>82</sup> In my view, Sternberg (2006: 88; cf. 90), who states “In *Against Simon*, bystanders enthusiastically intervene,” is not sufficiently skeptical of the speaker's account.

<sup>83</sup> Theodotus' legal status is not clear: see Todd 2007: 277–81 for a discussion of the evidence (he inclines toward the view that Theodotus is a free noncitizen; 281).

willingly joined him) formed a spontaneous union and collaborated in driving him away by force is highly suspect, and the speaker does not call any witnesses to support his account.<sup>84</sup> It seems more plausible that a crowd gathered and expressed displeasure at his behavior or simply told Simon that the speaker was dining elsewhere (cf. 7), at which point his drinking buddies led Simon off with them to continue the search for the speaker and Theodotus.<sup>85</sup> If, however, we accept this as evidence of physical intervention by bystanders, this would appear to be low-risk intervention, with the bystanders (perhaps neighbors) forcing Simon to leave and his companions not resisting them; the bystanders, in fact, may have been emboldened to act when they observed that Simon's companions were uneasy about his behavior.<sup>86</sup>

b. §§15–16. The speaker describes how on another occasion Simon, who was once again drunk, and his inebriated companions, tried to drag off Theodotus (12–13) and gave chase when he fled down the street:

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ μὲν μεираκίον εἰς γναφεῖον κατέφυγεν, οὗτοι δὲ συνεισπεσόντες ἦγον αὐτὸν βίᾳ, βοῶντα καὶ κεκραγότα καὶ μαρτυρόμενον. συνδραμόντων δὲ ἀνθρώπων πολλῶν καὶ ἀγανακτούντων τῷ πράγματι καὶ δεινὰ φασκόντων εἶναι τὰ γιγνόμενα, τῶν μὲν λεγομένων οὐδὲν ἐφρόντιζον, Μόλωνα δὲ τὸν γναφέα καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἐπαμύνειν ἐπιχειροῦντας συνέκοψαν. (15–16)

After this the boy took refuge in a fuller's shop; but these men burst in after him and began to drag him away by force, while he shouted and cried out and called for witnesses. Many people came running up, and were angry at their action, which they declared an awful proceeding:<sup>87</sup> these men gave no heed to anything that was said, but beat up Molon the fuller and some others who were trying to defend the boy.

When the speaker says that Molon and others were trying to “defend” (ἐπαμύνειν) Theodotus, he probably means to suggest that they provided

<sup>84</sup> Note too the formulaic aspect of the speaker's inflammatory characterization of the alleged home invasion, with its violation of female modesty: cf. Lys. fr. 279.5 Carey; Dem. 21.78–9; 37.45; 47.53–6; Christ 1998b: 525 n. 18.

<sup>85</sup> At least one crony of Simon was present at the fight that took place later outside the house where the speaker was dining (8). Cf. §12, where Simon's drunken comrades are said to have joined him in another violent episode.

<sup>86</sup> Todd (2007: 314–15) wonders if the “bystanders” may actually have been the speaker's slaves; in this case, we do not have concerned neighbors intervening but rather members of the household defending against intruders. Davidson (2007: 447–9) raises additional doubts about the veracity of the speaker's account of his ongoing struggle with Simon over Theodotus.

<sup>87</sup> The speaker also claims in §7 that the onlookers on that occasion viewed Simon's actions as δεινὰ; cf. §§17 and 19.

physical assistance,<sup>88</sup> whether by simply shielding the boy from his pursuers or more actively confronting them; this might have provoked the drunken invaders and led to their beating of the boy's helpers. If this is what transpired, however, we should not assume this is a simple case of humane intervention on behalf of a wronged stranger. Molon, in particular, may have reacted aggressively to Simon and company, indignant on his own behalf at the incursion (cf. συνεισπεσόντες) into his shop, which may also have been his home.<sup>89</sup> It is also possible that Molon and the boy's other helpers were ready to take some risk on his behalf either because they knew him from the neighborhood<sup>90</sup> or because, although a stranger, he was young, attractive, and vulnerable – they may not have been so ready to defend the middle-aged speaker, had he sought refuge there.

c. § 18: The speaker goes on to relate how his rival and cronies removed Theodotus from the shop and led him down the street, where the speaker met up with them and pulled the boy away from them:

μάχης δὲ γενομένης, ὡς βουλή, καὶ τοῦ μειρακίου βάλλοντος αὐτοὺς καὶ περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀμυνομένου καὶ τούτων ἡμᾶς βαλλόντων, ἔτι δὲ τυπτόντων αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς μέθης καὶ ἐμοῦ ἀμυνομένου, καὶ τῶν παραγενομένων ὡς ἀδικουμένοις ἡμῖν ἀπάντων ἐπικουρούντων, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ θορύβῳ συντριβόμεθα τὰς κεφαλὰς ἅπαντες. (18)

A battle ensued, members of the Council; the boy was pelting them and defending his person, while they were pelting us; they also, in their drunkenness, were beating him, and I was defending myself, and the others present were all supporting us as the wronged parties; and in this brawl we all of us got our heads broken.

In his efforts to portray the episode in which Simon was allegedly injured by him as a violent *mêlée* in which many participated (cf. Carey 1989: 100–1), the speaker casts it in martial terms as a “battle” in which bystanders unanimously supported him as allies. We may reasonably wonder, however, about the actual nature of involvement of bystanders. Indeed, the speaker himself is vague about their specific role: although he attributes

<sup>88</sup> Cf. the speaker's use of ἀμύνομαι twice in § 18 of physical self-defense.

<sup>89</sup> On the manly obligation to defend personal space from intruders, see Christ 1998b: 522–5; the “others” who were allegedly beaten up with Molon may have been kin or friends supporting him in defending his home. Carey (1989: 100; cf. Todd 2007: 321) suggests that the speaker names Molon because he was called as a witness in the case.

<sup>90</sup> Although Carey (1989: 100; cf. Todd 2007: 321–2) believes Theodotus was simply seeking “a crowded place which would provide either protection or witnesses to his treatment,” he may have visited Molon's shop before as it was only four stades (27) from the house where he was “spending time” (11).

physical action of various sorts to the other participants, his bystanders provide support of an uncertain sort (ἐπικουρούντων) (cf. 33). When he concludes that “in this brawl we all of us got our heads broken,” this may apply in fact only to the speaker, Simon, and Theodotus; he makes no specific mention of injury to bystanders here or later (37).

This survey suggests a reticence on the part of Athenian bystanders to intervene substantially on behalf of strangers. In some cases, we see Athenians maintaining distance from violence, by either apparently ignoring it completely (Lys. fr. 279 Carey; Aeschin. 1.58–9) or simply observing it (Dem. 47.34–40, 60). In other cases, observation leads only to fairly mild verbal intervention (Dem. 47.61) or (perhaps) to more assertive verbal engagement to discourage an aggressor (Lys. 3.6–7; cf. Dem. 54.3–6)<sup>91</sup> or to assistance of the worsted party after an assault when there was no longer risk of harm to the helper (Dem. 54.7–9). Solid evidence of physical intervention by bystanders to help a stranger during violence is hard to come by. Molon’s intervention for Theodotus, who had fled into his shop (Lys. 3.15–16), may have stemmed from his anger at the violent intrusion into his personal space as much as from concern over the boy. Although bystanders may have become involved in the street brawl described in Lys. 3.18 and have intervened physically to save Apollodorus from Arethysius ([Dem.] 53.17), the vague references to “assistance” in these episodes need not be taken as claims that physical assistance was rendered. If, however, we accept these two episodes as instances of physical involvement on the part of bystanders, in Lys. 3.18 bystanders may have entered in the drunken brawl without knowing what it was about and without any intention of helping anyone,<sup>92</sup> and in [Dem.] 53.17, physical intervention would have been low risk because the putative rescuers outnumbered the single assailant. Although our evidence is limited, it suggests that Athenians exercised a high level of caution and prudence when they came across aggressive and violent behavior. It may, therefore, be no accident that tales of reckless heroism to rescue a stranger do not appear in forensic oratory; heroic intervention might, in fact, have been quite uncommon, and litigants accordingly hesitated to make claims concerning this because jurors would suspect they were taking liberties with the truth.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>91</sup> Although one can imagine verbal intervention putting a bystander at some risk of violence, none of the attested scenarios represent this as the case.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Sternberg 2006: 90: “in such confusion, it seems unlikely that most who joined in the fight even knew what it was about.”

<sup>93</sup> It would appear that in Plato’s view, only strict regulation could alter this situation: in the *Laws*, he proposes legislation for his utopian Magnesia that requires bystanders to lend help

Although the wariness of Athenians concerning helping in these contexts is not shocking by modern urban standards,<sup>94</sup> this does not jibe well with the notion that Athenians were effectively bound to one another as members of the wide Athenian family and inclined to lend mutual support where needed out of *philia*.<sup>95</sup> This caution on the part of Athenians is probably due to several factors. First, Athenians were not inclined to risk harm on behalf of strangers; their obligation to help family and friends in such circumstances did not extend much to those outside this circle. Second, when Athenians came across strangers in difficulties, it must often have been hard for them to ascertain the rights and wrongs of the situation and to know whether intervention was warranted – quite apart from the risks this might entail for them. Although this can also be the case for modern bystanders, this may have been especially true for Athenian bystanders. For example, an individual carrying away another man's property in Athens might be engaged in a legitimate act of distraining, or he could be acting illegally (Dem. 47.52–61; cf. 47.34–40); as noted earlier, the exercise of legal self-help was common in Athens, and prudent onlookers, who did not have a context for evaluating it, may often have kept their distance from it. Furthermore, a stranger getting the worst of it in a street fight in Athens might be a hapless victim of thugs or, as noted earlier, a party to a long-standing feud of which this was just another episode (Lys. 3, Dem. 54); in the former case, intervention might be viewed as laudable<sup>96</sup> but in the latter case as meddling in others' affairs (Thphr. *Char.* 13.5, quoted earlier).<sup>97</sup> If Athenians were not inclined in the first place to take risks for strangers and it was often difficult to

to victims of assault and imposes fines on those who fail to do so (88ob–882a; cf. Saunders 1991: 277–8; Sternberg 2006: 79). This high level of responsibility of citizens for one another is consistent with the fraternity Plato seeks to foster in his ideal state in the *Republic* (cf. Cic. *Off.* 1.7.23). On Plato's view of ideal citizen relations, see Chapter II.

<sup>94</sup> Dovidio and Penner (2004: 248) observe that “in studies conducted in several different countries (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan) people in urban environments tend to be less helpful than residents in rural settings.”

<sup>95</sup> Contra Sternberg 2006: 177, quoted earlier in the text. It is worth noting that no claims concerning bystander intervention explicitly cast this in terms of *philia*.

<sup>96</sup> Although Fisher (1999: 60–8, esp. 68; cf. Spatharas 2008: 179) is fairly optimistic about the willingness of Athenians to join in the arrest of common criminals (κακοῦργοι), including thieves and muggers (i.e., “clothes-snatchers” [λωποδύται]), we do not have testimony concerning bystander involvement in such episodes as far as I am aware (cf. Fisher 67). On the legal procedures available against κακοῦργοι, see Hansen 1976.

<sup>97</sup> When violent episodes took place behind closed doors as in Aeschin. 1.58–9 and Lys. fr. 279 Carey (cf. Dem. 47.60), passersby and neighbors may have been especially reluctant to intervene, as this might appear to be both meddlesome and an unwarranted intrusion into another man's home.

assess whether help was warranted in a particular situation, this could explain the dearth of evidence in our sources for intervention on behalf of strangers.

## HELPING IN LITIGATION

If Athenians were unlikely to intervene in a fray that they happened upon in the streets at any great risk to themselves, they were also unlikely to enter a legal fray on behalf of a fellow citizen recklessly. Indeed, even a man's relatives and friends, who were expected to support him in some capacity in litigation, appear to have exercised some care to avoid over-exposing themselves.<sup>98</sup> Risk aversion is probably the primary reason why Athenians appear to have shunned the high-risk role of volunteer prosecutor against those alleged to have harmed weak third parties, and for the relative popularity of serving in the limited capacity of supporting speaker (*sunēgoros*) at trial, which carried no great risk.

### *Volunteer Prosecution*

Any Athenian who wished, ὁ βουλόμενος, could bring a public action for a variety of offenses.<sup>99</sup> Interestingly, this was a possibility not only for direct harm to the city, for example, by a general or other officeholder, but also for wrongs against individuals that were felt to threaten the public at large – for example, acts of gross insolence (*hubris*) or mistreatment of orphans. Indeed, the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* includes among the three most democratic features of Solon's constitution “the permission granted to anybody who wished to take vengeance on behalf of wronged persons” (τὸ ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τιμωρ[εῖ]ν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικουμένων) (9.1).<sup>100</sup> Plutarch, writing much later (late first/early second century A.D.) expands on this tradition:

ἔτι μέντοι μᾶλλον οἰόμενος δεῖν ἐπαρκεῖν τῇ τῶν πολλῶν ἀσθενείᾳ, παντὶ λαβεῖν δίκην ὑπὲρ τοῦ κακῶς πεπονθότος ἔδωκε. καὶ γὰρ καὶ πληγέντος ἐτέρου καὶ βιασθέντος ἢ βλαβέντος, ἐξῆν τῷ δυναμένῳ καὶ βουλομένῳ γράφεσθαι τὸν ἀδικοῦντα καὶ διώκειν, ὁρθῶς ἐθίζοντος τοῦ νομοθέτου τοὺς πολίτας ὥσπερ

<sup>98</sup> On the expectation that relatives and friends should lend assistance in some form to litigants, see Blundell 1989: 50–1 and Rubinstein 2000: 158–63.

<sup>99</sup> I draw on and update Christ 1998a: 119–30 in this section.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Thuc. 2.37.3; Dem. 22.25–30; 24.212–14. Although volunteer prosecution may well date back in some form to Solon (see Rhodes 2006: 255–6 and Gagarin 2006: 263–4), it seems unlikely that it was introduced with any real democratic intention (see Christ 1998a: 120–2; but cf. Gagarin 2006: 274).

ἐνὸς μέρη <σώματος> συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ συναλγεῖν ἀλλήλοις. (*Sol.* 18.5–6 = fr. 40b Ruschenbusch)

Solon, thinking it necessary to provide further protection for the weakness of the multitude, allowed every citizen to take legal action on behalf of one who had suffered wrong. If a man was assaulted and suffered violence or injury, it was permitted to anyone who was able and willing to indict the wrongdoer and prosecute him. The lawgiver in this way rightly accustomed the citizens, as if members of one body, to feel and sympathize with one another's wrongs.

Plutarch, however, may overestimate the impact of the institution of volunteer prosecution on citizen sympathy in Athens.

Athenians had recourse to volunteer prosecution routinely to pursue offenders against the city itself, but there is little evidence that they used this with any regularity on behalf of downtrodden individuals, whether friends or strangers. Although such prosecutions may have taken place with greater frequency than the sources suggest and just have not survived as the subjects of extant orations, in this case, one would expect litigants in other suits at least to allude to prosecutions of this sort – for example, to take credit for conducting them; the fact that they do not suggests they may indeed have been uncommon. To be sure, prosecutors sometimes claim that their opponents have treated the weak ruthlessly, but they do so while pursuing public suits on other grounds against them, alleging a wrong to the city (*Lys.* 31.18–19; *Dem.* 25.38; cf. 58.2) or to themselves (*Dem.* 21.83–101).

That Athenians felt no obligation to pursue third-party prosecutions on behalf of strangers is suggested by Demosthenes' speech in his public prosecution of Meidias for striking him in the face while he was serving as the sponsor of a public chorus (χορηγός).<sup>101</sup> In the course of his prosecution, Demosthenes describes at length how Meidias through a false suit brought about the disfranchisement of Strato, “a poor man” (ἄνθρωπος πένης μὲν τις) (21.83) who had decided in favor of Demosthenes rather than Meidias when arbitrating a dispute between them (21.83–101). To a modern observer, it may seem curious that Demosthenes did nothing to help Strato in his dire circumstances, especially given his willingness to pursue on his own behalf a public suit for a mere slap in the face. Demosthenes, however, feels no need to explain to his Athenian audience why

<sup>101</sup> On the debate over whether Demosthenes pursued the case to trial, see MacDowell 1990: 23–8.

he did not intervene on behalf of Strato through a third-party suit (for example, a public action for *hubris*: cf. 21.83) or for that matter why he did not support him in any way at all.<sup>102</sup> Demosthenes is unapologetic about his failure to render assistance presumably because he was under no obligation to help this average citizen who was caught in the crossfire between feuding rich men.<sup>103</sup> Consistent with this is Demosthenes' argument later in his speech that average Athenians have a vested interest in supporting men like Demosthenes who have the means to prosecute on their own behalf dangerous, powerful men like Meidias because this is the only way they will be brought to justice (21.123–4; cf. 141).

The most obvious explanation for the dearth of third-party prosecutions is that potential volunteers were deterred by the financial and personal risk of undertaking these: such suits normally entailed risk for the prosecutor because he had to pay a 1,000-drachma fine and incurred partial disfranchisement if he dropped his suit or won less than one-fifth of a jury's votes.<sup>104</sup> A further deterrent, however, may have been that prosecutors feared they would be perceived as meddling in others' business if they should take so active a role as advocate of another's cause. Even volunteer prosecutors of suits on behalf of the city are conscious that they may be accused of being meddlesome (Lyc. 1.3; cf. Ar. *Pl.* 913–15; Christ 1998a: 150–3), and this in a situation in which the city, an inanimate entity, could not bring suit on its own behalf.<sup>105</sup> All the more so then might the potential prosecutor on behalf of an individual fear he would appear meddlesome because arguably the victim could bring an action of some sort on his own behalf. This may help explain why, even in the case of *eisangeliai* on behalf of orphans, which did not carry the financial or personal risks for prosecutors that other public actions did

<sup>102</sup> Although Demosthenes may have had no opportunity to assist Strato when Meidias successfully prosecuted him before the body of arbitrators because he allegedly did this surreptitiously and without Strato present (21.86–7, with MacDowell 1990: 310–11), he could have supported Strato later when he appealed his condemnation to a jury (21.91, with MacDowell 314).

<sup>103</sup> In speaking of Strato's vulnerability to Meidias, Demosthenes (21.96) speaks of his lack of friends (*ἐρημιά*) (for this translation of *ἐρημιά*, see MacDowell 1990: 320, citing 21.80 as a parallel); it apparently does not occur to Demosthenes that he could have stepped in to fill this gap.

<sup>104</sup> See Christ 1998a: 29; but cf. Wallace (2006) on the question of penalties for withdrawing *graphai*. A wealthy individual could avoid these risks by paying a “straw man” to be the named prosecutor in a public action: see Rubinstein 2000: 201–4.

<sup>105</sup> Meddlesomeness was associated with *sykophancy* (Ar. *Pl.* 913–15), that is, gross abuse of the legal process; on the social construct of *sykophancy* and the *sykophant*, see Christ 1998a: 48–71.



([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 56.6), few parties stepped forward to embrace the cause of orphans; it was apparently much more common for orphans, upon coming of age, to bring their own private suits alleging abuses against their guardians.<sup>106</sup>

## Sunēgoroi

Consistent with this picture of Athenians being reluctant to put themselves at any great risk in others' legal affairs is the relative frequency with which they seem to have undertaken to provide low-risk assistance at trial as supporting speakers (*sunēgoroi*). *Sunēgoroi* could not be prosecuted, as witnesses could be, for making false claims (Rubinstein 2000: 71), and when participating in public prosecutions they were not subject to the personal and financial risks of unsuccessful prosecution, which were borne solely by the individual whose name appeared on the indictment (ibid.: 110–11).<sup>107</sup> It appears that kin and friends frequently supported litigants in private actions in this limited capacity and that politically active individuals often provided synegorial support in public actions to defendants with whom they did not have close personal ties (ibid.: 131, 163). In the latter case, an individual could justify his legal involvement as the benevolent action of a good democrat. Consider, for example, how Hyperides protests against his opponent's criticism of the help he is providing as *sunēgoros* for a defendant, Euxenippus, who is facing an *eisangelia*:

Καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδὲ βοηθεῖν οὐδένα φησ δεῖν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ συναγορεύειν, ἀλλὰ παρακελεύη τοῖς δικασταῖς μὴ θέλειν ἀκούειν τῶν ἀναβαινόντων. καίτοι τί τοῦ<του> τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βέλτιον ἢ δ[ημο]τικώτερόν ἐστι, πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων καλῶν ὄντων, ἢ ὁπόταν τις ιδιώτης εἰς ἀγῶνα καὶ κίνδυνον καταστὰς μὴ δύνηται ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, τούτῳ τὸν βουλόμενον τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξεῖναι ἀναβάντα βοηθῆσαι καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ πράγματος τὰ δίκαια διδᾶσαι; (*Eux.* 11; cf. *Lys.* 10)

<sup>106</sup> Osborne (1985b: 57) catalogues two cases of the *eisangelia* for orphans (Is. 11; Dem. 58.30–4), but numerous instances of the *dikē epitropēs* brought by orphans against guardians (Is. 7.6, 10, 13; Lys. 32, Dem. 27/28, Dem. 38.1, POxy 27. 2464); Lys. fr. XXXVII Carey should be added to the latter list (see Rubinstein 2000: 67). Rubinstein (67–8) notes that orphans bringing the *dikē epitropēs* often received synegorial support. On the apparent failure of public actions to protect orphans, see Osborne 1985b: 49; Christ 1998a: 127–30; cf. Humphreys 1993: 5.

<sup>107</sup> Although *sunēgoroi* could face prosecution if they accepted payment for their services ([Dem.] 46.26), no evidence for such a prosecution survives (Rubinstein 2000: 52–3, 71, with 71 n. 140).

You further claim that no one should even help him or be his advocate, and exhort the jurors to refuse to listen to speakers who come forward. And yet, of the many good practices in our city, what is better or more democratic than this – that, whenever a private person is facing the danger of a trial and cannot conduct his own defense, any citizen who wishes is allowed to come forward to help him and give the jury a fair statement of the case?

Because this was a high-profile and politically charged case stemming from a dispute over the distribution of land among the Athenian tribes and political heavy hitters appeared on both sides (see Whitehead 2000: 157–9), one may doubt that this is in fact a simple case of an experienced speaker stepping forward benevolently to help a wronged citizen as Hyperides claims (cf. *Eux.* 28).<sup>108</sup> In general, we should not assume that individuals lending synegorial support to those outside their intimate circles did so simply out of a sense of indignation at the harm being done to a fellow citizen. In fact, defense *sunēgoroi* in public actions supporting individuals who are not their friends or relatives regularly come under attack from their opponents for lending assistance for a variety of self-serving motivations: the desire to profit from a fee paid to them, a personal interest in the crimes of the defendant not being punished, or the wish simply to display personal power (Rubinstein 2000: 163–8). Although such claims from bitter rivals must be taken with a grain of salt, these frequent attacks on the motivations of men providing assistance to those outside their intimate circle may reflect a common Athenian skepticism that an individual would lend synegorial assistance simply to help a fellow citizen. Indeed, because defense *sunēgoroi* in public actions typically were politically active persons, it is plausible that they served in this capacity primarily when it suited their own political ends.

Although Lene Rubinstein (2000: 230–1) has argued that weak defendants could seek synegorial support from their tribes, there is no evidence of tribes supporting average citizens in this way. Two of the three pieces of evidence attesting to the practice involve tribal support of socially or politically prominent individuals (And. 1.150; Hyp. *Eux.* 12);<sup>109</sup> the remaining piece of evidence (Dem. 23.206) speaks of the negative impact of tribal support in the context of lamenting the excesses of current-day politicians (204–10, esp. 208–9). We should not assume, therefore, that tribes were

<sup>108</sup> On the exploitation of the ideology of volunteer prosecution in the quoted passage, see Christ 1998a: 127.

<sup>109</sup> And. 1.150 concerns support of Andocides, Hyp. *Eux.* 12 of Polyeuctus.

supportive of the weak and indigent, who did not have the power and connections to induce a tribe to provide *sunēgoroi*.<sup>110</sup>

A fairly consistent pattern emerges from our survey of helping behavior in diverse spheres: Athenians show little proclivity toward helping those outside their kin and circle of friends in substantial ways. On military campaigns, routed hoplites routinely left the wounded behind on the battlefield as they sought to save their own lives, and defeated forces moving camp did not linger much over the seriously wounded; kin and friends might lend support in these situations, but the exigencies of battle and its aftermath could make this too risky even for them. On the home front, care of the sick likewise fell on a man's intimates, and there seems to have been no expectation that kindly strangers would get involved; in the extreme case of plague, even kin and friends might keep their distance from those infected. Athenian assistance to the poor was largely limited to support from family and friends, and although wealthy Athenians sometimes invoked their charity to strangers as a public virtue, these claims are relatively infrequent and may misrepresent support of friends and acquaintances as assistance to strangers. Heroic intervention on behalf of strangers facing violence registers barely, if at all, in our record, and intervention in others' legal contests was confined to low-risk support by a man's intimates in private suits and by politicians in public suits where they might stand to benefit personally from becoming involved. In brief, although Athenians may at times have helped those outside of family and friends, this does not appear to have been as common as some scholars have thought, and any help rendered may have been modest.

If helping behavior among Athenians was largely limited to family and friends, how can this be explained? This orientation was, it appears, deeply embedded in Athenian social values and social relationships. Helping family and friends was a natural outcome of the affectionate nature of these relationships and the high expectations of reciprocity that they entailed – when an Athenian helped his kin and friends, he could reasonably expect that he would be helped in turn by them should the need arise. To help mere acquaintances or strangers substantially, where there was no affectionate bond or likelihood of reciprocation, was not attractive to Athenians (cf. Hands 1968: 30–1). Especially when helping of strangers entailed significant risks, caution and prudence were likely to

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Christ 2002. For general skepticism concerning the solidarity of the phyle as an association, see N. Jones 1999: 169–72.

prevail and preservation of one's own interests to take priority over concern for others.<sup>111</sup> In this environment where social values emphasized one's obligations to intimates rather than strangers, intervention on behalf of strangers could be seen not only as foolhardy but meddlesome and suspect (Thphr. *Char.* 13.5); observers might wonder what kind of man would seek to become involved in matters that do not concern him or his intimates.

Although the idea that Athenians were not regularly involved in extending help to their fellow citizens outside family and friends may clash with some modern assumptions about the nature of Athenian solidarity under the democracy, this is, in fact, consistent with Athenian understandings of democratic citizenship, as we shall see in the next chapter. One can imagine a state, as Plato did, in which citizens share a familial bond and look out for one another as if intimates, but this is not how Athenians viewed themselves and their relationship with fellow citizens. The fundamental democratic ideals of freedom and equality carried with them the expectation not so much that citizens lend one another mutual support but that they respect their free and equal peers and leave them alone, free of harassment and harm. Democratic culture and ideology, in keeping with this, encouraged mutual helping between citizen and city more than between fellow citizens. This distinction, we will see, is fundamental to understanding helping behavior in the democratic city.

<sup>111</sup> Athenians, like other Greeks, were not inclined to endanger their own self-interests to help others. As Dover aptly observes (1974: 81), "No Greek doubted . . . that an individual is very apt to give precedence to his own interest over the interests of others."

# II

## HELPING AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

Democritus of Abdera, writing in the late fifth century B.C., imagines an ideal society in which citizens mutually support one another and live in harmony as friends:

ὅταν οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσι καὶ προτελεῖν τολμέωσι καὶ ὑπουργεῖν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐν τούτῳ ἤδη καὶ τὸ οἰκτῖρειν ἔνεστι καὶ μὴ ἐρήμους εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐταίρους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἀμύνειν ἀλλήλοισι καὶ τοὺς πολίτητας ὁμονόους εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ, ἅσσα οὐδεὶς ἂν δύναίτο καταλέξει. (fr. 255 D–K)

Whenever the powerful have the courage to lend to the indigent, and help them, and benefit them, herein at last is pity, and an end to being isolated, and the emergence of friendship, and helping one another, and concord among the citizens; and other good things such as no man could enumerate.

This chapter argues that, although some elite critics of the Athenian democracy embraced such a vision of society, Athenian public discourse offers a distinctly different view of the nature of concord (*homonoia*) under the democracy and of the relations among citizens that this requires.<sup>1</sup> Rather than call on citizens to become friends of one another and to engage in the mutual support that was integral to friendship, Athenian civic ideology lays emphasis on citizens respecting one another as free and equal individuals by leaving others alone and refraining from doing them harm. The ideal of mutual support, in fact, is most salient in public discourse in connection not with interpersonal relations among citizens but rather with the reciprocal helping relationship between citizen and city.

In advancing this view of democratic citizenship, I am challenging the work of scholars who have argued that Athenians viewed themselves as

<sup>1</sup> On the translation of *homonoia* as “concord,” cf. Whitehead 1990: 27 n. 80: “The concept of *homonoia* means literally ‘being of one mind’; possible alternative translations would therefore be concord (the traditional rendering, via Latin), harmony, or even solidarity.”

members of an extended family and, consistent with this, felt obliged to engage in mutual support. Nicole Loraux, for example, pointing to Athenian claims in funeral orations and elsewhere to be autochthonous offspring of Attica and sharers of a common fatherland and motherland, infers that Athenians conceive of themselves as “brothers,” who proverbially were helpers of one another.<sup>2</sup> This inference is in my view mistaken. First, although it is true that Athenians sometimes invoke a common kinship, they do so primarily to mark out their collective identity and unity as a group in contrast to other Greeks and non-Greeks, not to assert an intimate interconnection among individual citizens that bears with it an expectation of a high level of mutual support.<sup>3</sup> Second, although it is genealogically logical to suppose, as Loraux does, that Athenians, as “children of Athens” are brothers of one another, Athenian public discourse, which provides our best evidence of popular ideology, does not to the best of my knowledge make this link.<sup>4</sup> As we shall see, critics of the democracy like Plato posit that brotherhood and fraternal helping among citizens are essential for a polis to thrive, but Athenians do not seem to have embraced this view of citizen relations.<sup>5</sup>

More recently, Gabriel Herman has argued that Athens was a close-knit society in which mutual support was widespread. As noted in Chapter I,

<sup>2</sup> For the epitaphic claim of autochthony, see Lys. 2.17, 43; Dem. 60.4; Hyp. *Epit.* 7; cf. Pl. *Mx.* 237b; Loraux 1986: 148–50; 2000; Rosivach 1987; Ober 1989: 261–6; E. Cohen 2000: 91–103; Pelling 2009; Lape 2010: 17–19, 99–101; for the city as fatherland and (sometimes) motherland, see note 44 to this chapter. On Athenians as “brothers,” see Loraux 2002: 198–9, 205; cf. 2000: 18–23; Sebillotte Cuchet 2006a: 18–19, 27; cf. de Romilly 1979: 109; Lape 2010: 99; for brothers as proverbial helpers of one another, see Pl. *R.* 362d6; Dem. 19.238; Arist. *EN* 1160a5–6; Loraux 2002: 202.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Lys. 2.17–20, which is discussed in the next section. On Athenians as a kin group, see Lape 2010: 122 with 122 n. 90.

<sup>4</sup> Brothers also do not figure very prominently in Athenian mythology, where we hear relatively little, for example, of Demophon and Akamas (E. *Heracl.* 119); in contrast, brothers are more conspicuous in Roman mythology and civic ideology, in which the fraternity of citizens is central (see Bannon 1997: 3–5, 136–73). Although the Athenian phratry may have fostered friendly feelings among their members (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1280b33–40), Athenians did not understand phratry to be “brotherhoods”: “[I]n all dialects of Greek before the Roman period the word *phrater*, cognates of which in other Indo-European languages mean ‘brother,’ was used exclusively to refer to a member of a phratry” (Lambert 1993: 3; cf. 269; contra Loraux 2002: 204–5 and Sebillotte Cuchet 2006a: 186–7).

<sup>5</sup> I argue later in the text and in note 39 that although the imitation *epitaphios* in Plato’s *Menexenus* (238e5–239a4) portrays the autochthonous Athenians as brothers, this reflects Plato’s own preoccupation with brotherhood as the basis of an ideal society. Loraux, in seeking Athenian “brotherhood,” may be influenced by the ideology of modern French democracy, in which *fraternité* is inextricably bound with *liberté* and *égalité* (see Ozouf 1989, 1992; cf. Hayward 2007: 43–4); she is critical of Glotz (1965: 141), however, who “unhesitatingly adds fraternity to the democratic values of liberty and equality” in his “French Athens” (1986: 6).

Herman argues that Athenians acted altruistically toward one another in a manner similar to family members in other societies, and attributes this to their frequent interaction within a small and intimate *polis* and to their egalitarian ethos (2006: 356–9, 375, 389). The evidence surveyed in the previous chapter suggests that there is little empirical support for this view and that in practice substantial mutual support was largely confined to family and intimates. The current chapter argues that the dearth of evidence concerning helping behavior among Athenian citizens is consistent with democratic ideology, which did not envision good citizenship as requiring mutual support among citizens but rather between citizen and city.

The first part of this chapter explores how the Athenian discussion of the ideal of *homonoia* reflects a rather limited expectation of how democratic citizens should interact with one another: they are to get along together and cooperate toward common ends but are not expected to engage in mutual interpersonal support. Isocrates and Plato, both of whom were elite critics of the democracy, offer images of ideal societies in which citizens enjoy close bonds and support one another strongly as these bonds demand. In so doing, however, they are not mirroring Athenian society but rather critiquing the low expectation on democratic citizens to engage in mutual support.

The second part of this chapter argues that the main locus for democratic helping on the part of individuals according to Athenian civic ideology is in helping the city, with which they enjoy a reciprocal relationship based on mutual support. The individual, by carrying out basic civic duties or in some cases more extraordinary civic tasks, helps the city, which in turn helps him in diverse ways. Although Athenians sometimes idealized this mutual helping as a natural extension of the intimate connection and affection between citizen and fatherland, frequently they present citizen helping of the city as a more calculating act based on enlightened self-interest and even the active pursuit of personal benefit.

## DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND THE IDEAL OF HOMONOIA

To understand how Athenians conceived of their relations with, and responsibilities toward, their fellow citizens, it is useful to consider first how Aristotle, who provides our fullest contemporary analysis of bonds among citizens in a *polis*, reflects on these. Although Aristotle's

late-fourth-century reflections do not focus on Athens specifically, his pragmatic and unromantic view of bonds among citizens and of the limited obligations these carry accords well with the picture that our Athenian sources paint for citizen relations in democratic Athens.

In Books 8 and 9 of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle treats the subject of *philia*, which can connote affection among family members, friendship between unrelated individuals, or, more broadly, the friendly feelings that individuals who associate together in diverse social groupings and the community at large may have for each other.<sup>6</sup> Aristotle posits that “all *philia* occurs within an association (*koinōnia*)” (ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν) (1161b12; cf. 1159b27–8), and characterizes the *polis* as a *koinōnia* on a large scale (1160a11–30) that is held together by *philia* (EN 1155a22–6; cf. *Pol.* 1280b33–5). If fellow citizens enjoy *philia* with each other, however, Aristotle makes it clear that this carries with it fewer obligations than the more intimate *philia* among family members or friends. Thus, he observes that the claims of justice vary in different relationships, for example, they are not the same among comrades and among fellow citizens (1159b35–1160a2), and

ἕτερα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἑκάστους τούτων, καὶ αὖξισιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα ἀποστερῆσαι ἑταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὀθνείῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὄντιν οὖν ἄλλον. (EN 1160a3–8)

Injustice also is differently constituted in each of these relationships, and is increasingly serious in proportion as it is done to nearer friends. For example, it is more shocking to defraud a comrade of money than a fellow citizen, and to fail to help a brother than a stranger, and to strike one’s father than anybody else.

Consistent with this portrayal of the limited nature of *philia* among citizens is Aristotle’s statement that “it is not possible to be a friend to many in the full meaning of the word *philia* . . . but it is possible to be pleasing to a number of persons because of one’s utility and pleasantness” (πολλοῖς δ’ εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται . . . διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται) (EN 1158a10–11, 16–17), and his denigration of men of many friendships, who act as though all men are

<sup>6</sup> On the broad range of *philia* in Greek, see Konstan 1997: 9: “the form *philia* does in fact cover relationships far wider than friendship, including the love between kin and the affection or solidarity between relatively distant associates such as members of the same fraternity or city”; cf. Blundell 1989: 39–49. On Aristotle’s treatment of *philia*, see Konstan 1997: 67–78; 2010; Pangle 2003.



their intimates, as friends to no one in fact “except in a political sense” (πλὴν πολιτικῶς) (1171a15).<sup>7</sup>

Further evidence that Aristotle views *philia* among citizens as distinct from that involved in more intimate relationships is evident in his introduction of the term *homonoia* to help characterize the *philia* among fellow citizens.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, at his first mention of *philia* as a civic bond near the beginning of Book 8, Aristotle links this to *homonoia*:

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοιὸν τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστα ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἐχθραν οὔσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν. (EN 1155a22–6)

*Philia* seems to hold cities together; and lawgivers seem to set more store by it than they do by justice, for to promote *homonoia*, which seems similar to *philia*, is their chief aim, while civil strife (*stasis*), which is enmity, is what they especially seek to drive out.<sup>9</sup>

In elaborating on the connection between *philia* and *homonoia* on the level of the state, Aristotle highlights the pragmatic facets of the latter:

φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται... ἄλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνώμονῶσι καὶ ταῦτα προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὲ ὁμονοοῦσιν. (EN 1167a22–9; cf. EE 1241a16–19; 1242a7–9)

*Homonoia* also seems to be a friendly thing... *Homonoia* is said to prevail in states when the citizens agree as to their interests, adopt the same policies, and carry out their common resolves. *Homonoia* then refers to practical ends of importance.

It is precisely the practical dimension of this cooperation among citizens in pursuit of common interests that Aristotle emphasizes in summing up his argument: “*homonoia* appears therefore to mean political *philia*, which indeed is the ordinary use of the term; for it refers to the interests and concerns of life” (πολιτικὴ δὲ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ ἔστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἥκοντα) (EN 1167b2–4).

<sup>7</sup> The careless expansion of one’s circle of friends was deemed imprudent since friends acquired in this way might prove false and not pay back favors (Democr. fr. 93 D-K; Isoc. 1.24; Plu. *Mor.* 94d-f). For further cautions of this sort in the ancient sources, see Blundell 1989: 32 n. 34, 34, and 45.

<sup>8</sup> On *homonoia* in Aristotle, see Klonoski 1996; Pangle 2003: 156–9; Konstan 2010: 240–2; cf. Schofield 1998.

<sup>9</sup> On the close connection between *philia* and *homonoia* in a state, see also Pl. *Alc.* 126b–c, with Denyer 2001: 202; cf. Pl. *Mx.* 244a1.

*Homonoia*, as Aristotle presents it, does not require that citizens support one another as intimate friends should but rather that they peacefully coexist and cooperate in governing and running the city. It entails, among other things, that each man do his part in supporting the city by carrying out his duties, as Aristotle makes clear in his description of what happens when base men, rather than good ones, inhabit a city:

τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πῆλιν ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν. (EN 1167b9–16)

The base are incapable of *homonoia*, except in some small degree, just as they are of *philia*, since they try to get more than their share of advantages, and take less than their share of labors and liturgies. And while each desires these things for himself, he spies on his neighbor to prevent him from doing likewise; for unless they keep watch over one another, the common interest goes to ruin. The result is civil strife (*stasis*), everybody trying to make others do their duty but refusing to do it themselves.

In Aristotle's view, therefore, for a city to prosper, its citizens must have a generally friendly feeling for one another and collaborate in a spirit of *homonoia* toward common ends; a higher degree of intimacy and the mutual interpersonal support that this might entail are not essential for collective success.

Although Aristotle's general account of civic *philia* and *homonoia* makes no specific mention of Athens, his observations may be inspired at least in part by Athens, where he resided as a metic. His experience in democratic Athens, for example, may help explain why he posits that there is greater scope in democracies for *philia* and justice than in other polities, "since the citizens being equal have many things in common" (πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν) (EN 1161b7–12; cf. EE 1241b12). Consistent with this approbation of democratic *philia* is the way Aristotle, or a member of his school, in the *Constitution of the Athenians*, expresses strong admiration for the spirit of *homonoia* with which the Athenian democrats acted after defeating their rivals in the civil strife of 404/3 (40.2–4). Whether Aristotle is thinking of Athens in his account of civic *philia* and *homonoia* in his *Nicomachean Ethics* or not, however, Athenian public discourse reflects a similar understanding of the limited nature of the bond among citizens and the obligations that go with it.

Consider, for example, how Aristotle’s contemporary Demosthenes depicts civic *philia* and *homonoia* as he addresses a popular jury in his *On the Crown* (330 B.C.). An orator, he asserts, should

τὰς ἐκασταχοῦ βραδυτῆτας, ὀκνοὺς, ἀγνοίας, φιλονικίας, ἃ πολιτικὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν πρόσσεστιν ἀπάσαις καὶ ἀναγκαῖ’ ἀμαρτήματα, ταῦθ’ ὥς εἰς ἐλάχιστα συστεῖλαι, καὶ τοῦναντίον εἰς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ὁρμὴν προτρέψαι. (18.246)

reduce to a minimum those delays and hesitations, those fits of ignorance and quarrelsomeness, which are the inevitable political failings of all states, and on the other hand exhort men to *homonoia*, *philia*, and whatever impels a man to do his duty.

Demosthenes, like Aristotle (EN 1167b9–16), associates *homonoia* and *philia* among citizens closely with their getting along and performing their civic duties (cf. Dem. 14.15), not with their supporting one another as individuals.<sup>10</sup>

An intriguing passage from Demosthenes 25: *Against Aristogeiton*, which explicitly addresses how citizens should behave toward one another, offers a minimalist view of what constitutes *homonoia* among citizens – namely, refraining from harm to others.<sup>11</sup> Demosthenes reproaches Aristogeiton, who is a state-debtor, because his outrageous behavior unfairly rouses social hostility toward all state-debtors (25.86) and undercuts the mutual tolerance on which society is based:

ἔπειθ’ ὅτι τὴν κοινὴν φιλανθρωπίαν ἦν ὑμεῖς ἔχετε ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὗτος ἀναιρεῖ καὶ διαφθείρει. ὑμεῖς γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ τῆς φύσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅπερ εἶπον, χρώμενοι φιλανθρωπίᾳ, ὥσπερ αἱ συγγένειαι τὰς ἰδίας οἰκοῦσιν οἰκίας, οὕτω τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖτε δημοσίᾳ. πῶς οὖν ἐκεῖναι; ὅπου πατήρ ἐστι καὶ υἱεῖς ἄνδρες, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ τούτων παῖδες, ἐνταῦθ’ ἀνάγκη πολλὰς καὶ μηδὲν ὁμοίας εἶναι βουλήσεις· οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν οὔτε λόγων οὔτ’ ἔργων

<sup>10</sup> Konstan (2010: 242 n. 19) notes the dearth of references in political and forensic speeches, with the exception of Dem. 18.246, to *philia* as a civic bond, but argues on the basis of the presence of this in Plato and Aristotle that “the language of friendship was more readily extended to embrace civic solidarity generally in Athens, where a well-defined system of patronage was lacking... than in Rome” (240; cf. Blundell 1989: 43–4, 48–9). In my view, this dearth of references in Athenian popular discourse reflects the fact that Athenians are not very drawn to envision civic solidarity in terms of friendship; instead, they place emphasis on leaving each other alone, which is central to the frequently invoked ideal of *homonoia* as we shall see in the text later in this chapter.

<sup>11</sup> Although I accept this speech as genuinely Demosthenic (see Christ 1998a: 56 and MacDowell 2009: 310–13), it is not important to my argument that Demosthenes is the author; whoever the author is, the speech is almost certainly a late-fourth-century Attic work that reflects Athenian thinking (cf. Wohl 2010: 51 n. 63).

ἔστιν ἡ νεότης τῷ γήρᾳ. ἀλλ' ὅμως οἱ τε νέοι πάνθ' ὅς' ἂν πράττωσιν, ἅνπερ ὦσιν μέτριοι, οὕτω ποιοῦσιν ὥστε μάλιστα μὲν πειράσθαι λανθάνειν, εἰ δὲ μή, φανεροί γ' εἶναι τοῦτο βουλόμενοι ποιεῖν· οἱ τε πρεσβύτεροι πάλιν, ἂν ἄρ' ἴδωσιν ἢ δαπάνην ἢ πότον ἢ παιδιὰν πλείω τῆς μετρίας, οὕτω ταῦθ' ὀρώσιν ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν ἑορακέναι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων γίγνεται τε πάνθ' ἃ φέρουσιν αἱ φύσεις καὶ καλῶς γίγνεται. τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν τρόπον ὑμεῖς, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖτε συγγενικῶς καὶ φιλανθρωπῶς, οἱ μὲν οὕτως ὀρώντες τὰ τῶν ἡτυχηκότων ἔργα ὥστε, τὸ τῆς παροιμίας, ὀρώντας μὴ ὀρᾶν καὶ ἀκούοντας μὴ ἀκούειν, οἱ δ' οὕτω ποιοῦντες ἃ πράττουσιν ὥστ' εἶναι φανεροί καὶ φυλαττόμενοι καὶ αἰσχυρόμενοι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡ κοινὴ καὶ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τῇ πόλει μένει καὶ συνέστηκεν ὁμόνοια. ταῦτα τοίνυν Ἀριστογείτων τὰ καλῶς οὕτω πεπηγότα τῇ φύσει καὶ τοῖς ἥθεσι τοῖς ὑμετέροις κινεῖ καὶ ἀναίρει καὶ μεταρρίπτει. (25.87–90)

[Further reason for hating Aristogeiton] is that he upturns and destroys the mutual *philanthrōpia* which you yourselves naturally preserve toward one another. For you, Athenians, observing what I have called a natural *philanthrōpia* toward each other, live in this city in public just as families live in their private homes. How then do families live? Where there is a father and grown-up sons and possibly also grandchildren, there are bound to be many divergent wishes; for youth and old age do not talk or act in the same way. Nevertheless, whatever the young men do, if they are modest, they do in such a way as to most avoid notice; or if not, at any rate they make it clear that such was their intention. The elders in their turn, if they see any immoderation in spending or drinking or amusement, manage to see it without showing that they have seen it. The result is that everything that their various natures suggest is done, and done well. And that is just how you, men of Athens, live in this city like relatives and with *philanthrōpia*, some watching the proceedings of the unfortunate in such a way that, as the saying runs, “seeing, they see not; hearing, do not hear”; while the others by their behavior show that they are both on their guard and alive to a sense of shame. The result is that that general *homonoia*, which is the source of all good things, abides and stands firmly established in our city. Those feelings, so happily implanted in your nature and your habits, Aristogeiton would change and remove and overturn.

If, according to Demosthenes, the city is like a family, it resembles a family not because fellow citizens enjoy the intimate bonds of family members and mutually support one another as kin do but rather because citizens, like members of a household, get along by avoiding conflict with one another.<sup>12</sup> Significantly, in drawing his comparison between city and family, Demosthenes compares relations among fellow citizens not, for

<sup>12</sup> On the problem of the relation between *oikos* and *polis*, see Arist. *Pol.* 1252a–1253b3; Aristotle notes that every *polis* is composed of households (1253b3) but challenges those who miss the

example, to those of mutually supportive brothers but to strained inter-generational relations within the family that are preserved by restraint on the part of old and young alike.<sup>13</sup> The key to civic *homonoia*, Demosthenes asserts, lies precisely in this accommodation among citizens and tolerance of those, like state-debtors, whose offenses are minor and who do not otherwise trouble their fellow citizens (cf. 25.90–1).<sup>14</sup> When Demosthenes appeals in this passage to the importance of *philanthrōpia* to Athenian society, he is clearly advocating not philanthropy in the common modern sense of active assistance to those in need but rather a benign tolerance of others' minor offenses in the interest of civic harmony.<sup>15</sup> Far from intervening to help state-debtors in their misfortune (cf. τῶν ἡτυχηκότων), in fact, Demosthenes' model Athenians look the other way and consider this sufficient kindness toward fellow citizens.<sup>16</sup>

Although Athenian attitudes toward ideal relations among citizens must have taken shape over many centuries and under the influence of a variety of historical experiences, the brief period of *stasis* between oligarchs and democrats in 404/3 drew vivid attention to the real costs of civil strife and engendered fresh reflection on the nature of social relations. Consider, for example, the words that Xenophon attributes to Cleocritus as he addresses the forces of the Thirty on the battlefield after they have been defeated by the exiled democratic forces:

Κλεόκριτος δὲ ὁ τῶν μυστῶν κήρυξ, μάλ' εὐφωνος ὢν, κατασιωπησάμενος ἔλεξεν·  
ἄνδρες πολῖται, τί ἡμᾶς ἐξελαύνετε; τί ἀποκτεῖναι βούλεσθε; ἡμεῖς γὰρ ὑμᾶς

generic difference between *polis* and household and who see no difference between a large household and a small city (1252a13–14).

<sup>13</sup> Compare the ideal Athenians of the Periclean funeral oration who live together harmoniously, not scowling at their neighbors' private pleasures (Thuc. 2.37.2–3). On the Athenian ideal that in a democracy men should live as they please in their private lives, see Hansen 1991: 74; 1996: 95; Wallace 1996: 105–9; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1317a40–b14, with Hansen 2010: 12–16.

<sup>14</sup> Consistent with the Athenian claim of mutual tolerance is the vaunting of “mildness” (πραότης) as a democratic virtue: see, e.g., Dem. 22.51; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.4; Dover 1974: 202; de Romilly 1979: 97–112; Hansen 1991: 310; Christ 1998a: 196; Whitehead 2000: 437–8; Forsdyke 2005a: 231–2, 265–6.

<sup>15</sup> On Demosthenes' presentation of *philanthrōpia* as a democratic virtue, see Christ forthcoming.

<sup>16</sup> The Periclean funeral oration suggests a similar aloofness on the part of Athenians toward citizens in financial straits: although they do not view poverty itself as disgraceful, they regard it as shameful if poor men do not try to improve their own situations (Thuc. 2.40.1). As Rosivach (1991) observes, Athenian sources often suggest “the poor are not responsible for their poverty” (190–1) and express pity for the state of the poor (193). This does not, however, mean that Athenians felt compelled to do anything to raise others from this state. Isocrates claims the situation was different in Athens' distant past under the rule of the Areopagus, asserting that wealthy men felt shame for the poverty of fellow citizens (7.32; discussed later in the text).

κακὸν μὲν οὐδὲν πώποτε ἐποιήσαμεν, μετεσχίκαμεν δὲ ὑμῖν καὶ ἱερῶν τῶν σεμνοτάτων καὶ θυσιῶν καὶ ἑορτῶν τῶν καλλίστων, καὶ συγχορευταὶ καὶ συμφοιτηταὶ γεγενήμεθα καὶ συστρατιῶται, καὶ πολλὰ μεθ' ὑμῶν κекινδυνεύκαμεν καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν σωτηρίας τε καὶ ἐλευθερίας. πρὸς θεῶν πατρῶων καὶ μητρῶων καὶ συγγενείας καὶ κηδεστίας καὶ ἑταιρίας, πάντων γὰρ τούτων πολλοὶ κοινωνοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις, αἰδούμενοι καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους παύσασθε ἁμαρτάνοντες εἰς τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ μὴ πείθεσθε τοῖς ἀνοσιωτάτοις τριάκοντα, οἱ ἰδίῳν κερδέων ἕνεκα ὀλίγου δεῖν πλείους ἀπεκτόνασιν Ἀθηναίων ἐν ὀκτῶ μηνσὶν ἢ πάντες Πελοποννήσιοι δέκα ἔτη πολεμοῦντες. ἔξδ' ἡμῖν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πολιτεύεσθαι, οὗτοι τὸν πάντων αἰσχιστόν τε καὶ χαλεπώτατον καὶ ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἔχθιστον καὶ θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις πόλεμον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους παρέχουσιν. ἀλλ' εὖ γε μέντοι ἐπίστασθε ὅτι καὶ τῶν νῦν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀποθανόντων οὐ μόνον ὑμεῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἔστιν οὓς πολλὰ κατεδακρύσαμεν. (*HG* 2.4.19–21)

Cleocritus, the herald of the initiates, a man with a very fine voice, obtained silence and said: “Fellow citizens, why do you drive us out of the city? Why do you wish to kill us? For we never did you any harm, but we have shared with you in the most solemn rites and sacrifices and the most splendid festivals, we have been companions in choruses and schoolmates and comrades-in-arms, and we have braved many dangers with you by land and by sea in defense of the common safety and freedom of us both. In the name of the gods of our fathers and mothers, in the name of our ties of kinship and marriage and comradeship – for all these many of us share with one another – cease, out of shame before gods and men, to do wrong against your fatherland, and do not obey those most accursed Thirty, who for the sake of their private gain have killed in eight months more Athenians almost than all the Peloponnesians in ten years of war. And when we might live in peace as citizens, these men bring upon us war with one another, a war most utterly shameful and intolerable, utterly unholy and hated by both gods and men. Yet for all that, be well assured that for some of those now slain by our hands not only you, but we also, have wept bitterly.

Cleocritus’ patriotic appeal for unity presents Athenian citizens as bound to one another by their common gods, shared religious practices, and joint participation in diverse civic and public activities.<sup>17</sup> When Cleocritus notes that many citizens also share “kinship, marriage ties, and friendship” (συγγενείας καὶ κηδεστίας καὶ ἑταιρίας) with one another, he takes for granted that these intimate bonds, which bear special obligations, are distinct from those that bind citizens to one another as fellow

<sup>17</sup> On these as sources of Athenian solidarity, see Osborne 1990b and 1994; Schmitt Pantel 1992: 117–252; Evans 2004; Ober 2008: 134–42, and 142 n. 28.

citizens and co-participants in the life of the city.<sup>18</sup> The primary obligation of Athenians as fellow citizens, as Cleocritus presents it, is to live at peace with one another; this entails above all refraining from harming others, a principle that the democrats had observed and the oligarchs had shamelessly violated.

Although Xenophon does not speak directly of *homonoia* in this passage, for Athenians in the fourth century, the paradigmatic and defining moment of Athenian *homonoia* was the Amnesty of 403, which brought to a close the civil strife between democrats and supporters of the Thirty with terms of reconciliation that included an oath “not to recall prior evils” (μὴ μνησικακεῖν) (And. 1.90; X. *HG* 2.4.43; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 39.6), in particular, through legal prosecutions.<sup>19</sup> Interestingly, when Athenian sources speak of the Amnesty and the ideal democratic values reflected in it, they present a rather minimal picture of the obligations of citizens to one another, placing emphasis on the importance of citizens getting along and refraining from harming each other rather than on their engaging in mutual support.

Athenians looking back on the Amnesty saw in it evidence of a laudable and characteristic restraint on the part of Athenians toward their fellow citizens.<sup>20</sup> Thus, for example, Andocides on trial in 399 B.C. praises the city for doing what was right and in its interests by passing the Amnesty for the sake of *homonoia* (1.106) and finds precedent for this in the noble actions

<sup>18</sup> Loraux (2002: 198–9; cf. Sebillotte Cuchet 2006a: 176–81) overlooks this distinction in taking Cleocritus’ appeal as evidence of an Athenian ideal of brotherhood among citizens. Lysias (12.92) also distinguishes between familial bonds and those between citizens when he speaks of how the partisans of the Thirty during the civil strife of 404/3 B.C. were forced to wage war “against brothers and sons and fellow citizens” (ἀδελφοῖς καὶ υἱέσι καὶ πολίταις). Consistent with Cleocritus’ distinction between fellow citizens and intimates is Aristotle’s statement that συστρατιῶται enjoy only limited *philia* (*EN* 1159b27–31; cf. 1160a15–18) and so too fellow tribesmen and demesmen, and those who associate together to share sacrifices and festivals (1160a18–30); note how Aristotle also distinguishes sharply between “schoolmate” (συμφοιτητής) and “comrade” (ἑταῖρος) (1162a33).

<sup>19</sup> On the Amnesty, see Cloché 1915: 251–77; Dorjahn 1946; Loening 1987; Loraux 2002; Carawan 2002, 2006; Quillin 2002; Wolpert 2002a: 75–99, 2002b; Joyce 2008; Wohl 2010: 201–6; Shear 2011: 188–226. Although the precise scope of μὴ μνησικακεῖν is not clear, most scholars believe that it entailed a prohibition of prosecution for offenses committed under the Thirty; Carawan 2002 challenges the orthodox view, but see Joyce 2008 (cf. Wohl 204 n. 12) for a defense of it. On the emergence of *homonoia* as an ideal in the late fifth century and its widespread invocation in Athenian sources in the fourth century, see de Romilly 1972; Funke 1980; Ober 1989: 297; Whitehead 1990: 126; 2000: 255–6; Thériault 1996; Rocchi 2007.

<sup>20</sup> In addition to the sources cited in the text, see esp. Lys. 25.21–3; Isoc. 7.67–9; 18.44, 67–8; cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 40.2–4.

of the Athenian ancestors at the time of the Persian Wars.<sup>21</sup> According to Andocides, in the face of the Persian invasion of 490 B.C., Athenians set aside their differences, recalling exiles and reinstating disfranchised citizens to join in the successful defense of Athens (1.107).<sup>22</sup> After their victory in the Persian Wars, they chose to continue not to “recall prior evils” (μνησικακῆσαι) and to live together in *homonoia*, and because of this they were able to establish an empire over the Greeks and hand a great city on to their descendants (1.108). If Athenians of the current generation can likewise refrain from recalling each other’s past transgressions and live in *homonoia* with one another, they too can enjoy prosperity and power (1.109).<sup>23</sup> Civic success arises, Andocides suggests, not from any extraordinary effort on the part of citizens to help one another but from their willingness to let go prior quarrels in the interest of *homonoia*.<sup>24</sup>

If Andocides is able to trace the Athenian passion for *homonoia* back to the time of the Persian Wars, Lysias finds an even earlier precedent for this in the remote mythical past. In his funeral oration (*epitaphios*) for Athenian war dead sometime during the Corinthian War (395–386 B.C.),<sup>25</sup> he links Athenian *homonoia* to the fact that Athenians are autochthonous:

πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ὑπῆρχε τοῖς ἡμετέροις προγόνοις μῆ γνώμη χρωμένοις περὶ τοῦ δικαίου διαμάχεσθαι. ἦ τε γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ βίου δικαία· οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, πανταχόθεν συνειλεγμένοι καὶ ἐτέρους ἐκβαλόντες τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ὥκησαν, ἀλλ’ αὐτόχθονες ὄντες τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκέκτηντο μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα. πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ μόνοι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐκβαλόντες τὰς παρὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς δυναστείας δημοκρατίαν κατεστήσαντο, ἡγούμενοι τὴν πάντων ἐλευθερίαν ὁμόνοιαν εἶναι μεγίστην, κοινὰς δ’ ἀλλήλοις τὰς ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων ἐλπίδας ποιήσαντες ἐλευθεραῖς ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπολιτεύοντο . . . καὶ γάρ τοι καὶ φύντες καλῶς καὶ γνόντες ὁμοία, πολλὰ μὲν καλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ οἱ πρόγονοι τῶν ἐνθάδε κειμένων ἡργάσαντο. (2.17–20)

<sup>21</sup> On the circumstances of this speech and its linking of the Amnesty and *homonoia*, see Wohl 2010: 206–17.

<sup>22</sup> MacDowell (1962: 140) accepts the historicity of this claim; cf. And. 1.77 (Decree of Patrocleides).

<sup>23</sup> Wohl (2010: 213) aptly observes of And. 1.106–9, “what is remarkable about Andocides’ account is that it turns Athens’ heroic history into a history of amnesties,” and notes (213 n. 29) the similarity of Isoc. 18.31.

<sup>24</sup> For the argument that *homonoia* among Athenians at home facilitates their power abroad, see also Lys. 2.65; 25.21–3; Isoc. 7.69; Din. 3.19. I would not go so far as to infer, however, that Athenians view *homonoia* primarily as a safeguard against external threats, as Carawan 2002: 4 (cf. Funke 1980: 17–22) suggests.

<sup>25</sup> Although Lysias, as a metic, would presumably not have been chosen by the Athenian public to present an *epitaphios*, I find it plausible (contra Todd 2007: 163) that as a successful *logographos* he may have written it for an Athenian speaker. As Todd (163–4) observes, however, this may be a display speech that reproduces well the norms of the genre.



There were many reasons for our ancestors to be of one mind and to fight for justice, because the origin of their life was just. They were not, like the majority of peoples, assembled together from all sorts of places, casting out their predecessors and living on land which was not originally their own. Instead, being autochthonous, they had the same land both as mother and as fatherland. They were the first people, and at that time the only ones, to have driven out those who held autocratic power among them, and to have established democracy, in the belief that freedom for all is the greatest source of *homonoia*. They allowed everybody to share in the hopes that arise out of danger, and governed themselves with freedom of spirit. . . . Because of the nobility of their nature and the harmony of their thoughts, the ancestors of the men who lie here achieved many good and wonderful things.

When Lysias asserts that Athenians have always possessed the same land as mother and as fatherland, this leads him to speak of Athenians not as if they are kin with special obligations to one another as individuals but rather as a cooperative and harmonious group that embraces justice and refrains from harming others;<sup>26</sup> it is this commitment to just relations that paves the way for Athenians to expel autocrats and establish democracy in which “freedom for all is the greatest source of *homonoia*.”<sup>27</sup> When Lysias later turns to praise the moderate behavior of the restored democrats in putting an end to the civil strife of 404/3 B.C., he presents them as heirs to this noble tradition in their preference for *homonoia* over *stasis* (2.63; cf. 2.65); in their restraint from acts of vengeance; and in their willingness to share their freedom even with those who were prepared to grovel before the Thirty (2.64). For Lysias then, Athenians across time consistently embrace *homonoia*, which entails above all refraining from harming others and respecting them as free men.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Plato, in contrast, emphasizes that Athenian autochthony makes Athenians brothers of one another (*Mx.* 238e5–239a4); on the consistency of this with Plato’s quest for a society based on “brotherhood,” see the discussion in the text later in the chapter. On Athenian claims of autochthony, see note 2.

<sup>27</sup> Although Lysias only uses *homonoia* once in this passage, he alludes to the idea of “being of the same mind” twice more with μιᾷ γνώμῃ and γνόντες ὁμοίως; on these and similar references to *homonoia* in this speech, see Todd 2007: 229.

<sup>28</sup> Lysias’ *epitaphios* and the other extant Attic funeral orations are virtually silent concerning the responsibility of citizens to support one another individually *qua* citizens. While they speak at great length about the city’s assistance in mythical and historical times to the weak and oppressed of other states (see Chapter IV), they have very little to say about mutual helping among citizens in their unabashed rehearsal of Athenian virtues. Although Thuc. 2.37.3 may allude to the principle of volunteer prosecution on behalf of wronged persons, it casts this in terms of citizen respect for the laws (*nomoi*) (“as many as have been established for the assistance of those suffering wrong” [ὅσοι τε ἐπ’ ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κείνται]) rather than of mutual support among citizens. The *epitaphioi* console survivors of the war dead with

In presenting the Amnesty of 403 as emblematic of democratic *homonoia*, Athenian sources suggest that restraint and moderation are the key virtues governing the relations not only among individual citizens but also between classes, that is, between “the rich” and “the poor.”<sup>29</sup> Thus, for example, a wealthy client of Lysias, seeking to save his family estate from confiscation, appeals to jurors to observe the spirit of the recent Amnesty (cf. 18.15) by refraining from taking this property away unfairly; while the city’s majority has the power to confiscate property unjustly from the rich, its interests are best served by respecting property rights so as to preserve *homonoia* (18.16–18; cf. 20–3). Hyperides makes the same point in his *Defense of Euxenippus* (330–324 B.C.) when he asserts that the Athenian people (*dēmos*) have refrained from confiscating property of the wealthy in the past (33–6) and that a good citizen will not advocate preying on the rich but rather will look to the city’s best interests and care for “*homonoia* among the citizens and your reputation” (τῆς ὁμονοίας τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑμετέρας) (37).<sup>30</sup>

This survey suggests that Athenians envision ideal citizen relations in terms not so much of mutual support as of mutual respect and restraint in keeping with a spirit of *homonoia*. Athenians, as free and equal individuals, are meant to live their private lives as they wish without interference or physical threat from others.<sup>31</sup> As fellow citizens, they are expected to get along with one another and to collaborate in supporting the city. These relations call for friendly feelings and tolerance among citizens but not an intimate fraternity among them and a comradeship of mutual support.

Although Athenian public discourse conceives of ideal relations among citizens primarily in terms of peaceful coexistence and cooperation, critics of the Athenian democracy such as Isocrates and Plato offer alternative models of citizen relations in which mutual support is central. The divergence

promises of support from their fellow citizens (Pl. *Mx.* 248e, *Lys.* 2.75) or from the city itself (Thuc. 2.46; Pl. *Mx.* 248d–249b; Hyp. *Epit.* 42; cf. Dem. 60.32) (cf. Ziolkowski 1981: 149), but they stop well short of characterizing mutual helping as a democratic principle.

<sup>29</sup> On the Athenian predilection for envisioning class differences through these polar categories, see Ober 1989: 194–6.

<sup>30</sup> On the dating of this speech, see Whitehead 2000: 155–7. Whitehead (252–3) argues that Hyperides is not referring to confiscation by the *dēmos* in the law courts but rather in the Assembly. On *homonoia* and the protection of property rights, see also *Lys.* 25.29–32; Isoc. 18.43–4, 67–8; cf. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 56.2.

<sup>31</sup> On the premium that Athenians place on the individual’s “negative freedom,” that is, “freedom from oppression by the state or by other individuals” including infringements against one’s person and property, see Hansen 1996: 94–5; cf. *ibid.* 1991: 74–8; Wallace 1996; Ober 2005; Balot 2009: 272.

of these models from Athenian ideals throws into relief the democratic Athenian perspective on ideal citizen interaction.

Consider, for example, how Isocrates conjures up a world in which the wealthy help those in need in his political “pamphlet” *Areopagiticus*, which contrasts the contemporary democracy with an idealized, aristocratic past in which the Council of the Areopagus governed the city:<sup>32</sup>

οὗ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ὠμονόουν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὸν ἴδιον βίον τοσαύτην ἐποιοῦντο πρόνοιαν ἀλλήλων ὅσην περ χρὴ τοὺς εὖ φρονούντας καὶ πατρίδος κοινωνοῦντας. οἱ τε γὰρ πενέστεροι τῶν πολιτῶν τοσοῦτον ἀπείχον τοῦ φθονεῖν τοῖς πλείω κεκτημένοις, ὥσθ' ὁμοίως ἐκήδοντο τῶν οἰκῶν τῶν μεγάλων ὥσπερ τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν, ἡγούμενοι τὴν ἐκείνων εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτοῖς εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν· οἱ τε τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες οὐχ ὅπως ὑπερεώρων τοὺς καταδεέστερον πράττοντας, ἀλλ' ὑπολαμβάνοντες αἰσχύνῃ αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπορίαν ἐπήμυνον ταῖς ἐνδείαις, τοῖς μὲν γεωργίας ἐπὶ μετρίαις μισθώσεσιν παραδιδόντες, τοὺς δὲ κατ' ἐμπορίαν ἐκπέμποντες, τοῖς δ' εἰς τὰς ἄλλας ἐργασίας ἀφορμὴν παρέχοντες. (7.31–2)

For not only did they [i.e., Athenians of that time] enjoy *homonoia* in their public affairs, but in their private life as well they showed that degree of consideration for each other which is due from men who are right-minded and fellow sharers in the fatherland. The poorer among the citizens were so far from envying those of greater means that they cared as much for the great estates as for their own, considering that the prosperity of the wealthy was a guarantee of their own well-being. Those who possessed wealth, for their part, did not look down upon those in more needy circumstances, but rather, regarding impoverishment among their fellow citizens as their own disgrace, warded off their poverty, handing over lands to some at moderate rents, sending out some to engage in commerce, and furnishing means to others to enter upon various occupations.

Isocrates goes on to explain that the rich were willing to lend money to the poor for various enterprises in this golden past because they were confident that jurors would enforce contracts between rich and poor and ensure that money lent would be returned (7.33–4). Both rich and poor, he asserts, benefited from this state of affairs:

καὶ γὰρ τοι διὰ τὴν γνώμην ταύτην οὐδείς οὐτ' ἀπεκρύπτετο τὴν οὐσίαν οὐτ' ὤκει συμβάλλειν, ἀλλ' ἥδιον ἐώρων τοὺς δανειζομένους ἢ τοὺς ἀποδιδόντας. ἀμφοτέρα γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνέβαινε ἀπερ ἂν βουλευθεῖεν ἄνθρωποι νοῦν ἔχοντες· ἅμα γὰρ τοὺς τε πολίτας ὠφέλουν καὶ τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν ἐνεργὰ καθίστασαν. κεφάλαιον δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἀλλήλοις ὁμιλεῖν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κτήσεις ἀσφαλεῖς ἦσαν,

<sup>32</sup> Scholars debate whether this work should be dated to 354 or 358/7 B.C.: see Ober 1998: 277 n. 46.

οἷσπερ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπῆρχον, αἱ δὲ χρήσεις κοιναὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς δεομένοις τῶν πολιτῶν. (7.35)

And so because of this knowledge [that contracts would be enforced], no one tried to conceal his wealth nor hesitated to lend it out, but, on the contrary, the wealthy were better pleased to see men borrowing money than paying it back. For both things came to pass for them that all right-minded men should wish: at the same time they were helping their fellow citizens and making their own property productive for themselves. In fine, the result of their associating honorably with each other was that the property was secure for those to whom it rightfully belonged, while the enjoyment of it was shared by all the citizens who needed it.

In Isocrates' vision of an ideal past, therefore, the entrepreneurial rich make a profit while helping their needy fellow citizens, who benefit from, and appreciate, their patronage.<sup>33</sup>

Isocrates' account of happy relations between rich and poor in the remote past constitutes an ideologically tinged critique of the shortcomings of the contemporary democracy. Isocrates proposes that fellow citizens should not only enjoy *homonoia* with one another in their public lives – the prevailing ideal of citizen relations in contemporary Athens as we have seen – but should also show substantial care (*pronoia*) for one another in their private relations.<sup>34</sup> He suggests that wealthy men under the democracy do not share their prosperity with those in need out of fear of the envious and unscrupulous poor, who can avoid paying back loans with the support of sympathetic popular courts. In contrast, in an earlier time when the wealthy had no such concerns and the poor cared for (ἐκῆδοντο) preserving the estates of the rich, the wealthy for their part were willing to help (ἐπήμυνον) their fellow citizens. Although Isocrates' basic observation that wealthy Athenians in his day do not routinely help their fellow citizens would appear to be accurate (see Chapter I), we do not have to accept his class-hostile analysis as to why this is so. An alternate explanation for the behavior of the wealthy in contemporary Athens can be found in Isocrates' narrative of the distant past, namely, the priority that the rich place on their own personal interests. Notably, even in the ideal world he imagines, Isocrates cannot envision the wealthy helping the poor without consideration of their own interests: they help the poor not

<sup>33</sup> On the prominence of patronage here, see Millett 1989: 26–8 and Ober 1998: 283. For a similar fantasy of aristocratic patronage and domination of the poor, see X. *Mem.* 2.9.1–8, with Christ 1998a: 86–9.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Isoc. 6.67, where Isocrates' Archidamus links *homonoia* to the mutual assistance (τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων εὐπορίας) of rich and poor.

through outright handouts but interest-bearing loans that must be repaid under threat of legal prosecution.<sup>35</sup>

Further reaction to, and criticism of, the nature of citizen relations in Athens, is found in Plato's works.<sup>36</sup> Although scholars are well aware of Plato's critical attitude toward Athenian democracy and democratic institutions, they have not fully appreciated how his presentation of ideal citizen relations provides an alternative to, and critique of, the model embraced by the Athenian democracy. In a variety of contexts, Plato embraces the idea that citizens should have an intimate, familial bond with one another, and in keeping with this should engage in mutual support. He explicitly presents this vision of ideal citizen relations as an alternative to Athenian norms in his presentation of Socrates in the *Apology*, and the negative example of Athens is likely not far from his thoughts as he proposes a new model for citizen relations in the ideal society that he imagines in the *Republic* and in the ideal legislation he proposes in his *Laws*.

In the *Apology*, Plato presents Socrates both as a traditional Athenian, who is pious toward the gods and courageous on the battlefield (28d6–29a4), and as an anomalous and idiosyncratic figure, whose unusual way of talking and acting sets him apart from his fellow citizens. In the latter category firmly falls Socrates' tireless efforts to help his fellow citizens by urging them to care for virtue and wisdom (29d4–30a7).<sup>37</sup> Socrates explicitly calls attention to the exceptional nature of his helping other citizens indiscriminately:

ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὦν τοιοῦτος οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθὲνδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἑαυτοῦ πάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. (31a8–b5; cf. 36b5–d4)

And that I happen to be a kind of gift from the god to the city, you might understand from this: for my conduct is not like that of humans – I have neglected all my own affairs and have been enduring the neglect of my household concerns all these years, but I am always busy in your interest, approaching each one of you individually, just like a father or an elder brother, and urging you to care for virtue.

<sup>35</sup> Note how in Democritus' vision of mutual support across class lines (fr. 255 D–K, quoted at this chapter's opening), the rich also appear to lend (προτελεῖν) money to the poor rather than make a gift of it.

<sup>36</sup> On Plato as a critic of Athenian democracy, see Ober 1998: 156–247 and Allen 2010, but cf. Monoson 2000.

<sup>37</sup> For the argument that Socrates is an altruist, see Zanker 1998: 78.

What is striking and even “un-human” about Socrates’ assistance of his fellow citizens is that he treats them as if his own kin, seeking them out “like a father or an elder brother” to help them improve themselves. Clearly, for Plato, Socrates’ helping of fellow citizens as if they were kin is remarkable and sets him apart from other Athenians.<sup>38</sup>

Just how drawn Plato is to the idea that fellow citizens should enjoy an intimate familial bond with each other and, in keeping with this, help one another, emerges in his *Republic*, which envisions an ideal society constructed along these very lines. The citizens of Plato’s ideal state, as described by Socrates, will be led to believe through a “noble lie” (414b) that

καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτοὺς μήτηρ οὔσα ἀνῆκεν, καὶ νῦν δεῖ ὡς περὶ μητρὸς καὶ τροφοῦ τῆς χώρας ἐν ᾗ εἰσι βουλευέσθαι τε καὶ ἀμύνειν αὐτούς, ἐάν τις ἐπ’ αὐτὴν ἦη, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ὡς ἀδελφῶν ὄντων καὶ γηγενῶν διανοεῖσθαι. (414e2–6)

the earth, being their mother, delivered them, and now they ought to take thought for the land that they inhabit as if it were their mother and nurse, and defend her if anyone attacks her and regard the other citizens as their brothers and offspring of the self-same earth.

Although scholars have often noted the resemblance between this civic myth of origins and Athenian claims of autochthony, Plato diverges from his Athenian model in making autochthony the basis of an explicitly fraternal bond among citizens (cf. 415a5).<sup>39</sup> Among the surviving examples of the Attic funeral oration, only Plato’s imitation *epitaphios* in the *Menexenus* envisions autochthony as making Athenians brothers of one another.<sup>40</sup> The belief of future generations of citizens in Plato’s ideal state that they were born of the same mother and are brothers “would have a

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Pl. *Euthphr.* 3d5–9, where Socrates speaks of his generosity (φιланθρωπία) in conversing with all men without pay, and X. *Mem.* 1.2.60–1, where Socrates is said to be generous (φιλάνθρωπος) and a helper of all who wish to associate with him (πάντας τοὺς βουλομένους ὠφέλει).

<sup>39</sup> On the centrality of brotherhood in the Platonic city of the *Republic*, see Hahm 1969; Loraux 2002: 198; Schofield 2007; cf. Brown 1966: 12; Richter 2011 (on the development of the related ideal of cosmopolitanism starting in the late classical period). Plato also diverges from the Athenian model of autochthony, which provides a mythical basis for political equality among citizens, in deploying it to justify “a rigid social and political hierarchy” in his ideal state (Ober 1998: 225–6).

<sup>40</sup> Plato’s Aspasia, in her funeral oration speaks of “we and our people, being all brothers born of one mother” (ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι, μιᾶς μητρός πάντες ἀδελφοὶ φύντες) (238e5–39a4); cf. Pl. *Alc.* 126d–e; Monoson 2000: 189–202. The closest that any other funeral oration comes to speaking of fraternity among Athenians is Lysias’ *epitaphios*, which asserts that the counsels of those who restored the democracy in 403 are “brotherly to” (ἀδελφὰ) the deeds of the city’s

good effect in making them more inclined to care for the state and one another” (εὖ ἂν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ ἀλλήλων κήδεσθαι) (415c6–d5). Implicit in the assertion that this arrangement is a superior one is the idea that citizens of other states – including presumably Plato’s own Athens – are not so inclined, in the absence of a strong familial bond with one another, to care for the state and their fellow citizens.

The importance of fostering a fraternal bond among citizens, in fact, leads Plato to formulate that in his ideal state the guardians will hold wives and children in common, so that parents and children will not know each other (457d1–3), and all will support one another as if intimate relations.<sup>41</sup> This will lead those in the guardian class to refrain from harming their elders and to rush to the assistance of men who are suffering harm:

καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε νεώτερος πρεσβύτερον, ἂν μὴ ἄρχοντες προσταττωσιν, οὔτε ἄλλο βιάζεσθαι ἐπιχειρήσει ποτέ οὔτε τύπτειν, ὥς τὸ εἰκός. οἶμαι δ’ οὐδὲ ἄλλως ἀτιμάσει· ἱκανῶ γὰρ τῷ φύλακε κωλύοντε, δέος τε καὶ αἰδώς, αἰδώς μὲν ὡς γονέων μὴ ἄπτεσθαι εἴργουσα, δέος δὲ τὸ τῷ πάσχοντι τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ὡς υἱεῖς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀδελφούς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς πατέρας. (465a8–b2)

Again, it is plain that the young man, except by command of the rulers, will probably never attempt to do any violence to an elder or strike him, or, I take it, dishonor him in any other way. For there are two guardians sufficient to prevent this, fear and respect, respect by restraining him from laying hands on those regarded as his parents, and fear that the others will rush to the aid of the sufferer, some as sons, some as brothers, some as fathers.

In Plato’s view, only a radical reform of society and of the bonds among citizens could prompt an individual to rush like a family member to assist a fellow citizen suffering wrong.<sup>42</sup>

Plato pursues a similar social agenda in his *Laws*, in which model legislation, rather than social engineering, seeks to foster the kind of mutual helping among fellow citizens that is normally found primarily among family members and intimates. This is particularly evident when Plato’s Athenian Stranger proposes legislation that will require bystanders to intervene when they see an individual being beaten:

current war dead (2.64, with Todd 2007: 263–4). This metaphor, however, links the traits of Athenians across time rather than asserting a bond of fraternity among living citizens.

<sup>41</sup> On the restriction of the sharing of wives and children to the guardians, see Halliwell 1998: 135–6; cf. 19–20.

<sup>42</sup> In Plato’s native Athens, as we saw in Chapter I, active bystander intervention of this sort was not the norm for fellow citizens.

ἐάν τις τύπτῃ τὸν πρεσβύτερον εἴκοσιν ἔτεσιν ἢ πλείοσιν ἑαυτοῦ, πρῶτον μὲν ὁ προστυγχάνων, ἐάν μὴ ἤλιξ μηδὲ νεώτερος ᾗ τῶν μαχομένων, διειργέτω ἢ κακὸς ἔστω κατὰ νόμον· ἐάν δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πληγέντος ἡλικίᾳ ᾗ ἔτι νεώτερος, ἀμυνέτω ὡς ἀδελφῷ ἢ πατρὶ ἢ ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ. (880b1–6)

If anyone beats a person who is twenty or more years older than himself, in the first place, whoever comes upon them, if he be neither of equal age with, nor younger than, the combatants, shall try to separate them, or else be held to be a coward in the eyes of the law; and if he be of a like age with the man assaulted or still younger, he shall defend him who is wronged as he would a brother or a father or a still older progenitor.

The need to formulate such a mandate and to impose fines on citizens who violate it (880d1–6) reflects Plato's assumption that citizens cannot otherwise be relied on to intervene to stop an assault of a fellow citizen; only by requiring them to intervene in such instances, as if they were interested family members, can one ensure that citizens will provide help.<sup>43</sup>

Thus, in his *Republic* and *Laws* Plato assumes that mutual assistance among fellow citizens must be created by reform, social or legislative, because fellow citizens do not normally assist one another in the way that family members do. Although Plato is not necessarily playing directly off Athens in offering these alternative worlds, this is quite plausible in light of his explicit portrayal of Athens in the *Apology* as a place where mutual assistance among citizens is not the norm. In any event, the ideal worlds that Plato imagines in the *Republic* and the *Laws* lie in striking contrast to the contemporary world of democratic Athens, where citizens are expected not to behave as if they are intimates who are obliged to help one another but rather to coexist peacefully and refrain from harming one another. For Athenian democrats this restraint on the part of free and equal citizens was paramount and a sufficient basis for civic cohesion and solidarity.

## HELPING AS A CIVIC VIRTUE

Although Athenians did not envision mutual support as central to relations among fellow citizens, this does not mean that they viewed helping as irrelevant to their lives as citizens. On the contrary, a fundamental precept of democratic citizenship was that individuals should help the city, which for its part supported and protected them. This powerful ideology of civic

<sup>43</sup> Sternberg (2006: 79; cf. Saunders 1991: 277–8) rightly observes that Athenian law does not appear to have had the sort of mandate for intervention that Plato proposes here. Indeed, in my view Plato is seeking to remedy a defect that he observes in Athens and elsewhere through this legislation.



helping appears, in fact, to have supplanted any idealization of mutual support among fellow citizens. The remainder of this chapter examines the representation of this helping relationship between city and citizen so as to illuminate how Athenians conceptualized helping and the motivations behind this in a civic context.

If Athenians largely refrained from imagining relations among fellow citizens as intimate and affective, and consistent with this did not picture them as based on mutual helping, they envisioned the relationship between citizen and city as close and mutually supportive. Athenians regularly speak of the city in familial terms as the fatherland (*patris*) and of citizens as sons and offspring of the city, who naturally feel affection for it.<sup>44</sup> In keeping with this construction of the bond between citizen and city as intimate and affective is the way Athenians depict it as a close reciprocal relationship in which mutual support abounds. The city benevolently nurtures and raises its sons and they, in return, help and serve it as good citizens.<sup>45</sup> The affection of citizens for the city, in fact, inspires in them a patriotic fervor and zeal (*prothumia*) that impels them not only to serve the city but even to die for it on the battlefield.<sup>46</sup> Although it is hard to miss the prominence of reciprocity between citizen and city in Athenian civic ideology, the manner in which Athenians construct their relationship with the city specifically in terms of mutual helping has drawn little scholarly comment. The following discussion examines first the role of citizens in this helping relationship and then the city's place in it.

### *Citizens Help the City*

The idea that a good citizen helps the city is ubiquitous in Athenian public discourse. When Athenians speak of their patriotic helping, they frequently

<sup>44</sup> For the Athenian state as “father,” see Blundell 1989: 44; Strauss 1993: 44–5, 49, 57–60; Christ 2006: 26–7; Herman 2006: 357–8. On the affective dimensions of relations between citizen and fatherland in the Greek world, see Nielsen 2004; Sebillotte Cuchet 2006a, 2006b. On the subordinate role of “motherland” in this masculine discourse, see Loraux 2000: 23–6; Sebillotte Cuchet 2005; 2006a: 258–60, 268–9; cf. 2006b: 127–31.

<sup>45</sup> On Athenian assumptions concerning father-son relations and a son's debt of gratitude to his father, see Dover 1974: 273–5; Millett 1991: 132–5, 289 n. 11; Strauss 1993: 61–99. This hierarchical model of the citizen's relation with the state coexists with a more egalitarian model based on mutual self-interest (see Christ 2006: 26–7).

<sup>46</sup> On *prothumia* as patriotic zeal, see Christ 2006: 64. Thucydides' Pericles goes so far as to construe passion for service to the city in erotic terms, casting model citizens as “lovers” (*erastai*) of the city (2.43.1; cf. Pl. *Lg.* 643e); on this metaphor, see Monoson 1994: 254, 267–8; cf. Balot 2001: 510–12; McGlew 2002: 41–2; Wohl 2002: 55–62; Ludwig 2002; Christ 2006: 29.

characterize this as “coming to the rescue” (βοηθέω) of the city or of “helping/benefiting” (ὠφελέω) it.<sup>47</sup> Athenians vaunt their service to the city in many capacities, but they claim special praise for putting their persons or property in danger (κίνδυνος) for the city and for aiding it in times of crisis. Although claims of helping the city – and the closely related boasts of helping its laws or the governing majority that is closely identified with it<sup>48</sup> – are so familiar that some might dismiss these as merely commonplace, this portrayal of the citizen’s relationship with the city in terms of helping deserves close attention. A survey of how citizens portray their helping of the city confirms how widespread this conceptualization of citizenship is and illustrates how diverse civic behaviors, with a wide range of motivations behind them, are assimilated – if sometimes with difficulty – to this ideal. Of particular interest is the extent to which individuals acknowledge or suppress the personal interests that may lie behind their helping of the city. As we shall see, although Athenians are drawn to an ideal of spontaneous service to the city inspired by love of country, they also pragmatically accept that helping the city can have a more calculating and selfish side to it.

We consider first how citizens carrying out mandatory civic duties portray their actions in terms of helping the city. Next, we examine how citizens who chose to step forward as advocates of the public interest as speakers (*rhētores*) in the Assembly and as volunteer prosecutors in the courts present their exceptional civic roles in terms of helping the city.

Although Athenians were expected to contribute to the city in a variety of ways, they were subject to two fundamental obligations as citizens: to serve the city as hoplite in time of war and, if they were sufficiently wealthy, to perform needed public services (liturgies) and pay the war tax (*eisphora*). The centrality of these two obligations to Athenian citizenship is reflected in the common formulation that a good citizen serves the city “with person and property” (Dem. 10.28; 42.25).<sup>49</sup> Although Athenians boasting of their performance of these duties often cast them as voluntary, most citizens probably came to serve as hoplites through conscription and performed liturgies and paid the *eisphora* because the city’s

<sup>47</sup> Although Athenians often seem to use βοηθέω and ὠφελέω interchangeably in speaking of helping the city, the latter, which can carry the nuance of financial benefit, crops up especially frequently when wealthy men speak of their service to the city in paying the war tax or carrying out liturgies.

<sup>48</sup> On Athenian conceptualizations of their city and the relation of “the people” (*dēmos*) to it, see Anderson 2009.

<sup>49</sup> On these as fundamental duties, see Hansen 1991: 99–101 and Christ 2006: 1–2.

officials assigned them these responsibilities.<sup>50</sup> Let us consider how litigants addressing popular courts, the Areopagus, or the Council sitting as court locate their performance of these duties within the reciprocal helping relationship between themselves and the city.<sup>51</sup>

**Military Service.** Litigants regularly invoke the ideal that model citizens risk their lives as hoplites in coming to the aid of the city in its time of need.<sup>52</sup> Thus, for example, Mantitheus, a long-haired aristocratic client of Lysias defending himself at his scrutiny (*dokimasia*) for membership on the Council, contrasts his brave service as hoplite with the shirking behavior of others (16.15–17), and then implores jurors:

καίτοι χρηὶ τοὺς φιλοτίμως καὶ κοσμίως πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἴ τις κομᾷ, διὰ τοῦτο μισεῖν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτηδεύματα οὔτε τοὺς ἰδιώτας οὔτε τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως βλάπτει, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κινδυνεύειν ἐθελόντων πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἅπαντες ὑμεῖς ὠφελεῖσθε. (16.18)

Surely, one ought to judge who are the aspiring and orderly citizens from such conduct, and not take the fact of a man’s wearing his hair long as a reason for hating him; for such habits as this do no harm either to private persons or to the public, while it is from those who are ready to face danger before the enemy that you all are helped.

Litigants are equally eloquent in appealing to the ideal of helping the city when they denigrate their opponents for their civic shortcomings. Thus, a client of Lysias, prosecuting a certain Philon at his *dokimasia* for the Council, casts his opponent as an anticitizen who failed to help the exiled democrats oust the Thirty: “when each helped the fatherland to the best of his ability, Philon’s conduct was the opposite of that shown by the rest of the citizens” (ἐπειδὴ . . . καθ’ ὅσον ἕκαστος οἷός τ’ ἦν, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἐβοήθει τῇ πατρίδι, τὰ ἐναντία ἅπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ἐποίησε, 31.8; cf. 31.32). Rather than consider “how he might benefit the city” (ὅπως ὠφελήσει τὴν πόλιν), in fact, Philon looked to “how he might profit personally” (ὅπως τι κερδανεῖ) in this time of crisis; he enriched himself by robbing elderly citizens who were supporters of the democracy but unable

<sup>50</sup> On the compulsory nature of these obligations and citizens’ attempts to evade them, see Christ 2006.

<sup>51</sup> In the survey that follows, I treat litigants’ appeals to their military service and financial service separately because these entail different types of civic helping. Litigants, however, often present claims of military and financial helping in tandem: see Hunt 2010: 279–82 for a survey of both types of claims in the extant orations.

<sup>52</sup> On litigants’ vaunting of their military records, see Burckhardt 1996: 154–256; Roisman 2005: 105–29; Christ 2006: 47; Hunt 2010: 57–9, 279–82.

to help (βοηθεῖν) it because of their age (31.17–18). Likewise, Lycurgus, in his prosecution of Leocrates for leaving the city soon after it suffered defeat at Chaeronea (338 B.C.), portrays his opponent's behavior as antithetical to that of a good citizen: whereas Leocrates abandoned the fatherland and failed to come to the rescue of its ancestral shrines (μὴ βοηθήσαντα δὲ τοῖς πατρώοις ἱεροῖς, 1.8; cf. 1.133), good citizens who were abroad on trade hastened back to assist the city (ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως βοήθειαν, 1.57).<sup>53</sup>

Litigants portray the failure of citizens to help the city as not only a violation of the norms of good citizenship but a breach of the reciprocal helping relationship between citizen and city. Thus, a prosecutor of Andocides, after rebuking him for failing in the closing years of the Peloponnesian War to support the city as hoplite, trierarch, or payer of the *eisphora*, or “to help the fatherland” (ὠφελεῖσαι τὴν πατρίδα) by importing grain (Lys. 6.46–8), pointedly asks him “what return have you made for your nurture [sc. by the city]” (ποῖα τροφεῖα ἀνταποδοῦς, 6.49). Similarly, it is Leocrates' breach of the citizen's mutual helping relationship with the city that Lycurgus condemns. No city, he asserts, will welcome Leocrates as exile, knowing that a man who did not help (οὐκ ἐβοήθησεν) his own fatherland would be unlikely to face any danger for his adopted land. Social misfits like Leocrates fail to understand the mutual nature of helping between citizen and city: “they will partake of the advantages offered by the state but will not deem it worthy of help in times of difficulty” (οἱ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τῶν τῆς πόλεως μετέξουσιν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀτυχίαις οὐδὲ βοηθείας ἀξιῶσουσιν) (1.133; cf. Thuc. 2.63.1).

If litigants could present the performance of military service as the repayment of an outstanding debt to the city and a return for benefits received, they could also cast this as assistance that obliges jurors, acting on behalf of the city, to show their gratitude (*charis*) by rendering help in return in the form of a favorable verdict.<sup>54</sup> Thus, for example, Lysias' client Mantitheus makes his military service the basis of his appeal for a reciprocal good turn of forensic *charis* from his audience:

ὥστ' εἴ τινες ὑμῶν ὀργίζονται τοῖς τὰ μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἀξιοῦσι πράττειν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κινδύνων ἀποδιδράσκουσιν, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως περὶ ἐμοῦ τὴν γνώμην ταύτην ἔχοιεν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ προσταττόμενα ἐποιοῦν προθύμως, ἀλλὰ καὶ κινδυνεύειν ἐτόλμων. καὶ ταῦτ' ἐποιοῦν οὐχ ὥς οὐ δεινὸν ἡγούμενος εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίοις μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἵνα, εἴ ποτε ἀδίκως εἰς κίνδυνον καθισταίμην,

<sup>53</sup> Lys. 31 and Lyc. 1 are discussed at greater length in Chapter III.

<sup>54</sup> On forensic *charis*, see Davies 1971: xvii–xviii; 1981: 92–7; Millett 1998; Johnstone 1999: 100–6; Rubinstein 2000: 212–31; Christ 2006: 180–4. On *charis* as a binding force within the city, see Fisher 2010.

διὰ ταῦτα βελτίων ὑφ' ὑμῶν νομιζόμενος ἀπάντων τῶν δικαίων τυγχάνοιμι.  
(16.17)

So if any of you are angry at those who claim the right to manage the city's affairs and yet run away from its dangers, you could not justly hold that opinion about me; for I not only carried out my orders with zeal, but I was also bold to face danger. I acted in this way, not because I did not think it a serious thing to do battle with the Lacedaemonians, but in order that, if ever I should be unjustly forced into litigation, I would be better received by you because of this and would receive full justice.

One may doubt that Mantisheus was so prescient as to anticipate an unjust prosecution of himself and to act self-consciously so as to lay up *charis* with the city on which he might later draw. His reconstruction of his motivations for serving the city well, however, which is paralleled elsewhere, reveals much about Athenian assumptions concerning the relationship between citizen and city.<sup>55</sup> Mantisheus presents himself as not only a zealous patriot eager to help his city (16.18) but also a calculating individual who seeks through the help he renders the city to help himself in future legal contests and thus to capitalize on the reciprocal helping relationship between citizen and city. While litigants might be castigated before an Athenian jury for pursuing personal profit (*kerdos*) instead of helping the city (Lys. 31.17; cf. 20.31; Dem. 36.58–9), it was apparently acceptable for them to acknowledge that in helping the city, they were simultaneously helping themselves by laying up a stock of *charis* to draw on in the future.<sup>56</sup>

**Financial Service.** When wealthy litigants speak of their performance of liturgies and payment of the war tax, they regularly vaunt this as help rendered to the city and locate this within the mutual helping relationship between citizen and city.<sup>57</sup> The fact that only a wealthy minority were obliged to support the city in this way, however, created tensions between the city and its sometimes reluctant benefactors. This explains the often pointed nature of the claims that wealthy litigants make about their record of helping and the sacrifices involved, and their insistence on the forensic *charis* that the city owes them in return for this.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Lys. 20.30; 25.13; And. 1.141; Dover 1974: 293.

<sup>56</sup> Litigants also openly acknowledge the role that the personal pursuit of honor (*philotimia*) plays in motivating them to serve the city (see Christ 2006: 171–2, with 171 n. 57).

<sup>57</sup> It is important to note that wealthy Athenians speak of their financial services not as directed toward “the poor” but rather as performed for the city and the majority that rules it. Deme decrees honoring wealthy benefactors likewise emphasize the collective benefit they have bestowed on their fellow demesmen: see Whitehead 1986: 245, with 245 n. 108.

<sup>58</sup> On tensions between the city and its wealthy benefactors, see Christ 2006: 143–204.

Litigants appeal to the ideal that the model citizen helps the city through performance of liturgies and payment of the *eisphora* both when they laud individuals who embrace this ideal and rebuke those who reject it. For example, a client of Isaeus, Thrasyllus, contrasts the behavior of Apollodorus, whose estate he is seeking to inherit, with that of his opponent, Pronapes, who is seeking the estate on behalf of his wife. Whereas Pronapes took steps to evade the *eisphora* by submitting a low assessment for his property, Apollodorus knew it was necessary to help the city (ὕμᾱς . . . ὠφελεῖν) and therefore “openly declared the amount of his fortune and carried out zealously all the service that you ordered him to do” (ἀλλὰ φανερά τὰ ὄντα καταστήσας ὑμῖν, ὅσα προστάττοιτε, πάνθ’ ὑπηρέτει φιλοτίμως) (7.39).<sup>59</sup> Thrasyllus proceeds to praise Apollodorus for acting as a model citizen, who rather than conceal his property is among the first to pay the *eisphora* whenever the city needs money (7.40; cf. Lys. 18.21); he casts himself as a similarly dutiful citizen, who joins in the city’s military expeditions and performs liturgies (7.41–2), unlike his opponents who have reduced to desolation an estate that once sustained a trierarchy (7.42).<sup>60</sup> Another client of Isaeus, Menexenus, attacks Dikaiogenes for his failure to help the city in any way whatsoever:

διὰ τί οὖν ἀξιώσεις σου τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀποψηφίσασθαι, ὦ Δικαιογενεῖς; πότερον ὅτι πολλὰς λητουργίας ληλητούργηκας τῇ πόλει καὶ πολλὰ χρήματα δαπανήσας σεμνοτέραν τὴν πόλιν τούτοις ἐποίησας; ἢ ὡς τριηραρχῶν πολλὰ κακὰ τοὺς πολεμίους εἰργάσω καὶ εἰσφοράς δεομένη τῇ πατρίδι εἰς τὸν πόλεμον εἰσενεγκῶν μεγάλα ὠφέληκας; ἀλλ’ οὐδέν σοι τούτων πέπρακται. (5.45–6)

On what grounds, Dikaiogenes, do you think the jurors should acquit you? Because you have performed many liturgies for the city and enhanced the majesty of their city by spending a lot of money? Or, because as trierarch, you have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, or bestowed great benefits upon your fatherland in its hour of need by paying the war tax? No, you have done none of these things.

In casting Dikaiogenes as a bad citizen who fails to help the city in its need, Menexenus seeks to preempt any claim to *charis* he might make to jurors on the grounds that his prior good services warrant favorable treatment. Notably, in rejecting any claim to *charis* from Dikaiogenes, he takes for

<sup>59</sup> Wealthy Athenians routinely concealed their wealth from public view to avoid some or all of their liability to liturgies and the *eisphora*: see Gabrielsen 1986; 1994: 53–60; E. Cohen 1992: 191–207; Christ 1990: 158–60; 2006: 191–4. On the self-assessment for the *eisphora* alluded to here, see Christ 2007a: 63–7.

<sup>60</sup> Note the similar claim that a model citizen spends more money on the city than on himself (Is. 6.60; cf. 7.39).

granted the legitimacy of genuine benefactors of the city seeking help from jurors in exchange for their civic helping.<sup>61</sup>

Indeed, wealthy litigants are not at all shy about seeking legal help from jurors in exchange for the help they or their families have provided to the city. Consider, for example, how Polystratus' son speaking on behalf of his father, who is facing a charge in connection with his support of the oligarchy of 411, seeks a reciprocal good turn from the jury in exchange for the patriotic services of his father, himself, and his two brothers.<sup>62</sup> First, he focuses on his father's helpfulness to the city:

ὥς δ' ἦν δημοτικός, ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἀποδείξω. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὅσων οὐδεμιᾶς στρατείας ἀπελείφθη, ἀλλ' ἐστρατεύετο, ὥς συνειδότες ἂν εἴποιεν οἱ δημόται· καὶ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφανῇ καταστήσαντι μηδὲν ὑμᾶς ὠφελεῖν, εἴλετο μᾶλλον συνειδέναι ὑμᾶς, ἵν', εἰ καὶ βούλοιτο κακὸς εἶναι, μὴ ἐξείη αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' εἰσφέρει τε τὰς εἰσφορὰς καὶ λητουργοίη. καὶ ἡμᾶς παρεσκεύασεν, ὥς ἂν τῇ πόλει ὠφελιμώτατοι εἴημεν. (Lys. 20.23)

I will demonstrate to you that he supported the common people. First, his demesmen would be able to say from personal knowledge how often he served on campaign without a break. Then, he could have made his property invisible and given you no help, but instead he wanted you to know about it – so that even if he did want to be bad that would not be possible, but he would have to pay the war taxes and perform liturgies. Moreover, he brought us [his three sons] up to be most helpful to the city.<sup>63</sup>

The speaker proceeds to relate in detail how he and his brothers have all provided military support to the city (20.24–9) and then bluntly seeks reciprocal help in the form of forensic *charis* from the jurors as a reward for his family's assistance of the city:

πῶς οὖν οὐ χρὴ χάριν παρ' ὑμῶν ἀπολαμβάνειν, εἰ τοιοῦτοί ἐσμεν; <ἦ> ὦν μὲν ὁ πατὴρ διαβέβληται εἰς ὑμᾶς, δικαίως τούτων δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἕνεκα ἀπολέσθαι, {δὲ} ὦν δὲ πρόθυμοι εἰς τὴν πόλιν γεγενήμεθα, μηδεμίαν ὠφέλειαν γενέσθαι; ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' εἰ διὰ τὴν τούτου διαβολὴν δεῖ ἡμᾶς <τῇ> πᾶσχειν, δίκαιοί ἐσμεν διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν προθυμίαν τοῦτόν τε σῶσαι καὶ ἡμᾶς. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡμεῖς χρημάτων γε ἕνεκα, ἵνα λάβοιμεν, εὖ ὑμᾶς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἵνα, εἰ ποτε κίνδυνος

<sup>61</sup> Lycurgus (1.139–40) exceptionally proposes that a performer of festival liturgies, unlike trierarchs and other benefactors, does not deserve *charis* because his service advances only his household and “he does not benefit others” (τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν ὠφελῶν).

<sup>62</sup> On the circumstances of the case, see Todd 2000: 217–19.

<sup>63</sup> The speaker's characterization of himself and his brothers as “most helpful” (ὠφελιμώτατοι) in this context, where he has just spoken of his father's financial helping of the city, implies that they have followed their father's example in providing the city benefits of this sort.

εἴη ἡμῖν, ἐξαιτούμενοι παρ' ὑμῶν τὴν ἀξίαν χάριν ἀπολάβοιμεν. χρηὴ δὲ ὑμᾶς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνεκα τοιούτους εἶναι, γινώσκοντας ὅτι, ἐάν τις πρόθυμος εἰς ὑμᾶς ᾖ, οὐ μόνον ἡμᾶς ὠφελήσετε· ἡμῶν μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρὶν δεηθῆναι πεπεύρασθε, οἱ εἰσμεν εἰς ὑμᾶς· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους προθυμοτέρους ποιήσετε, κατ' ἀξίαν χαριζόμενοι, ὅς' ἂν τις ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιῇ. (20.30–1)

How then should we not obtain *charis* from you, if we are such men. Is it right for us to be destroyed because of slanders you have heard against our father but to have no benefit from the zeal that we have shown in the city's service? No, it is not right. If we must suffer anything because of the slanders against the defendant, we deserve to save both him and ourselves because of our patriotic zeal. The reason we treated you well was not to receive money, but so that if we were ever in danger, you would grant our request [for acquittal] as a deserved favor (*charis*). You should do this to influence others also, recognizing that you will be benefiting not just us [but yourselves as well], if anyone shows patriotic zeal to you in the future. You have had experience of what sort of people we are toward you, even before we requested your favor, but you will make others more zealous by showing appropriate gratitude for whatever good anybody does you.

This speaker not only directly seeks help from jurors in exchange for help given to the city by his family but asserts that it was indeed in anticipation of such a future need that they so zealously supported the city. The help that they seek, he insists, is in an appropriate form – namely, a legal favor (*charis*) in exchange for their prior services; this does not involve a crass exchange of money, which might suggest they were seeking personal profit (*kerdos*) through their civic services but rather a reciprocal action by the jury that corresponds to the generous actions of the speaker's family. The speaker suggests, moreover, that jurors, acting on behalf of the city, will not only be doing the right thing by repaying the city's debt to his family but will be helping themselves and the city because the city's other benefactors will be more zealous in their service if they see that the city honors its mutual helping relationship with its supporters. Strikingly, the speaker thus projects his own calculus of helping onto jurors: just as he and his family gave help to the city to ensure future help from it, so too will jurors, acting on behalf of the city, render help on the current occasion to help ensure future help from other benefactors. In fact, as he concludes his speech, he indicates that if the jury honors its reciprocal relationship with its benefactors, it is not only other citizens but his own family who will help the city: a favorable verdict will allow him and his brothers to go even further in their benefactions to the city (20.36).

Other litigants are even more blunt in promising future benefits to the city should jurors come to their assistance on the present occasion.



As Isaeus' client Thrasyllus puts it in laying claim to the estate of Apollodorus: "We have already performed liturgies and will continue to do so, if you ratify the intentions of Apollodorus by restoring to us this estate" (ἡμῶν δὲ καὶ λελητουργηκότων ἤδη καὶ λητουργησόντων, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς ἐπικυρώσητε τὴν Ἀπολλοδώρου γνώμην ἀποδόντες ἡμῖν τοῦτον τὸν κλῆρον) (7.42). Some litigants directly invite jurors to calculate how much they will benefit from helping them in their current legal distress through a favorable verdict. Thus, a wealthy client of Lysias, arguing against the confiscation of his father's fortune, insists that the city will benefit more by leaving it to him and his kin because they are generous benefactors of the city: "if you will take my advice, you will receive no less benefit from it than we, the owners" (ἐὰν δ' ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, οὐκ ἐλάττω ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὑμεῖς ὠφεληθήσεσθε ἢ ἡμεῖς οἱ κεκτημένοι) (18.20–1). Another client of Lysias, who is also arguing that his father's estate should not be confiscated, lays even stronger emphasis on how the city will benefit if jurors leave the estate in the hands of its current possessors, who are civic benefactors: "So not only with a view to your reputation, but also in respect of money, it will profit you more to acquit us; for you will get far more benefit if we keep it" (ὥστε οὐ μόνον πρὸς δόξαν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς χρημάτων λόγον λυσιτελεῖ μᾶλλον ὑμῖν ἀποψηφίσασθαι· πολὺ γὰρ πλείω ὠφεληθήσεσθ', ἐὰν ἡμεῖς ἔχωμεν) (19.61; cf. 62).<sup>64</sup> Interestingly, although litigants do their best to distance themselves from the charge that they help the city with an eye toward base personal profit (*kerdos*), they are sometimes comfortable attributing to jurors a legitimate desire to provide financial benefits to themselves and the city.<sup>65</sup>

Although litigants' specific claims about helping the city as hoplites or liturgists and payers of the *eisphora* may be exaggerated or even false, the fact that they consistently invoke the same model of reciprocal helping between citizen and city points to the appeal of this to the large popular audiences they were seeking to persuade. It is clear from their presentation of this mutual helping relationship that, although it is a close and friendly bond, it is also grounded in mutual self-interest. A good citizen helps the city because it ensures his personal prosperity as long as it is flourishing. The city, through the large groups of citizens who judge suits on its behalf, helps litigants in recognition of the help it has received from them in the past and in anticipation of the help it hopes to receive in the future

<sup>64</sup> For similar promises of future benefit, see Lys. 21.25; Is. 6.61; Dem. 28.24; 36.58–9; cf. Lanni 2006: 63 n. 106.

<sup>65</sup> The *dēmos*, however, like individual citizens, is meant to shun disgraceful or dishonest profit from its activities: see Hyp. *Eux.* 37, quoted earlier in the text.

from them and others who see that the city indeed helps those who help it. Through this ongoing cycle of reciprocal helping, the interests of individual citizens and of the city are advanced.

Citizens who helped the city by performing their civic duties did not need to explain or justify their personal involvement in the city's affairs since their helping was not only expected but mandatory. Individuals who stepped forward unbidden to help the city, however, could find their motivations placed under close scrutiny and subject to dark interpretations before a public that was highly attuned to the role of private interests in public service. The tensions surrounding voluntary helping in the public sphere are well illustrated by two conspicuous roles that volunteers filled, service as a public speaker offering political advice to the Athenian Assembly or as a public prosecutor of an alleged enemy of the city in the law courts. Although the same individuals often assumed both roles, it is useful to consider these separately because they involved distinctive activities that could evoke different concerns from the public and therefore divergent strategies of self-presentation from the individuals involved.

**Political Service: *Rhētores*.** In democratic Athens anyone who wished (ὁ βουλόμενος) could address the Assembly and offer advice on the topic under debate, from domestic affairs to interstate relations.<sup>66</sup> Although average citizens may often have risen to register their opinions, an elite group of public speakers (*rhētores*) emerged as regular advisors to the *dēmos*. They were commonly wealthy, sometimes of aristocratic background, and educated; as men of leisure who were often trained in public speaking, they were in a good position to attend and address the Assembly frequently. These volunteer advisors were under pressure in addressing the *dēmos* to reconcile their elite background and status with democratic values and to assure mass audiences that they embraced democratic ideology.<sup>67</sup> An interesting facet of their self-presentation is the way they present themselves as helpers of the people and the city, and how they insist upon the purity of the motivations behind their helping.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>66</sup> On the role of ὁ βουλόμενος in the Assembly and elsewhere in Athenian democracy, see Hansen 1991: 266–8.

<sup>67</sup> On elite speakers addressing mass audiences, see Ober 1989. On *rhētores* and their role within the democracy, see also Hansen 1991: 268–71; cf. Yunis 1996; Piepenbrink 2001: 93–170.

<sup>68</sup> Recent scholarship only addresses this briefly: see Connor 1971: 99–119; Ober 1989: 316; Yunis 1996: 52; 2001: 201, 207. *Rhētores*' claims of selfless helping could be viewed in modern terms as claims of "pure altruism" (on this concept, see the Introduction).

The idea that a public advisor and leader is a helper of the city first crops up in Athenian sources in the poetry of Solon (ca. 590 B.C.), well before the emergence of the classical democracy in 508/7 B.C.<sup>69</sup> Solon portrays himself as a mediator in the conflict between rich and poor, protecting the interests of both in an equitable manner: “I stood with a mighty shield cast round both sides and did not allow either to have an unjust victory” (ἔστην δ’ ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι, | νικᾶν δ’ οὐκ ἔασ’ οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως) (fr. 5.5–6 West). Consistent with this heroic image is Solon’s assertion elsewhere that his service puts him in danger because the competing factions fail to appreciate his efforts at mediation and turn against him: “For that reason I set up a defense on every side and turned about like a wolf among a pack of dogs” (τῶν οὐνεκ’ ἄλκην πάντοθεν ποί<ε>ός μιν | ὥς ἐν κυσὶν πολλῇσιν ἐστράφην λύκος) (fr. 36.26–7 West).

Democratic *rhētores*, although operating in a very different political context, likewise vaunt their heroic helping of the city and the risks this entails for them.<sup>70</sup> From their first prominent appearance in our late-fifth-century sources, they cast themselves as helpers of the people. As Robert Connor (1971: 99–119) has argued, a new breed of “politicians” in this period cast themselves as friends of the people and, in keeping with the common assumption that friends are obliged to assist one another, claimed to help the people to advance their interests and to fend off enemies through their efforts in the Assembly and law courts.<sup>71</sup> These individuals, however, did not characterize this as a friendship among equals but rather one in which they gave priority to the interests of the people over their own. Some *rhētores* conveyed the idea of their subservience through the graphic image that they were “watchdogs” of the people, dutifully and loyally seeking to protect them and their interests. The comic poet Aristophanes satirizes such claims, presenting Cleon as a voracious hound who preys on the *dēmos* rather than protecting it (*Eq.* 1017–34, V. 894–930).<sup>72</sup> That public helping is a veil for the pursuit of private interests recurs frequently as a criticism of Athenian public figures under the democracy.

Our best documentation of the conspicuous role of helping in political rhetoric comes from fourth-century oratory in which public speakers

<sup>69</sup> For Solon as a proto-*rhētōr*, see Noussia 2006.

<sup>70</sup> On the risks of being a *rhētōr*, see And. 4.1; Aeschin. 2.183; Dem. *Ep.* 3.3; Hyp. *Eux.* 9; cf. Isoc. 16.41–2; Din. fr. 87 Conomis.

<sup>71</sup> For similar depictions in the fourth century of the *rhētōr* as a friend of the people, see Dem. 15.33; 18.220; 58.30.

<sup>72</sup> Similar imagery is applied to other *rhētores* in this period: see Eup. fr. 220 K-A; X. *Mem.* 2.9.2, 7. This imagery continues to crop up in connection with *rhētores* through the fourth century: see Dem. 25.40; 26.22; cf. Thphr. *Char.* 29.4a; Plu. *Dem.* 23; Christ 1998a: 149.

regularly invoke the standard that a model *rhētōr* helps the city. Thus one of Aristogeiton’s prosecutors advises jurors:

δεῖ δ’ ὑμᾶς ἅπαντας μὲν ἀπείργειν καὶ κωλύειν τοὺς παρανομοῦντας, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὄντας καὶ τοὺς πολιτευομένους· διὰ γὰρ τούτους τὰ κοινὰ καὶ βλάπτεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἔαν ὥσι φαῦλοι, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα πάλιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἔαν ὥσιν ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ θέλωσιν ἐμμένειν τοῖς νόμοις. (Dem. 26.1–2; cf. 26.14)

You must restrain and check all lawbreakers, but especially those who hold office and take part in public affairs because such men tend to injure the community, if they are base, and on the other hand to confer the greatest benefit upon it, if they are honest men and willing to abide by the laws.

The idea that the *rhētōr* stands in a critical position to help or harm the city has a profound impact on how public speakers talk about themselves and their rivals.

The centrality of helping in the public image of *rhētores* is abundantly clear in the hostile exchanges between Demosthenes and his political rivals. For example, Demosthenes’ longtime rival and enemy Aeschines, in prosecuting Ctesiphon for illegally proposing that Demosthenes be awarded a crown by the people, preemptively challenges Demosthenes’ claims concerning which of them has helped the city:

περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς ἑμαυτὸν λοιδοριῶν βραχέα βούλομαι προειπεῖν. πυνθάνομαι γὰρ λέξειν Δημοσθένην ὡς ἡ πόλις ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ μὲν ὠφέληται πολλά, ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ δὲ καταβέβλαπται, καὶ τὸν Φίλιππον καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων αἰτίας ἀνοίσειν ἐπ’ ἐμέ. (3.215)

I wish to caution you in a few words as to the slanders that will be made against me. For I understand that Demosthenes will speak about how the city has been helped in many ways by him, whereas it has been greatly harmed by me, and he will cast against me Philip, Alexander, and charges connected with them.

Indeed, Demosthenes aggressively takes up the topic of helping at length in his defense of Ctesiphon (18.301–14).

In this speech, Demosthenes sharply contrasts his patriotic helping of the city with Aeschines’ base and venal service to its enemies.<sup>73</sup> Whereas Demosthenes presents himself as a model citizen and *rhētōr* (18.301) who diligently and honestly advises the city and successfully proposes decrees to

<sup>73</sup> Balot (2009: 283) aptly observes of Demosthenes’ speech that it is “an extended analysis of his virtues and Aeschines’ vices.”

protect it and its interests (301–5; cf. 308; 13.13), he portrays Aeschines as his polar opposite in his perverse service to the city’s enemies for personal gain:

οὐ μὰ Δί’ οὐκ ἀποστάντα τῶν συμφερόντων τῇ πόλει, μισθώσαντα δ’ αὐτὸν τοῖς ἐναντίοις, τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν καιροὺς ἀντὶ τῶν τῆς πατρίδος θεραπεύειν, οὐδὲ τὸν μὲν πράγματ’ ἄξια τῆς πόλεως ὑποστάντα λέγειν καὶ γράφειν καὶ μένειν ἐπὶ τούτων βασκαίνειν. (18.307)

[It was not the duty of a good citizen], by Zeus, to abandon what was advantageous to his city, to take the hire of its adversaries, to subserviently seek opportunities that suit, not his fatherland, but its enemies. It was not his duty to malign a man who endeavors to propose, move, and support measures worthy of the city.

Demosthenes proceeds to point out how Aeschines has utterly failed to serve the best interests of the city as *rhētōr* and to act for the benefit of the people, and thus has failed the traditional test (ἐξέτασις) of what makes a good statesman (18.309–10). In Aeschines’ entire career, in fact, Demosthenes can find no evidence whatsoever of his helping the city as political advisor or benefactor (18.311–12).<sup>74</sup>

When Demosthenes was prosecuted for bribery in connection with the Harpalus affair (323 B.C.), however, his opponents applied the same standard of helping the city to him and found him grossly deficient. One of his prosecutors, for example, asks:

ἐπειτα ποῦ τῆς εὐνοίας τῆς σῆς ὁ δῆμος ἔλαβε πείραν, ἢ ποῦ τὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος βοήθειαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐξεταζομένην εἶδομεν; ἢ ἐνταῦθα φήσεται εἶναι δεινοί, εἰ παρακρούεσθε τούτους ἀεὶ λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξω τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῖν ἐξελεῖν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη καταφυγὴ χωρὶς τῆς ὑμετέρας εὐνοίας; φανεροὺς ἐχρῆν γεγενημένους ἀντιπράττοντας καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ τοῖς κατὰ τοῦ δήμου γραφομένοις ψηφίσμασιν, οὕτω πείθειν τούτους λέγοντας ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ὑμῖν οὐδεμία σωτηρία χωρὶς τῆς παρὰ τοῦ δήμου βοήθειας. (Din. 1.102)

In what way then did the people sample your goodwill, where did we see proof of the orator’s power to help? Or will you all maintain that herein lie your powers: to cheat these men by persisting in saying, “It is not possible for us to leave the fatherland,” and “there is no other refuge than your goodwill”? You should have made it clear that in speech and action you opposed the decrees brought forward against the people’s interests and thus

<sup>74</sup> Note especially Dem. 18.311: “What civic, communal benefit have you rendered either the affluent or the indigent? None!” (τίς ἢ τοῖς εὐπόροις ἢ τοῖς ἀπόροις πολιτικὴ καὶ κοινὴ βοήθεια; οὐδεμία.) The MSS read βοήθεια χρημάτων, but Yunis (2001: 283) argues persuasively in support of Blass that χρημάτων is an interpolation.

you would persuade these men when you say that you have no means of safety apart from the help of the people.

Demosthenes' prosecutor thus insists that he has no legitimate claim to seek reciprocal help from the jury on the present occasion because as *rhētōr* he has failed to help the city.

This last passage raises the question of what a *rhētōr* can legitimately hope to get in return for the help he renders the city. Although *rhētores* typically present their help to the city as a matter of spontaneous good citizenship and patriotism and not rendered in anticipation of any benefit, sometimes they seek a reward for their efforts on the grounds that this is merited. Demosthenes, for example, in his exchange with Aeschines over the crown that Ctesiphon proposed the *dēmos* should give Demosthenes, argues that this is an appropriate honor and show of gratitude (*charis*) for his services to the city (18.299). Further, a *rhētōr* on trial might well, as Demosthenes' prosecutor in the Harpalus affair suggests, attempt to seek gratitude for his services in the form of forensic *charis* (Din. 1.102). This is, in fact, what Aeschines does, as he approaches the conclusion of his defense when prosecuted by Demosthenes for his role as ambassador to Philip:

ἐὰν οὖν ἐθελήσητε σώζειν τοὺς τῆς εἰρήνης καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀδείας συναγωνιστάς, πολλοὺς βοηθοὺς λήψεται τὸ τῆς πόλεως συμφέρον καὶ κινδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐτοίμους. (2.183)

If, therefore, you are willing to save those who have labored together with you for peace and for your security, the common good will find many helpers, ready to face danger in your behalf.

Like litigants appealing for forensic *charis* in other circumstances, Aeschines suggests that it is not only right that the city help him in light of his service as *rhētōr* but advantageous to it because a favorable verdict will lead others to step forward like him to take risks as helpers of the city.

If a *rhētōr* might seek a return of honor or forensic *charis* from the *dēmos* for his service, it was important that he disavow interest in gaining financially through his political activities. Thus, for example, Thucydides' Pericles presents himself as "patriotic and above money" (φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων, 2.60.5), and Demosthenes contrasts Aeschines' pursuit of shameful gain (αἰσχροκερδία, 18.295) as a hireling of Philip and Alexander (18.294–7) with his own incorruptibility:

ἐμ' οὔτε καιρὸς οὔτε φιλανθρωπία λόγων οὔτ' ἐπαγγελιῶν μέγεθος οὔτ' ἐλπὶς οὔτε φόβος οὔτ' ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἐπῆρεν οὔδ' ἐπροηγάγετο ὧν ἔκρινα δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων τῇ πατρίδι οὐδὲν προδοῦναι, οὐδ', ὅσα συμβεβούλευκα πώποτε

τουτοισί, ὁμοίως ὑμῖν ὥσπερ ἂν τρυτάνη ρέπων ἐπὶ τὸ λῆμμα συμβεβούλευκα, ἀλλ' ἅπ' ὀρθῆς καὶ δικαίης καὶ ἀδιαφθόρου τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ μεγίστων δὴ πραγμάτων τῶν κατ' ἑμαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων προστάς πάνθ' ὕγιῶς καὶ δικαίως πεπολίτευμαι. 18.298)

No opportunity, no friendly words, no large promises, no hope, no fear, or any other thing at all induced or seduced me to betray what I judged to be just and advantageous for the fatherland; nor, whenever I advised these men, did I offer that advice as you and your accomplices did, sinking toward profit like a balance, but rather with an honest, just, and incorruptible soul. Presiding over the greatest issues affecting the people of my day I directed the city's affairs throughout with purity and justice.

Notwithstanding such claims of absolute virtue, however, it was no secret that those in public life stood in a position to benefit not only the city but themselves, for example, by accepting “gifts” in exchange for favors.<sup>75</sup>

Hyperides, as one of Demosthenes' prosecutors for bribery in the Harpalus affair, offers a principle for evaluating such profit-making on the part of public figures:

ὅπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷι δήμῳ εἶπον, πολλὰ ὑμεῖς ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ δίδοτε ἐ]κόντες τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ῥήτορσιν ὠφελῆσθαι, οὐ τῶν νόμων αὐτοῖς δεδωκότων τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑμετέρας πραότητος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας, ἐν μόνον παραφυλάττοντες, ὅπως δι' ὑμᾶς καὶ μὴ καθ' ὑμῶν ἔσται τὸ λαμβανόμενον (*Dem.* 24–5)

It is as I said in the Assembly. You willingly allow, gentlemen of the jury, generals and orators great scope to benefit themselves (cf. *Hyp. Eux.* 9). It is not the laws which grant them this but your tolerance and generosity. But on one point you insist: your interests must be furthered, not opposed, with the money they receive.

According to Hyperides, however, Demosthenes' profiteering comes at the expense of the city, and therefore must not be tolerated (cf. Aeschin. 3.170). Although one may doubt that the Athenian public was as indulgent toward profit making on the part of *rhētores* as Hyperides asserts here, Athenians appear to have been relatively tolerant of what many modern Westerners would view as outright bribery and corruption.<sup>76</sup> It was one thing, however, for *rhētores* to discreetly profit on the side from their

<sup>75</sup> Contrast Aeschines' portrayal (3.173) of Demosthenes as utterly corrupt, profiting at the expense of the people by taking bribes from the city's enemies.

<sup>76</sup> On Athenian attitudes toward bribery, see Wankel 1982, 1991; MacDowell 1983; Harvey 1985; Strauss 1985; Hansen 1991: 274–6; Whitehead 2000: 438; C. Taylor 2001a, 2001b.

activities and quite another for them to call attention to this. Significantly, if *rhētores* regularly gained personal profit from their public service, they did not call attention to this, for this might make them vulnerable to the charge that their service was but a pretense for their private enrichment and even lead to legal prosecution. On the contrary, they found the safest course was to insist on the purity of their motivations in helping the city and to insist on the corruption of those opposing them.

**Public Prosecution.** Athenians allowed anyone who wished (ὁ βουλόμενος) to bring a public prosecution either on behalf of a wronged individual in special circumstances or on behalf of the city itself when it suffered some wrong.<sup>77</sup> In Chapter I, I argued that volunteer prosecutions of the first sort were uncommon, and this reflected the reluctance of Athenians to risk getting involved in the problems of other individuals. Volunteer prosecutions on behalf of the city were, by contrast, quite common and the city was, in fact, reliant on these in the absence of a standing body of state-appointed prosecutors. Although any Athenian could bring a volunteer prosecution, members of the elite were especially well situated to carry out this service for the same reasons they were able to serve frequently as *rhētores* in the Assembly – namely, many were trained in the art of rhetoric, and they had the leisure to participate actively in public life; in addition, elite Athenians had sufficient wealth to risk the statutory fines that fell on unsuccessful prosecutions. Indeed, often the same individuals who addressed the Assembly as *rhētores* served as volunteer prosecutors because this was an effective way for *rhētores* to advance themselves and their political agendas.

Volunteer prosecution and the motivations behind it, however, appear to have been subject to especially close scrutiny from the public, which was inclined to regard cynically the claim that a prosecutor was simply a patriotic helper of the city. This reflects the fact that volunteer prosecution was a conspicuously aggressive act undertaken by individuals or groups and entailed high stakes because conspicuous failure could lead to a huge fine of 1,000 drachmas and partial disfranchisement, and success could enrich or otherwise benefit the prosecutor.<sup>78</sup> The public naturally wondered why a volunteer prosecutor had assumed this role and was acutely conscious that volunteer prosecution might be motivated not by eagerness

<sup>77</sup> On volunteer prosecution, see Christ 1998a: 118–59; the analysis here draws on my earlier discussion (especially on 148–50). See also Rubinstein 2000: 91–111, 186–212, but cf. Christ 2002.

<sup>78</sup> On these statutory penalties, see Chapter I, note 104.



to serve the public interest but rather by desire for personal profit or malice. Defendants regularly sought to exploit the public's worst suspicions and prosecutors exerted themselves to demonstrate that, whatever their personal stake in a suit might be, they were genuine helpers of the city.

Public prosecutors in Athens routinely portray themselves as patriotic citizens who have courageously stepped forward to help the city and its laws. Thus, a prosecutor before the popular courts seeks credit for boldly initiating the current prosecution in a preliminary hearing before the Council:

τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων ἡσυχίαν ἀγόντων ἀναστὰς αὐτῶν κατηγοροῦν, καὶ πᾶσι φανερόν ἐποίησα ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὲρ τούτων ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις ἐβοήθουν. (Lys. 22.3)

While the rest kept quiet, I rose and accused these men, and made it clear to all that I was speaking not in their defense, but rather I was assisting the established laws.

That the claim of helping the city is central to prosecutorial rhetoric is evident from the way prosecutors sometimes invoke this trope near the end of their speeches to sum up what they have undertaken to do. For example, as Aeschines concludes his prosecution of Ctesiphon, he proclaims “I have given my help [to the city] and have spoken” (βεβοήθηκα καὶ εἶρηκα, 3.260). Similarly, when Lycurgus approaches the end of his prosecution of Leocrates, he speaks of himself as “helping the fatherland, its temples and its laws” (ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ τῇ πατρίδι βοηθῶν καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς καὶ τοῖς νόμοις) (1.149).<sup>79</sup> The claim of prosecutors that they “come to the rescue” (βοηθέω) of the city suggests there is something valorous about their activity, and consistent with this is their emphasis on the risks (κίνδυνοι) that they take in helping the city: they risk not only the statutory penalties falling on unsuccessful prosecutors (Dem. 24.3; [Dem.] 53.1; Lyc. 1.3) but also the enmity of their opponents, who may seek vengeance on them through lawsuits or other means (Dem. 23.1; 58.59–60; Lyc. 1.3; cf. Ant. 6.35).

In vaunting their willingness to face dangers to help the city, public prosecutors link their behavior implicitly to that of hoplites serving the

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Din. 1.114, where a publicly appointed *sunēgoros* proclaims: “I have given help [to the city] insofar as this fell to my part of the prosecution” (ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὅσον εἰς τὸ μέρος τοῦμὸν τῆς κατηγορίας ἦκει, βεβοήθηκα). Litigants in private suits sometimes conclude their speeches with assertions that they have helped not only themselves or their relatives but the city's laws (Ant. 1.31; Dem. 43.84).

city in time of war. Thus, Aeschines depicts his prosecution of Ctesiphon in martial terms, asserting that his opponents have engaged in preparation and are marshalled up in battle-array against the current suit (3.1), and exhorts jurors to take the proper side in this legal war and not to desert the rank assigned to them by the city's laws (3.7). Some prosecutors go further in casting themselves as hoplites defending the democracy. Epichares, for example, attributes to the frequent prosecutor, Theocrines, the boast that he has been placed in the ranks against proposers of illegal decrees and is on guard against them (Dem. 58.45–6; cf. 58.34, 63). Similarly, Lycurgus groups together jurors, prosecutors, and the laws as the three things that together guard and preserve the democracy (1.3, quoted later in the chapter). When prosecutors evoke these martial associations, they not only glorify their civic service by equating it with the most dangerous and noble help a citizen can give the city but gloss over tensions surrounding its voluntary character by conflating it with obligatory military service in defense of the city.

That prosecutorial claims of helping the city were regularly contested is evident from the common charge that a prosecutor is a false helper of the city who is pursuing only his own personal interests. Thus, Polystratus' son, defending his father from charges stemming from his alleged support of the oligarchy of 411, asserts that the prosecutors neither helped the *dēmos* against its oligarchic enemies at that time nor are they helping it through the current prosecution:

καὶ οἱ κατήγοροι τότε μὲν οὐδαμῇ εὖνοι ὄντες ἐφαίνοντο τῷ δήμῳ οὐδὲ ἐβοήθουν· νῦν δὲ ἡνίκα αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ εὐνούστατός ἐστιν ὁ δῆμος, βοηθοῦσι τῷ μὲν ὀνόματι ὑμῖν, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς. (Lys. 20.17)

The prosecutors at the time in no way showed their loyalty to the *dēmos*, nor helped it; but now that the *dēmos* is its own most loyal friend, they help you in name but themselves in deed.<sup>80</sup>

One of the most evocative claims leveled against those who were allegedly using volunteer prosecution to advance their own corrupt interests, financial or personal, is that they are “sykophants,” or devious prosecutors. A client of Lysias on trial before the Council of the Areopagus on a charge of having removed a sacred olive stump, for example, asks his audience “whether you think that he [the prosecutor] is rendering assistance on

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Lys. fr. 195.1 Carey, which challenges Cinesias' claim to be a “helper of the laws” (ὁ τοῖς νόμοις βοηθός).

behalf of the city or acting as a sykophant in making his charge” (πότερον οἴεσθε αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως βοηθεῖν ἢ συκοφαντοῦντα αἰτιάσασθαι, 7.38). The claim that sykophants advance their own corrupt interests and thereby harm the city rather than help it is commonplace in forensic rhetoric.<sup>81</sup>

Because volunteer prosecutors are vulnerable to accusations that they are false helpers of the city, they regularly seek to defend and justify their role and the motivations that led them to assume it. Consider, for example, this excerpt from Lycurgus’ extensive justification of his role as volunteer prosecutor of Leocrates for treason:

ἐβουλόμην δ’ ἂν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὥσπερ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστι τῇ πόλει εἶναι τοὺς κρίνοντας ἐνταῦθα τοὺς παρανομοῦντας, οὕτω καὶ φιλόπρωπον αὐτὸ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπειληφθαι· νῦν δὲ περιέστηκεν εἰς τοῦτο, ὥστε τὸν ἰδίᾳ κινδυνεύοντα καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἀπεχθανόμενον οὐ φιλόπολιν, ἀλλὰ φιλοπράγμονα δοκεῖν εἶναι, οὐ δικαίως οὐδὲ συμφερόντως τῇ πόλει. τρία γάρ ἐστι τὰ μέγιστα, ἃ διαφυλάττει καὶ διασώζει τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ τῶν νόμων τάξις, δεύτερον δ’ ἡ τῶν δικαστῶν ψῆφος, τρίτον δ’ ἡ τοῦτοις τὰ δεικνύμενα παραδιδούσα κρίσις. . . οὕτε δι’ ἐχθραν οὐδεμίαν, οὕτε διὰ φιλονικίαν οὐδ’ ἡντινοῦν τοῦτον τὸν ἀγῶνα προελόμενος, ἀλλ’ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι νομίσας τοῦτον περιορᾶν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐμβάλλοντα καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἱερῶν μετέχοντα, τῆς τε πατρίδος ὄνειδος καὶ πάντων ὕμων γεγεννημένον. πολίτου γάρ ἐστι δικαίου, μὴ διὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἐχθρας εἰς τὰς κοινὰς κρίσεις καθιστάναι τοὺς τὴν πόλιν μηδὲν ἀδικούντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τι παρανομοῦντας ἰδίους ἐχθροὺς εἶναι νομίζειν, καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀδικημάτων κοινὰς καὶ τὰς προφάσεις ἔχειν τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς διαφορᾶς. (1.3–6)

Gentlemen, I would wish that, since it is beneficial to the city that there are men who bring lawbreakers to judgment here, the people would view this as a benevolent activity. In fact, the opposite is true: anyone who takes on himself personal risk and incurs enmity [of defendants] on behalf of the public appears [to his fellow citizens] to be fond not of the city but of lawsuits. This is neither just nor advantageous to the city. For three things in particular guard and preserve the democracy and the city’s prosperity: first, the system of laws; second, the vote of jurors; and third, the prosecution that hands over crimes to them. . . It was not out of any enmity or any contentiousness that I undertook this trial; but I thought it shameful to look on while this man pushes into the marketplace and shares in the public sacrifices, when he had been a disgrace to his fatherland and to you all. A just citizen will not let private enmity induce him to start a public prosecution against those who do the state no harm. On the contrary, it is those who

<sup>81</sup> On the charge of sykophancy and its implications, see Harvey 1990; Osborne 1990a; Christ 1998a.

break his country's laws whom he will consider his personal enemies; crimes which affect the public will, in his eyes, offer public grounds for enmity toward the criminals.

This polemical defense of the role of volunteer prosecutor is noteworthy both for its resemblance to the justifications offered by other prosecutors and its divergence from these.

Much of Lycurgus' defense of volunteer prosecution is consistent with typical prosecutorial self-justification. For example, Lycurgus resembles other prosecutors in speaking of how helpful and beneficial (ὠφέλιμον) volunteer prosecution is to the city and in characterizing it as a dangerous and patriotic enterprise.<sup>82</sup> Further, like other prosecutors, Lycurgus presents himself as a concerned bystander, whose sense of shame prevents him from simply standing by and looking on (περιορᾶν) when he sees the city suffering harm.<sup>83</sup> Lycurgus diverges from other prosecutors, however, in casting volunteer prosecution not only as beneficial to the city and patriotic but as φιλόανθρωπον, that is, "benevolent" or "generous."<sup>84</sup> One explanation for this exceptional characterization of volunteer prosecution is that Lycurgus himself claims to be acting with entirely pure – some might say "altruistic" – motivations in the current case: he puts himself at personal (ιδίᾳ) risk solely for the public good (ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν) and not to avenge himself on a personal enemy.<sup>85</sup>

The unusual nature of Lycurgus' claim that his volunteer prosecution benefits *only* the city stands out when juxtaposed with the frequent assertion of volunteer prosecutors that they are seeking simultaneously to help the city and punish a personal enemy through their prosecutions. Thus, Aeschines opens his prosecution of Timarchus:

οὐδένα πώποτε τῶν πολιτῶν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε γραφὴν γραψάμενος οὔτ' ἐν εὐθύναις λυπήσας, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔγωγε νομίζω μέτριον ἑμαυτὸν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων παρεσχηκώς, ὁρῶν δὲ τήν τε πόλιν μεγάλην βλαπτομένην ὑπὸ Τιμάρχου τουτοῦ δημηγοροῦντος παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ συκοφαντούμενος – ὃν δὲ τρόπον, προϊόντος ἐπιδείξω τοῦ λόγου – ἐν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων ἡγηςάμην εἶναι μὴ βοηθῆσαι τῇ τε πόλει πάσῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἑμαυτῷ· εἰδὼς δ' αὐτὸν ἔνοχον ὄντα οἷς ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἠκούσατε ἀναγιγνώσκοντος τοῦ γραμματέως, ἐπήγγειλα αὐτῷ τὴν δοκιμασίαν ταυτηνί. καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ εἰωθότες λόγοι λέγεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς δημοσίοις ἀγῶσιν

<sup>82</sup> On the similar self-presentation of the sykophant in Ar. *Pl.* 901–25, see Christ 1998a: 145–7.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Aeschin. 1.1–2 (quoted below in the text) and Dem. 24.8.

<sup>84</sup> On *philanthrōpia*, which is invoked frequently in fourth-century Athenian sources, see de Romilly 1979: 37–52, 97–112 and Christ forthcoming.

<sup>85</sup> For interesting reflections on Lycurgus' voice and self-presentation in this speech, see Allen 2000; I do not see the level of Platonic influence, however, for which she argues.

οὐκ εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς. αἱ γὰρ ἴδιαι ἐχθραὶ πολλὰ πάνυ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπανορθοῦσι.  
(I.1–2)

I have never, men of Athens, brought indictment against any citizen, nor vexed any man when he was rendering account of his office; but in all such matters I have, as I believe, shown myself to be a moderate man. But when I saw that the city was being seriously injured by the defendant, Timarchus, who, though disqualified by law, was speaking in your assemblies, and when I myself was made a victim of his sykophancy – the nature of the attack I will show in the course of my speech – I decided that it would be a most shameful thing if I failed to come to help the whole city and its laws, and you and myself; and knowing that he was liable to the accusation that you heard read a moment ago by the clerk of the court, I instituted this suit, challenging him to official scrutiny. Thus it appears, men of Athens, that what is so frequently said of public suits is no mistake, namely, that very often private enmities correct public abuses.

A prosecutor of Androtion likewise invokes the happy convergence of helping the city and taking vengeance on a personal enemy when he explains that he joined the prosecution, “thinking that I had seized upon a favorable opportunity for helping the state, and at the same time taking vengeance for the wrongs I had suffered” (ἡγούμενος ἀρμόττοντ’ εἰληφέναι καιρὸν τοῦ βοηθῆσαι θ’ ἅμα τῇ πόλει καὶ τιμωρίαν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐπεπόνθειν λαβεῖν) (Dem. 24.8). These passages suggest that it was normal for prosecutors to speak of their personal enmity with defendants and to represent this as entirely compatible with helping the city through their prosecutions.<sup>86</sup> Even Lycurgus, who denies he is motivated by personal enmity in his prosecution of Leocrates, does not rule out the legitimacy of prosecuting personal enemies when they have also harmed the city; he only condemns false public prosecutions prompted by personal enmity.<sup>87</sup>

The fact that prosecutors frequently characterize their prosecutions as helping the city *and* themselves likely reflects both the sociology of Athenian litigation and the public’s cynicism toward claims of pure motivations behind helping in this context. Personal enemies of an individual were more likely than public-spirited strangers to take the financial and personal risks of bringing a public prosecution. Those with such a prosecutorial profile, moreover, had a ready and satisfactory explanation in the

<sup>86</sup> See also Lys. 12.2; Dem. 22.1–3; cf. Ant. 6.9; fr. V.1 Gernet.

<sup>87</sup> For enmity as a potentially corrupting motivation behind a prosecution, see Christ 1998a: 157–9. Kurihara 2003 in my view exaggerates Athenian concerns about enmity corrupting prosecutions; there is abundant evidence that Athenians were to a large extent comfortable with personal enemies bringing prosecutions (see Rhodes 1998: 154–61 for a balanced view of the evidence).

public's view for why they were bringing a prosecution on behalf of the city. They were not motivated by the corrupt pursuit of money but by the natural and understandable desire to harm an enemy. Although, as Lycurgus suggests, private enmity could lead to a false public prosecution, the acknowledgment of this apparently helped a prosecutor more than it hurt him because it fit his behavior to a recognized pattern of public prosecution and explained to a cynical public why an individual might be willing to play this exceptional helping role.

This survey suggests that, although Athenians are drawn to the ideal that citizens place the city's needs above their own and come to its assistance solely out of patriotic zeal, they pragmatically accept the reality that citizen helping of the city can have a more selfish side to it. The fact that military service and the performance of liturgies and payment of the war tax are compulsory in Athens for those liable to these duties is a strong indication that Athenians did not rely too heavily on the ideal that citizens spontaneously serve the city and sacrifice their interests to it. Indeed, we have seen that litigants variously acknowledge the role of self-interest in their decision to help the city by carrying out these basic duties, most conspicuously when they cast their helping as a calculated act meant to create a debt of *charis* on the part of fellow citizens, which jurors must pay back in the courts through a favorable verdict.

*Rhētores* are generally more cautious in portraying their voluntary helping of the city, emphasizing the purity of their motivations and their ready subordination of their own interests to those of the city. If *rhētores*, in fact, found ample opportunities to enrich themselves through "gifts" from grateful parties, they did not advertise the personal benefits that came with their public service; this is likely because the public, although conscious of the potential windfalls of this type of service, was uncomfortable with the idea that its advisors on state policy might be motivated by anything other than the public good. This does not stop *rhētores*, however, from seeking rewards for their selfless helping in the form of civic honors or forensic *charis* when they found themselves on trial; in such circumstances, they could invoke a reciprocal helping relationship between themselves and the city, and seek a proper return for their noble voluntarism.

Volunteer prosecutors, in contrast, frequently do not conceal the fact that personal motivations have played a role in prompting them to step forward to help the city. Before a public that was disinclined to believe in the purity of their motivations because of the highly personal nature of volunteer prosecution and the conspicuous and sometimes immediate benefits accruing to a successful prosecutor, volunteer prosecutors often

disclose their personal stake in pursuing a suit. Significantly, however, they suppress any financial interest they may have in conducting a prosecution and often emphasize instead that they are seeking retribution on a personal enemy who has also harmed the public good. One may infer from this that, whereas the public might regard the pursuit of profit as a corrupting influence that might call into question the legitimacy of a prosecution, it viewed the pursuit of personal vengeance through the courts as perfectly understandable and a natural explanation for why an individual might undertake this potentially dangerous enterprise.

On balance, Athenians seem to take a generally pragmatic view of the role of personal interests in motivating individuals to help the city. It is enough, in the view of Athenians, for the city to benefit from its citizens' good services, even if they too stand to benefit personally from these. The general flexibility of Athenians concerning what may legitimately motivate individuals to help the city is revealing of social assumptions about helping as a reciprocal activity that regularly has a calculating facet to it, as well as the nature of democratic citizenship, in which free and equal citizens help the city, not least to be helped in return by it.

### *The City Helps Citizens*

When Athenians make claims about helping the city in their various capacities as citizens, they sometimes explicitly present their help, as we have seen, as a reciprocal good turn for the city's prior support of them or as an act that obligates help in return from the city and its representatives. Although the nature of the city's helping of its citizens can take many forms in Athenian discourse, three aspects are especially prominent: the city's general support of citizens; its laws' protection of them; and the assistance that the city's jurors give to individuals in the courts.

The idea that the city supports and sustains its citizens crops up regularly in Athenian popular discourse, as we have noted. Our most extensive and explicit commentary on the city as helper of its citizens, however, comes from Thucydides' Pericles. In his funeral oration for the city's war dead at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles draws attention to the manifold benefits – material, political, and cultural – that the democratic city bestows on its citizens as he seeks to explain and justify why citizens sacrifice their lives for it (2.36.4–41). When plague and the burdens of the ongoing war have weakened the resolve of Athenians to support the war effort, Pericles builds on this vision of the city as benefactor of its citizens in exhorting his audience in the Assembly to be steadfast in their support of it:

ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ιδιώτας ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἀθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην. καλῶς μὲν γὰρ φερόμενος ἀνὴρ τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν διαφθειρομένης τῆς πατρίδος οὐδὲν ἦσσαν ξυναπόλλυται, κακοτυχῶν δὲ ἐν εὐτυχούσῃ πολλῶ μᾶλλον διασώζεται. ὁπότε οὖν πόλις μὲν τὰς ἰδίας ξυμφορὰς οἷα τε φέρειν, εἷς δ' ἕκαστος τὰς ἐκείνης ἀδύνατος, πῶς οὐ χρὴ πάντας ἀμύνειν αὐτῇ, καὶ μὴ ὁ νῦν ὑμεῖς δρᾶτε· ταῖς κατ' οἶκον κακοπραγίαις ἐκπεπληγμένοι τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀφίεσθε, καὶ ἐμέ τε τὸν παραινέσαντα πολεμεῖν καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἱ ξυνέγωντε δι' αἰτίας ἔχετε. (2.60.2–4)

For I believe that a city assists its private citizens more when as a whole it is successful, than when it prospers as regards the individual but fails as a community. For even though a man flourishes in his own personal affairs, yet if his fatherland goes to ruin, he perishes with it all the same; but if he suffers bad fortune and his fatherland is in good fortune, he is far more likely to be saved. Since, then, the state is able to bear the misfortunes of her private citizens but the individual cannot bear those of the state, surely all men ought to defend her, and not to do as you are now doing – proposing to sacrifice the safety of the commonwealth because you are dismayed by the hardships you suffer at home, and blaming both me who advised you to make war and yourselves who voted with me for it.

Pericles' logic is clear: because the city, as long as it prospers, can assist its citizens in their travails and save them, citizens must help it and act to save it despite their private woes.<sup>88</sup>

Later in the same speech, Pericles emphasizes once more how critical it is for citizens to come to the aid of their city:

τῆς τε πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν, ὥπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν. (2.63.1)

You may reasonably be expected, moreover, to come to assist the dignity which the state has attained through empire – a dignity in which you all take pride – and not to avoid its burdens, unless you resign its honors also.<sup>89</sup>

Viewed from this perspective, citizen and city are bound together in a reciprocal helping relationship, in which the city, helped by its citizens, benefits them not only by keeping them secure and prosperous but by allowing them to share in its glory. A rational citizen, in Pericles' vision, will therefore help the city so as to help himself.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Democr. fr. 252 D–K.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Thuc. 1.140.1; Lyc. 1.133.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Christ 2006: 26–31.



If the city's prosperity provides the general circumstances under which its citizens can flourish and the city can be said therefore to help and benefit them, Athenians regularly imbue the city's laws with the capacity to help citizens and protect their property and persons from diverse threats in specific circumstances. This is especially clear when litigants invoke the "help" of the laws in support of their cases. For example, a supporting speaker in an inheritance dispute posits that the laws concerning bestowal of property through wills "help kinsmen" (τοῖς συγγενέσι βοηθοῦσι) (Is. 4.16), and a litigant who protests he was duped into making a contract asserts that he has on his side "the very powerful help written in the law" (μ[ε]γ[ί]στην βοήθειαν τὴν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γεγραμμένην) (Hyp. Ath. 18).<sup>91</sup>

Because the laws themselves cannot directly help them, however, litigants remind jurors that it is incumbent on them, as the living manifestation of the city, to ensure that the laws give help to those in need. A litigant involved in a dispute concerning a maritime loan that he made points out:

ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς νόμοις πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ βοηθείαι εἰσιν αὐτοῖς· ὑμεῖς δὲ δεῖ συνεπανορθοῦντας φαίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ συγχωροῦντας τοῖς πονηροῖς, ἵν' ὑμῖν ὥς πλείστη ὠφέλεια παρὰ τὸ ἐμπόριον ᾗ. (Dem. 34.52)

In the laws there is much excellent help for them [i.e., lenders]. It is your duty to show clearly that you uphold the laws, and that you make no concession to wrongdoers, in order that you may derive the greatest possible benefit from your market.

Similarly, Demosthenes in his prosecution of Meidias, invoking the laws against hubristic assault, exhorts jurors: "You are the ones who guarantee and guard help for victims in accordance with the laws" (ὥς βεβαιούντων ὑμῶν καὶ φυλαττόντων τὰς ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς παθοῦσι βοηθείας) (21.76). Demosthenes later asserts that the relationship between jurors and the laws is one of mutual support ("So the laws get their power from you, and you from the laws" [οὐκοῦν οἱ νόμοι θ' ὑμῖν εἰσιν ἰσχυροὶ καὶ ὑμεῖς τοῖς νόμοις]), and posits that it is through this collaboration of jurors and the laws that citizens receive help in court against aggressors (21.223–5).<sup>92</sup>

The idea that the city's laws ultimately require human agents to help individual citizens pervades the Athenian law courts, where litigants regularly call on jurors, as representatives of the community, to intervene and rescue them from those doing wrong. These appeals for help, and the way

<sup>91</sup> For laws as "helpers," see also Dem. 24.107; cf. 102. Litigants sometimes speak of written contracts in similar terms: see Dem. 35.50 and 56.16.

<sup>92</sup> This passage is discussed in detail in Chapter III.

that litigants construct the collective helping role of jurors, acting on behalf of the city, are the focus of the next chapter.

This chapter has sought to locate helping in its democratic context in Athens by considering its place in civic ideology. Scholars have often assumed that Athenians, who appear to have enjoyed considerable social cohesion and solidarity through most of the classical period, were closely bound to one another as members of the Athenian “family” and that, like actual family members, they felt obliged to engage in mutual support. Athenian democratic ideology, however, does not suggest that citizens share an intimate fraternity and the mutual support that might accompany this. Instead of insisting that fellow citizens help and support one another, democratic ideology emphasizes that citizens should, in a spirit of *homonoia*, get along with each other and refrain from harming fellow citizens. This emphasis is consistent with the Athenian view of citizens under the democracy as free and equal individuals who should above all be respected and left unharassed by others. If Athenians did not picture the relationship among fellow citizens as a helping one, they did, however, envision their relationship with the city as based on mutual helping. Athenians imagined a variety of citizen roles, ranging from the performance of mandatory obligations to voluntary service as *rhētōr* or public prosecutor in terms of helping the city. Although the public’s expectations of the individuals carrying out these helping roles varied with the service being performed, it viewed helping as central to all of them. The city for its part was pictured as helping and assisting citizens through its general prosperity, laws, and law courts in which jurors could be called on to come to the rescue of wronged individuals. It is to this last helping role of the city’s jurors that we now turn.

# III

## HELPING AND COMMUNITY IN THE ATHENIAN LAW COURTS

If Athenians were not inclined as individuals to go out of their way to help fellow citizens outside their circle of intimates, they were strongly drawn to the ideal of collective communal protection of individual citizens from harm and injury and indeed viewed this collective support of individuals as central to their democratic polity. This feature of democratic ideology is nowhere more salient than in the Athenian law courts where litigants invoke and exploit ideals of helping in representing the courts as venues in which Athenians can collectively help individuals in their legal distress. Of particular interest is the way litigants appeal for help (βοήθεια) from jurors in the form of a favorable verdict.<sup>1</sup> Close study of these frequent and varied appeals reveals how litigants call on and disseminate a vision of the Athenian community as one that supports and assists wronged individuals, as well as some of the tensions behind this idealization. Appreciation of this facet of forensic discourse can lead us to a deeper understanding of both the Athenian courts and democratic ideals of helping.

This chapter first explores how litigants construct courts as venues for communal helping of individual citizens, with attention to some of the elements that contribute to this picture, and considers why this image of the courts may have appealed to jurors. Next, it offers several case studies that illustrate how litigants diversely appeal to jurors to become their helpers and the grounds on which they seek and justify intervention on their behalf. Finally, it considers some of the tensions behind the construction of courts as venues for helping and what this suggests about Athenian courts and democratic values.

<sup>1</sup> Although this chapter focuses on the forensic oratory of the popular law courts, it includes some material from orations presented before the court of the Areopagus (Ant. 1; Lys. 3, 4, 7) and the Council sitting as court (Lys. 24, 31).

## COURTS AS VENUES FOR HELPING

Over the past several decades, scholars have examined the Athenian popular courts not only as legal institutions concerned with the application and enforcement of laws and the settlement of disputes but as social and political institutions in which values and relationships, including those between mass and elite, are negotiated and reproduced before large popular audiences.<sup>2</sup> Most of those who have advanced this broader conception of the Athenian courts do not deny the importance of laws and ideas of legality in forensic discourse but argue that other elements also come into play in interesting and significant ways. Building on this body of scholarship that views the courts as complex and multifaceted institutions, I propose that the courts played a critical role in the conceptualization of community in Athens by fostering an image of Athens as a *polis* in which citizens collectively help individuals in distress. Litigants, in presenting their cases before large popular audiences, deploy a nexus of images that depict Athenian courts as venues for helping as they call on jurors as bystanders to a manifest injustice to help them with a favorable verdict. Although elements of this depiction have drawn comment from scholars, the full significance of these figures has not been recognized.

In a society in which the injunction “Help friends, Harm enemies” was a powerfully appealing guide to social relationships and values,<sup>3</sup> it comes as no surprise that litigants, in presenting their cases to jurors, speak of helping behavior and breaches of it in their narratives that relate the background to their current legal conflicts. For example, they regularly characterize themselves as generous helpers of kin and friends and rebuke their opponents for their failure to live up to this standard or to reciprocate help rendered.<sup>4</sup> Sometimes, as we noted in Chapter I, litigants also assert or imply that bystanders spontaneously intervened to help them against the malicious behavior of their opponents on the streets of Athens.<sup>5</sup> Far more common, however, than such claims of bystander intervention in extant forensic oratory are litigants’ direct appeals to jurors to help them in their current legal difficulties. Indeed, litigants frequently cast jurors themselves as citizen bystanders to a crime-in-progress in court and call on them to intervene in defense of communal principles and of the community itself.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Dover 1974; Ober 1989; Fisher 1992; Johnstone 1999; Roisman 2005, 2006.

<sup>3</sup> On this adage, see the discussion at the opening of Chapter I.

<sup>4</sup> On the invocation and manipulation of ideals of *philia* in forensic oratory, see Christ 1998a: 167–91.

<sup>5</sup> See especially Lys. 3.6–7, 15–16, 18; [Dem.] 53.17.

Let us consider some of the elements that contribute to this picture of a trial as a social drama – some would say melodrama – in which juror-bystanders can intervene and rescue a worthy litigant.<sup>6</sup>

Although forensic speakers naturally call attention to the mistreatment and crimes they have suffered out of court at the hands of their opponents, they also often vividly represent the trial in which they are involved as a continuation of the injustices and indignities perpetrated earlier by their rivals. As victims of their opponents’ ongoing machinations and misrepresentations in court, litigants tellingly speak of themselves as deserving assistance because they are “in the process of suffering wrong/harm” (ἀδικούμενοι). A client of Demosthenes, for example, in closing his speech, pleads:

ταῦτα ἡγούμεθα δίκαια εἶναι, καὶ ὑμῶν δεόμεθα, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, βοηθεῖν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις, καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς κακοτεχνοῦντας καὶ σοφίζομένους, ὥσπερ οὗτοι σοφίζονται. (35.56)

We consider these things to be just; and we beg you, men of the jury, to come to the aid of us who are being wronged, and to punish those who devise evil and resort to sophistries as these men do.

Thus, although diverse wrongs may lie behind a trial and prompt the litigation that leads to it, the trial itself becomes for the allegedly wronged parties a crime-in-progress – an extension of what they have suffered out of court.<sup>7</sup> Consistent with this dramatization of a trial as a crisis in progress is the common characterization of it as fraught with risk and danger and the labeling of the trial itself sometimes as not only a “contest” (ἄγών) but a “danger” (κίνδυνος).<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> On the interplay of drama and oratory in Athens, see Ober and Strauss 1990; E. Hall 1995, 2006; Scafuro 1997; Goldhill and Osborne 1999; Rosenbloom 2002; cf. Humphreys 1985: 355 (“Courts are inherently rhetorical and theatrical”).

<sup>7</sup> For the appeal to help (βοηθέω) a litigant who is “in the process of being wronged” (ἀδικούμενος), see also Dem. 21.224–5; 30.25; 34.2; 35.56; 38.2; 40.5; 44.15; 45.1; 56.4; [Dem.] 50.64. Litigants sometimes use the perfect tense to highlight the continuity of the past wrongs done them with the current ones in court, asking jurors to help them as men “who have been wronged” (ἡδικημένοι) (Is. 8.15; Dem. 27.3; 42.15; 54.2; cf. 57.3). Some litigants graphically appeal for help from jurors on the grounds that they are suffering a hubristic assault in court (ὕβριζομαι) (Isoc. 16.48; Is. 8.45; Dem. 43.84); the same verb could be applied to an insolent physical assault on the streets (Lys. 3.17).

<sup>8</sup> On the common characterization of a trial as an ἄγών, see Garner 1987: 59–71; Todd 1993: 9; Christ 1998a: 35. For a trial as a κίνδυνος, see Lys. 3.2, 45; 18.23; 20.31; 24.17; Dem. 21.9; Christ 1998a: 35–6; cf. Balot 2004: 242–6. In forensic oratory, κινδυνεύω often means “to be on trial”: see Lys. 1.50; 3.2, 39; 4.13; Worthington 1985; Todd 2007: 309.

If litigants, according to this construction of court experience, are hapless victims suffering wrong at their opponents' hands at trial, jurors are, consistent with this, transformed into eyewitnesses of the "crime-in-progress." Litigants direct jurors, as eyewitnesses, to see and recognize the manifest wrong before them and, above all, not to stand by and "just look on" (περιοράω). For example, a client of Demosthenes involved in an inheritance dispute pleads:

δέομαι δ' ὑμῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, βοηθῆσαι τῷ τε πατρὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐμοί, ἐὰν λέγωμεν τὰ δίκαια, καὶ μὴ περιιδεῖν πένητας ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καταστασιασθέντας ὑπὸ παρατάξεως ἀδίκου. (44.3)

I beg you, men of the jury, to come to the aid of my father and myself, if we speak what is just, and not just look on while men who are poor and weak are crushed by the unjust men marshaled against us.<sup>9</sup>

What should jurors, as bystanders to a crime-in-progress, do in these circumstances? Litigants call on them to intervene, just as a victim of crime in the streets might call on bystanders for help.<sup>10</sup> Intervention by jurors, as by witnesses to street crime, could take the form of verbal support or more active assistance, as litigants make clear. One option for jurors was to lend verbal support to the wronged litigant by raising a *din* (θόρυβος) in his favor or drowning out his opponent.<sup>11</sup> Another option, however, was, in the common parlance of litigants, to *help* the wronged litigant and *save* him through a favorable verdict.

<sup>9</sup> For jurors as eyewitnesses who should not "just look on" (περιοράω), see also And. 1.2; Ant. 2.2.13; 3.1.2; Lys. 3.47; 4.20; 9.22; 18.23; Is. 9.37; Dem. 20.75; 21.222; 26.24; Lyc. 1.82–3; cf. Lys. 3.17 (on not "just looking on" street violence); on the use of περιοράω with present and aorist participles, see Smyth 1956, §2141. For the exhortation that jurors should not simply look on (περιοράω) but rather give help (βοηθῆω), see Lys. 19.64; Is. 2.47; 8.45; Isoc. 16.48; Dem. 28.19–20; 42.32; 43.84; 44.3; Hyp. *Eux.* 38; cf. Dem. 45.85 (using ὑπεροράω). A litigant could also appeal to jurors to help on the grounds that they were eyewitnesses to a previous trial (Is. 5.20; cf. Dem. 47.79), or that they have direct and personal knowledge of the goodness or badness of the litigants (see Ober 1989: 149; cf. Wolpert 2003). If litigants present jurors as eyewitnesses at the trial, they also remind jurors that they are in the public eye as they cast their votes not least since they are being watched by "those standing around" (οἱ περιεστηκότες) as observers of the trial (see Lanni 1997).

<sup>10</sup> Sternberg (2006: 101) notes that jurors are called on "in a sense as bystanders to a wrongdoing – but long after the event, when they can interpret it at leisure, when they can intervene with little risk to themselves." It is my position that litigants often present the trial itself as a crime-in-progress and vividly cast jurors as bystanders who must determine whether and how to intervene.

<sup>11</sup> On dikastic θόρυβος, see Bers 1985.

By far the most common word that litigants use in asking jurors for “help” is βοηθέω, a vivid compound that reinforces the idea that jurors are bystanders being called to intervene in a crime. βοηθέω means literally “run to a shout,” and evokes the image of bystanders rushing to the cry of a victim in the streets. As scholars have observed, this word embodies an expectation found in many historical societies that those hearing a cry should run to lend assistance.<sup>12</sup> Although it is possible that Athenians used βοηθέω and its cognates with sufficient frequency that its constituent elements and their vivid connotations did not always register with listeners, Athenians were clearly conscious of the nuances of this word, as its appearance in forensic oratory and elsewhere attests.<sup>13</sup> It is therefore plausible that, when litigants called on jurors for βοήθεια at trial, jurors heard this not only as a general plea for support but as a cry for help, to which they were asked to come running as bystanders to a crime-in-progress. If it seems preposterous that seated jurors would be asked to “run” to help a litigant, we should remember that opposing litigants could also be envisioned in motion – the prosecutor, as “the chasing party” (ὁ διώκων) and the defendant, as the “fleeing one” (ὁ φεύγων).<sup>14</sup> In keeping with this dramatic picture of jurors running to help wronged litigants is the closely related plea of litigants that jurors “save” them (σώζω and its cognates) in the dire situation in which they find themselves at trial.<sup>15</sup>

It is noteworthy that litigants not only appeal for help (βοήθεια) from jurors with great frequency but also often highlight their cries for help by placing them in salient places within a forensic oration, near its opening or

<sup>12</sup> On the etymology of βοηθέω and historical parallels for calling on community members for urgent relief, see Schulze 1933: 160–98; Fraenkel 1950: 3.614; Chantraine 1968: 1.182–3; Lintott 1982: 18–22; Fisher 1998: 88, and 1999: 67; Sternberg 2006: 79–80. The etymology of βοηθέω, however, does not tell us what level of responsibility individuals felt to intervene when they “ran to a shout;” the analysis in Chapter I suggests Athenians were cautious about getting involved in strangers’ difficulties.

<sup>13</sup> For Athenian consciousness of the semantics of βοηθέω, see [Dem.] 53.17; Ar. *Ach.* 572–3; X. *HG* 7.2.19; An. 5.2.31; cf. Lys. 3.15–16; Dem. 21.224; 24.208; X. *HG* 7.2.7.

<sup>14</sup> On this imagery, see Garner 1987: 60–2; cf. Dem. 38.2, in which a litigant begs jurors to “run to my cry” (βοηθῆσαί μοι) because he has unjustly been made to “flee a suit” (φεύγειν δίκην), i.e., to be a defendant. Both defendants and prosecutors could appeal for help from jurors, the former in fending off an unjust attack, the latter in pursuing a malefactor: see note 33.

<sup>15</sup> For the use of σώζω in this context, see Ant. 5.73; And. 1.148–9; Lys. 14.23; 19.54; 24.7; 28.17; Is. 7.38; fr. 18 Forster; Dem. 19.239; 21.98; 22.64; 24.170; 25.2; 57.6, 17; Aeschin. 2.44, 149, 180, 183. For the use of σώζω and βοηθέω in close conjunction, see Dem. 19.292–3; 28.19–20; 36.59; 57.3; Hyp. *Eux.* 38; Lyc. 1.150. On the political, mythological, and religious nuances of σώζω in an Athenian context, see Faraone 1997: 47, 56.

close.<sup>16</sup> When these appeals appear both at the beginning and conclusion of a speech, it seems especially clear that litigants are advancing a view of themselves as victims and of jurors as helping bystanders that is meant to provide a frame for, and context to, all else that intervenes, including narratives of past wrongs, citations of laws, and witness testimonies. Further amplifying appeals for help is their frequent conjunction with the supplication of jurors to intervene.<sup>17</sup> Steven Johnstone (1999: 109–25) has called attention to the ritualistic nature of these supplications, arguing that through them elite litigants abase themselves before the *dēmos* and acknowledge its power over them (122–4). In my view, this is an attractive reading of the power dynamics that may be involved in these situations, but it is important to appreciate that the imagery of supplication, which is closely allied with appeals for βοήθεια, is also part of a broader phenomenon – the construction of the courts as venues for helping and of the relationship between litigant and jurors as that of hapless victim and communal helpers intervening in a crime-in-progress.

The fact that litigants frequently invoke the language of helping in their appeals to jurors invites the possible objection that we are dealing with mere commonplaces.<sup>18</sup> Commonplaces yes, mere no. Although it is certainly true that litigants and the logographers who provided many of them with their speeches are conscious of these rhetorical tropes,<sup>19</sup> we must ask, as with other commonplaces, why these are so common and what in them appealed to audiences. For scholars of an earlier generation, it was enough to identify and catalogue such commonplaces; over the past several decades, however, scholars have found these to be a rich source for the social and political assumptions, attitudes, and ideals, of

<sup>16</sup> For βοήθειω near the start of a speech, see Ant. 1.3–4; Lys. 32.3; Is. 7.4; 8.5; Isoc. 18.4; Dem. 21.7; 27.3; 35.5; 38.2; 40.5; 42.4; 44.3; 45.1; 54.2; 56.4; 57.3; 58.7; near its end: Lys. 10.32; 12.99; 18.27; 19.64; 28.17; Is. 2.47; 4.30–1; 8.45; 9.35; Isoc. 16.48; Dem. 21.227; 26.27; 27.68; 28.19–20; 35.56; 36.59; 40.61; 42.31–2; 43.84; 45.88; 47.79; 54.42; 58.69; [Dem.] 46.28; 49.68; 50.64; Hyp. *Eux.* 38; Lyc. 1.150; Din. 3.20; cf. Ant. 1.31; 2.3.11; 3.4.10.

<sup>17</sup> For the conjunction of βοήθειω with ἱκετεύω, see Lys. 18.27; Is. 8.45; Dem. 21.7; 27.68; 28.19–20; 42.32; 43.84; 45.1, 85; 56.4; [Dem.] 46.28; Lyc. 1.150; Din. 3.20–1; with ἀντιβολέω, see Lys. 18.27; Dem. 27.68; 28.20; 43.84; 45.85; with δέομαι, see Ant. 1.3; Lys. 18.27; 19.63; 32.3; Is. 2.47; 7.4, 37; 8.5, 45; Isoc. 16.48; Dem. 21.7; 27.3, 68; 35.56; 42.4, 32; 43.17, 84; 44.3; 45.85; 54.2; 56.4; [Dem.] 46.28; Lyc. 1.150; Din. 3.20–1.

<sup>18</sup> Sternberg (2006: 101) underestimates the richly evocative nature of these calls for help: “It is striking that the verb *boētheō*, which means ‘come to the rescue,’ is a frequent figure of speech in deliberative and forensic oratory – having lost much of its physical immediacy, having faded into a plea to cast the right vote.”

<sup>19</sup> On the rhetorical use of appeals for βοήθεια, see [Arist.] *Rh. Al.* 1433b17–22, and 1445a3–6; cf. Ant. 2.3.11.



the large popular audiences before whom they were presented in the law courts.<sup>20</sup>

These are not simply isolated commonplaces in the repertoire of forensic speakers and logographers, moreover, but part of what could be described as a readily adaptable “poetics of helping” that litigants weave into the presentation of themselves, their cases, and jurors’ relationships with them. At the heart of this poetics of helping, as we have seen, is the idea that jurors are bystanders who are called on to intervene in a crime-in-progress by helping the victim and coming to his rescue. Numerous variations on this immediately crop up, however, as one surveys the corpus of forensic oratory. For example, litigants call on jurors to lend help not only to them but to the dead who have suffered at the hands of their opponents, to the city and its laws, and not least to themselves as members of the community with a vested interest in seeing justice done.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, the cry for help to jurors is often accompanied by the urgent complaint that an opponent is receiving help from corrupt and debased supporters, especially supporting speakers (*sunēgoroi*) in the current trial, and that it is incumbent on jurors to provide help to correct the imbalance and tip the scales in favor of the right litigant.<sup>22</sup> In such cases, litigants construct a world in which they and jurors, as members of a just community, are (or should be) allied against their legal opponents and their corrupt supporters and co-conspirators<sup>23</sup> and in which jurors are in a position to provide just and proper help to one of their own. In considering several case studies later in this chapter, I examine some of the ways that litigants deploy the poetics of helping in their attempts to win the help of jurors.

The apparent popularity of this construction of law courts as venues for communal helping is likely due to both its psychological and social appeal. First, one can well imagine how this construction might appeal

<sup>20</sup> See note 2.

<sup>21</sup> Help the dead: Ant. 1.21–2; Lys. 12.99–100; Is. 2.47; Dem. 28.19–20; 43.84; cf. Ant. 1.3–4, 31; 2.3.11; Lys. 10.32.

Help the city: Lys. 15.9; Lyc. 1.150; Din. 3.20.

Help the laws: Lys. 10.32; Dem. 21.225; 26.27; 43.84; 57.32; Din. 3.20; cf. Ant. 1.24, 31; Isoc. 18.4, 28; Dem. 21.76; 42.15; [Dem.] 46.28; Ar. *Pl.* 914. For this trope used in connection with the Assembly, see Aeschin. 1.33.

Help yourselves: Lys. 12.80; 29.8; Isoc. 20.15; Dem. 21.7; 24.157; 28.20; [Dem.] 46.28; cf. Lys. 19.64; Dem. 21.227; 35.56; 43.84; [Dem.] 50.64; Lyc. 1.150.

<sup>22</sup> For protests against help rendered by an opponent’s supporters and *sunēgoroi*, see Ant. 1.24; Lys. 8.16, 18; 12.85–6, 89; 14.21–3; 15.1, 4; 30.33; 31.32; Dem. 19.239; 21.127, 205–6, 211; 22.38; 24.157; Aeschin. 1.194; 3.196; Lyc. 1.43, 140; cf. Rubinstein 2000: 163–8.

<sup>23</sup> On the rhetoric of conspiracy in Athens, see Roisman 2006.

psychologically to Athenian jurors. Athenians, in general, appear to have been drawn to the idea that heroic helping was a national trait, to judge from the mythical episodes involving Athenian help to non-Athenians – like the story of their intervention against Thebes on behalf of the kin of the fallen Seven to retrieve their corpses for proper burial – that crop up regularly in funeral orations and on the tragic stage.<sup>24</sup> The casting of the Athenian juror as a heroic rescuer who comes to the assistance of a wronged citizen could not help but appeal to his ego and sense of manliness.<sup>25</sup> Although, as noted in Chapter I, Athenians outside the courts were cautious about intervening to help strangers in distress due in large part to the physical risks involved, Athenian jurors could provide risk-free assistance to litigants by responding to their cries for help through a favorable verdict and thereby enjoy the fiction of being heroic rescuers.<sup>26</sup> The risk-free character of the help rendered by jurors is evident in Lysias’ *Against Eratosthenes* when he appeals to the jury to condemn his opponent, who as one of the Thirty was responsible for the death of many Athenians and metics, including Lysias’ own brother. Near the end of his speech, Lysias urges jurors, “Since you were unable to protect them when they were alive, come to the aid of the dead” (ἐπειδὴ ζῶσιν ἐπαμῦναι οὐκ ἔδύνασθε, ἀποθανοῦσι βοηθήσατε) (12.100; cf. 13.93).<sup>27</sup> Although Athenians do not appear to have engaged in many heroics to intervene on behalf of the victims of the Thirty presumably in part because of the high risk involved,<sup>28</sup> Lysias presents his jurors with an opportunity to give heroic

<sup>24</sup> On Athenian myths concerning the helping of other Greeks and Athens’ claim of “helping the wronged” in interstate relations, see Chapter IV.

<sup>25</sup> For a caricature of the egotism of the Athenian juror, see Ar. V. 517–630 and passim. On the Athenian preoccupation with manliness, see Roisman 2005.

<sup>26</sup> That jurors might fancy the idea that they were heroic rescuers is also suggested by the exploitation of this notion by Diodorus, a client of Demosthenes, who proposes that, in the event of a massive escape of prisoners from the city’s jail, each juror would come to the rescue (βοηθήσειεν ἅν) to the best of his capacities (24.208). On the risk-free nature of the help for which litigants ask jurors, see Sternberg 2006: 101.

<sup>27</sup> Lysias goes on in this passage to cast this act of forensic helping as one involving the pursuit of just vengeance (τιμωρία) on behalf of the dead. On “helping” and “avenging,” see the later discussion in the text.

<sup>28</sup> Athenians apparently did not take action against the Thirty when they began their purge of their democratic enemies on the pretext that they were cleansing the city of sykophants (see X. *HG* 2.3.12; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 35.3; Lys. 12.5; Christ 1998a: 72–3, 80–1). Nor did they attempt to intervene on behalf of Theramenes when he was condemned to death by the Thirty (see X. *HG* 2.3.52–5, with Sternberg 2006: 83, 101). Plato’s Socrates took considerable risk in not obeying the Thirty when they ordered him and four others to go to Salamis to arrest Leon the Salaminian, but he did not go so far as to seek to warn Leon: “the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home” (οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ὥχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὥχομην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε) (*Ap.* 32c-d); cf. Balot 2006: 135. Lysias,

help to the dead now at no risk whatsoever to themselves and thus perhaps implicitly to redeem themselves for their previous inaction.

If jurors were happy to conceive of themselves as heroic rescuers, they may also have relished the notion that they enjoyed a quasi-divine power in their ability to help and save litigants from their dire straits.<sup>29</sup> Greek divinities, after all, are regularly envisioned as having the capacity to help and rescue human beings. A client of Hyperides thus prays to the gods “to help me and save me in the present trial” (βοηθῆσαί μοι καὶ σῶσαι ἐ[κ] τοῦ παρόντος ἀγῶνος) (*Lyc. fr. 3*).<sup>30</sup> That jurors have a power akin to that of the gods is explicit when Aeschines calls on both to rescue him from his legal difficulties:

παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ ἱκετεύω σῶσαί με πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς θεούς, δεύτερον δ' ὑμᾶς τοὺς τῆς ψήφου κυρίους, οἷς ἐγὼ πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν κατηγορημένων εἰς μνήμην εἶναι τὴν ἐμὴν ἀπολελόγημαι, καὶ δέομαι σῶσαί με καὶ μὴ τῷ λογογράφῳ καὶ Σκύθη παραδοῦναι. (2.180)

I call upon and supplicate, first of all, the gods, to save me, and then you who are in control of the vote, before whom I have defended myself against each of the accusations, to the best of my recollection; I beg you to save me and not give me over to the hands of the logographer, the Scythian [i.e., Demosthenes].<sup>31</sup>

Although Aeschines finds it prudent to appeal to both the gods and jurors as potential rescuers, most litigants dispense with appeals to the divine and supplicate exclusively the human agents who have the ability to help and rescue them through a favorable verdict.<sup>32</sup>

The construction of the courts as venues for helping, however, was not only psychologically but socially appealing to jurors. When litigants called upon large panels of jurors to help them, they invoked an attractive image of the Athenian community as one in which fellow citizens, acting

however, received some help (relatively low risk) from a friend, Damnippus, in whose house he was being held by the Thirty: Damnippus agreed to attempt to bribe Theognis to release him, but Lysias escaped from the house before the transaction was completed (12.12–16).

<sup>29</sup> The quasi-divine power of jurors did not escape Aristophanes' Philocleon in *Wasps*, who asserts that as juror he wields power that is no less than that of Zeus (619–30; cf. 572).

<sup>30</sup> For divinities as helpers of those suffering wrong, see Arist. *Rh.* 1383b7 (“the divine is thought to come to the aid of the wronged” [τὸ δὲ θεῖον ὑπολαμβάνεται βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις]); cf. Ar. *Pl.* 1025.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. [Demad.] 1.2: “Since I have myself fallen victim to the full hatred of the orators, I seek help from you, just as I do from the gods.” (ἐμπεσὼν δὲ αὐτὸς εἰς μέσσην τὴν τῶν ῥητόρων δυσμένειαν, ὥσπερ τῆς παρὰ θεῶν οὕτω τῆς παρ' ὑμῶν δέομαι τυχεῖν βοηθείας.)

<sup>32</sup> See the passages collected in note 17.

collectively, would come to the rescue of a wronged individual out of a sense of solidarity and unity. Whichever litigant they chose to help through their votes – and nothing prevented both litigants from appealing for help<sup>33</sup> – jurors could confirm the centrality of the idea of collective helping in their vision of the democratic Athenian community.

## CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNAL HELPING

Thus far, this chapter has argued that litigants construct the courts as venues for communal helping, casting themselves as victims and jurors as bystanders in a position to help or save them, and has proposed some explanations for why this may have appealed to jurors. To appreciate some of the nuances and subtleties of this way of envisioning the Athenian courts and the relation between litigants and jurors within them, it is useful to examine a few case studies. Although appeals for help in the courts draw on recognizable commonplaces, litigants freely adapt these to their own situations and purposes and in so doing offer diverse conceptualizations of the democratic Athenian community as one that assists and protects individual citizens. In the case studies that follow, litigants emphasize different aspects of communal helping: helping in the form of avenging a wrong done to both a victim and the city; helping as a reward for prior service to the city; and helping as an act of solidarity against a threat to the community.

### *A Community of Kindred Avengers*

The speaker of Antiphon 1: *Against the Stepmother* is prosecuting his stepmother before the Areopagus for poisoning his father; his half-brothers support her, and one of them speaks in her defense. The speaker is responsible, as the son of the deceased, to bring suit against his father's alleged murderer. Although the suit is a private one (δική), as is standard for Athenian homicide cases, the speaker reaches out to his judges to support and help him because of not only the private wrong but the threat to the

<sup>33</sup> For appeals for help (βοήθειαι) from defendants and their supporters, see Ant. 5.79–80; Lys. 18.25; 19.63; Is. 2.47; Isoc. 16.48; 18.37; Hyp. *Eux.* 38; Dem. 57.3. For appeals from prosecutors/plaintiffs and their supporters, see Ant. 1.3–4; Lys. 10.32; 32.3; Is. 5.20; Dem. 21.7; 27.3; 28.20; 30.25; 40.5; 42.4; 44.3; 45.1; 47.79; 54.2; 56.4; 58.7; [Dem.] 46.28; 49.68; 50.64; cf. Lyc. 1.150. Prosecutors of public suits often also cast themselves as helping the city through their suits: see Lys. 22.3; Dem. 22.1; 24.8; Aeschin. 1.2; 3.260; Lyc. 1.149; Din. 1.114; cf. Lys. 7.38; 20.17; fr. 195.1 Carey; Is. 3.46; Ar. *Pl.* 914–15 (see Chapter II for a fuller discussion of this).

city and its laws. Central to the speaker's presentation of his case are his appeals for help from his judges, which are interwoven with his calls for them to join him in seeking vengeance against his stepmother.

From the start, Antiphon's client highlights his need for help from his judges:

δέομαι δ' ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐὰν ἀποδείξω ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ προβουλῆς τὴν τούτων μητέρα φονέα οὔσαν τοῦ ἡμετέρου πατρός, καὶ μὴ ἅπας ἀλλὰ πολλὰκις ἥδη ληφθεῖσαν τὸν θάνατον τὸν ἐκείνου ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ μηχανωμένην, τιμωρῆσαι πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς ὑμέτεροις, οὓς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν προγόνων διαδεξάμενοι κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκείνοις περὶ τῆς καταψηφίσεως δικάζετε, δεύτερον δ' ἐκείνῳ τῷ τεθνηκότι, καὶ ἅμα ἔμοι μόνῳ ἀπολελειμμένῳ βοηθῆσαι. ὑμεῖς γάρ μοι ἀναγκαῖοι. οὓς γὰρ ἔχρην τῷ μὲν τεθνεῶτι τιμωροὺς γενέσθαι, ἔμοι δὲ βοηθοὺς, οὗτοι τοῦ μὲν τεθνεῶτος φονῆς γεγέννηται, ἔμοι δ' ἀντίδικοι καθεστᾶσι. πρὸς τίνας οὖν ἔλθῃ τις βοηθούς, ἢ ποῖ τὴν καταφυγὴν ποιήσεται ἄλλοθι ἢ πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ τὸ δίκαιον; (1.3–4)

If I show that their mother murdered our father intentionally and with premeditation, and indeed that she was caught in the act of contriving his death not just once but many times before, then I beg you, gentlemen, to take vengeance, first for your laws, which you received from the gods and your ancestors – for you convict people by these laws just as they did; second, take vengeance for the dead man, and at the same time help me who am left all alone. You are now my family, while they, who ought to be avengers of the dead man and my helpers [cf. 1.2], have become his murderers and my opponents. Where can one turn for helpers? Where can one take refuge except with you and with justice?

A striking feature of this cry for help is the speaker's appeal to his judges to act as surrogate kin in lending him assistance: because his family – to whom he would most naturally have recourse when in need of assistance in or out of court – have betrayed him and are his opponents, he must turn to his judges to be his helpers.<sup>34</sup> In transforming the strangers judging his case into helping kinsmen, the speaker advances a view of the Athenian community as a large family that naturally acts together to assist its individual members.<sup>35</sup> Consistent with this effort to bridge the gap between himself and his audience is the way the speaker calls on his judges here

<sup>34</sup> For similar appeals to jurors, see Dem. 28.20; 45.85; cf. And. 1.148–9; Lys. 13.92; 18.24; Ober 1989: 263. On the “unnaturalness” of intrafamilial litigation, see Christ 1998a: 168–73. Antiphon's client, as a young man (allegedly) without legal experience (1.1, 30), is in a particularly good position to appeal for compassionate help from jurors; cf. Ant. 5.79–80; Is. 9.35; Isoc. 16.48; Dem. 58.41.

<sup>35</sup> Most litigants in the courts were probably strangers or near-strangers to most jurors; as E. Cohen (2000: 104–29) argues, Athens was not a face-to-face society.

to avenge both the public wrong against the laws and the private wrong against the dead man.

Antiphon's client later invokes this same convergence of public and private vengeance in characterizing his own role as prosecutor:

καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἐπεξέρχομαι λέγων, ἵνα δῶ δίκην ὧν ἡδίκηκε καὶ τιμωρήσω τῷ τε πατρὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς ὑμετέροις· ταύτη καὶ ἄξιόν μοι βοηθῆσαι ὑμᾶς ἅπαντας, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγω. (1.24)

I am prosecuting her with this speech so that she will pay the penalty for the wrongs she has committed and I will gain revenge for our father and your laws, and in this way I deserve help from all of you if I speak the truth.

The speaker asserts that he embraces the same dual objective of avenging the laws and his father that his judges do and that this justifies their support of him. If the speaker puts vengeance for his father first and for the laws second, thus reversing the sequence he used when appealing to his audience earlier (1.3), the fact that he and his judges share the same twofold goal – if with naturally different priorities – sufficiently binds them to one another against the speaker's stepmother and her supporters.

When the speaker calls on his judges to help him in seeking vengeance for his dead father, it is perhaps implicit that they will simultaneously be helping the dead man by punishing his murderer. Lest his judges miss this aspect of their provision of help, the speaker makes this point explicitly in the heart of his speech, asserting that the dead man “deserves to obtain your pity, help, and vengeance” (ἄξιός καὶ ἐλέου καὶ βοηθείας καὶ τιμωρίας παρ’ ὑμῶν τυχεῖν) (1.21) and that they should be helpers (βοηθοί) not of murderers but of their victims (1.22). The idea that the judges will be rendering help ultimately to the dead man himself paves the way for the speaker in his peroration to characterize himself too as a helper of the dead man and the law:

ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν διήγηται καὶ βεβοήθηται τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ τῷ νόμῳ· ἐν ὑμῖν δ’ ἐστὶ σκοπεῖν τὰ λοιπὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ δικάζειν τὰ δίκαια. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ θεοῖς τοῖς κάτω μέλειν οἱ ἡδίκηνται. (1.31)

I have told my story and have given my help to the dead man and the law. Now it is up to you by yourselves to consider what remains to be done and decide in accordance with justice. The gods below, I think, are also concerned about those who have suffered wrong.

Interestingly, this speaker who began his speech as an isolated individual in need of help from the court has by the end of it himself become a helper of his father and the law. Yet he makes it clear that his help is but a part (μὲν) of what is needed; what remains (δέ) is for his judges to embrace

the helping role that he has insisted on from the start by also helping the dead man and the law through a favorable verdict. Working together as members of a just and helping community, he suggests, prosecutor and judges can avenge the offense against the dead man and the city's laws, and thus simultaneously serve legitimate private and public ends.<sup>36</sup>

### *A Community of Reciprocal Helpers*

As noted in Chapter II, Athenian litigants regularly parade before jurors their ancestors' and their own services to the city and seek gratitude (*charis*) from them in the form of a sympathetic hearing and favorable verdict. An integral part of the appeal to, and exploitation of, *charis* in the courts, is the rhetoric of helping – the idea that those who have helped the city as good citizens deserve reciprocal help from their fellow citizens in their time of need. The flip side of this, which litigants invoke frequently, is that citizens who have failed to help the city in the past do not deserve help from jurors. In each case, litigants advance a view of the Athenian community in which individual and group are bound to one another through reciprocal helping.<sup>37</sup>

The idea that jurors, as members of the *dēmos*, should help those who have helped the city is well illustrated by the speaker of Lysias 18: *On the Confiscation of the Property of Nicias' Brother* as he seeks to defend the property of his deceased father, Eucrates (brother to the famous Athenian general Nicias), from his opponent's claim against it.<sup>38</sup> Throughout his speech, Lysias' client emphasizes the services of his kin to the city during the Peloponnesian War and under the regime of the Thirty, including his own personal role as a child in his family's appeal to the Spartan Pausanias to help them on the basis of bonds of friendship and hospitality (18.10) and to support the *dēmos* rather than the violent oligarchs (18.11–12). The help that he and his brother gave to the *dēmos* (ἡμᾶς . . . βοηθῆσαι τῷ πλῆθει) as children and the multiple benefactions of his kin make it natural to seek refuge with jurors, and to ask them to show *charis* for these past services and thus “to provide an example to those who wish to do the city good service of the treatment that they will receive from you in times of danger” (παράδειγμα ποιῆσαι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὴν πόλιν εὖ ποιεῖν, οἷων

<sup>36</sup> For a similar intertwining of “helping” and “avenging,” see Ant. 2.3.11; 5.79–80; Lys. 12.99–100; 29.8; Dem. 21.76, 227; [Dem.] 46.28; 50.64; cf. Dem. 58.1–3, 59.

<sup>37</sup> On reciprocal helping between citizen and city, see Chapter II.

<sup>38</sup> On the obscure circumstances of this suit, see Todd 2000: 191–3 and Wolpert 2002b: 119–23.

ὑμῶν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις τεύξονται) (18.22–3). As the speaker approaches his peroration, he emphasizes his isolation and vulnerability in the present circumstance because the kinsmen who might otherwise have supported him died in service to the city (18.24), and calls on jurors to render him and his family what is due to them through the help of a favorable verdict:

ὦν ἄξιον ὑμᾶς ἐνθυμηθέντας προθύμως ἡμῖν βοηθῆσαι, ἡγησαμένους τούτους ἂν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δικαίως εὖ πάσχειν ὑφ' ὑμῶν, οἷπερ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν συμφορῶν μετέσχον τὸ μέρος. (25) . . . ἡμεῖς τοίνυν, ὑεῖς ὄντες καὶ συγγενεῖς τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας προκεκινδυνευκότων, ἀπαιτοῦμεν ὑμᾶς νυνὶ ταύτην τὴν χάριν, καὶ ἀξιοῦμεν μὴ ἀδίκως ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον βοηθεῖν τοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν μετασχοῦσι συμφορῶν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ ἀντιβολῶ καὶ ἱκετεύω, καὶ τούτων παρ' ὑμῶν τυγχάνειν ἀξιῶ· οὐ γὰρ περὶ μικρῶν κινδυνεύομεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων. (27)

Bearing all this in mind, you ought to help us eagerly, judging those to be rightful recipients of your favors under democracy who bore their share of calamity under oligarchy. . . . So we, sons and relatives of those who have been foremost to meet danger in the cause of freedom, ask this return of your gratitude today, and deem it right that you not ruin us unjustly, but much rather that you help those who have shared in the common calamities. Now I beg and beseech and supplicate you, and I think we deserve to receive this from you. For it is no slight matter that we have at stake, but rather the whole of our possessions.

Thus, according to Lysias' client, his solidarity and that of his kin with the *dēmos* in its past misfortunes warrants help from the jury in his family's current difficulties. In rendering this help, the jury will confirm both its gratitude and the reciprocal nature of helping between individuals and the larger Athenian community.<sup>39</sup>

If litigants insist that jurors owe them help because of their past assistance to the city, they are equally adamant that their opponents who have failed to serve the city deserve no help from jurors. Consider, for example, how a client of Lysias castigates his opponent, Philon, who is undergoing a scrutiny (*dokimasia*) before the Council to determine whether he should become a member of it, for his failure to support the democrats in 403 in their struggle with the Thirty.<sup>40</sup> In a time when every good citizen helped (ἐβοήθει) the fatherland to the best of his ability (31.8) and metics helped (ἐβοήθησαν) the *dēmos* beyond what was expected of them (31.29),

<sup>39</sup> For other appeals to jurors for help based on reciprocity, see Is. 7.37–42; Dem. 21.70; 45.85; [Dem.] 50.64.

<sup>40</sup> In such cases, the Council sat as jury: see Todd 1993: 115–16, with 116 n. 14.



Philon went to live in Oropus, from which he set out to take plunder from old Athenians left behind in the demes (31.17). Despite this, Philon has found unscrupulous supporters, who will plead on his behalf in the current case: “I see certain men who have conspired to help this man and to beg you since they were not able to bribe me” (ὁρῶ δέ τινας οἱ νῦν μὲν τούτῳ παρασκευάζονται βοηθεῖν καὶ δεῖσθαι ὑμῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐδύναντο πείσαι); when the city was in dire straits, these men “did not at that time beg him to help you and the city we share, and to betray neither his fatherland nor the Council” (τότε οὐκ ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ βοηθῆσαι καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πόλει, καὶ μὴ προδοῦναι μήτε τὴν πατρίδα μήτε τὴν βουλήν) (31.32). This man who failed to help the city in its hour of need should not benefit from the corrupt help of his supporters in the current circumstances and certainly does not merit, the speaker implies, help from the Council sitting in judgment of him.

The most vehement and extended attack on a citizen in these terms is found in Lycurgus’ prosecution of Leocrates for treason on the grounds that he abandoned the city after Philip’s victory at Chaeronea (338 B.C.). Throughout his speech, Lycurgus casts Leocrates as an antipatriot who deserted his country and failed to come to help (μὴ βοηθήσαντα) its sacred shrines (Lyc. 1.8; cf. 58) and contrasts him with the vast majority of Athenians who made every effort to support the fatherland (1.57). His failure to assist his own country in its need, in fact, made him unwelcome in other cities as well because they saw they would get no help from him in time of crisis:

ὅς γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ πατρίδος οὐκ ἐβοήθησεν, ταχύ γ’ ἂν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας κίνδυνόν τιν’ ὑπομείνειεν. κακοὶ γὰρ καὶ πολῖται καὶ ξένοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ φίλοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσίν, οἱ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τῶν τῆς πόλεως μεθέξουσιν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀτυχίαις οὐδὲ βοηθείας ἀξιώσουσι. (1.133)

One who failed to help his own country would perhaps be likely to face danger for another’s! Such men are bad, whether as citizens, guests, or personal friends; for they will partake of the advantages offered by the state, but will not deem it worthy of help in times of difficulty.

This patent breach of proper reciprocity between city and citizen, Lycurgus asserts, means that no patriot would be so foolish as to lend assistance (βοηθεῖν) to Leocrates in the current trial (1.140) – a snipe at the *sunēgoroi* supporting him; far better to do what Lycurgus is doing, “helping the fatherland” (τῇ πατρίδι βοηθῶν) by prosecuting him (1.149; cf. 3–6).<sup>41</sup> In

<sup>41</sup> For the common claim that a prosecutor is “helping” the city, see note 33.

concluding his speech, Lycurgus exhorts the jury to condemn Leocrates to death to ensure the city's future security:

ἐάν δὲ τοῦτον ἀποκτείνητε, διαφυλάττειν καὶ σώζειν τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὰς προσόδους καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν παρακελεύσεσθε. νομίζοντες οὖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵκετεύειν ὑμῶν τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰ δένδρα, δεῖσθαι τοὺς λιμένας <καὶ> τὰ νεώρια καὶ τὰ τείχη τῆς πόλεως, ἀξιοῦν δὲ καὶ τοὺς νεῶς καὶ τὰ ἱερά βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς, παράδειγμα ποιήσατε Λεωκράτη, ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν κατηγορημένων, {καὶ} ὅτι οὐ πλέον ἰσχύει παρ' ὑμῖν ἔλεος οὐδὲ δάκρυα τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων καὶ τοῦ δήμου σωτηρίας. (I.I 50)

If you kill him, you will be encouraging others to protect and save your fatherland with its revenues and its prosperity. Imagine then, Athenians, that the countryside and its trees are supplicating you, that the harbors, dockyards, and walls of the city are begging you, yes, and the temples and sanctuaries deem it right that you help them. Bear in mind the charges brought and make of Leocrates an example that with you pity and tears do not have more weight than the preservation of the laws and the *dēmos*.

In asserting that the temples and sanctuaries of Attica think it right that jurors come to *their* rescue against the treason of Leocrates,<sup>42</sup> Lycurgus deftly preempts any plea for help that Leocrates, as defendant, may make to jurors. He indicates, moreover, that in rendering that help, the members of the jury can simultaneously help themselves by acting for the “preservation of the laws and the *dēmos*.”

### *Community, Solidarity, and Security*

Perhaps the richest extant forensic speech is Demosthenes' prosecution of Meidias for his hubris in striking Demosthenes in the face in the Theater of Dionysus when he was serving as the sponsor of a public chorus (χορηγός) for his tribe. Although scholars have productively mined this speech for evidence of Athenian understandings of hubris and of the relationship between mass and elite in Athens,<sup>43</sup> no one as far as I know has analyzed it for the light it sheds on the poetics of helping in the Athenian courts.<sup>44</sup> As scholars have observed, Demosthenes effectively isolates Meidias from all that is decent and democratic in Athens, casting him as a hubristic, dangerous antidemocrat, whose assault on Demosthenes is an attack on the

<sup>42</sup> Cf. the emphasis placed on protecting the homeland and its sanctuaries in the Athenian Ephebic Oath (RO 88.1).

<sup>43</sup> On hubris in Dem. 21, see Fisher 1992: 44–51; on mass and elite, see Ober 1989: 208–12.

<sup>44</sup> MacDowell (1990: 226), however, notes the wide field of application of βοηθῆω in this speech.

entire community and its values, social and political.<sup>45</sup> An important part of this isolation of his enemy, as we shall see, is the way that Demosthenes forges an alliance with his audience against Meidias based on what he represents to be their shared understanding of helping and its role in the Athenian community.

From early in his speech, Demosthenes frames his appeal for help from jurors as one with broad communal implications because Meidias' hubris threatens both individual and group:

δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν ἀπάντων, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ ἱκετεύω, πρῶτον μὲν εὐνοϊκῶς ἀκοῦσαί μου λέγοντος, ἔπειτ', ἐὰν ἐπιδείξω Μειδίαν τουτονὶ μὴ μόνον εἰς ἐμέ ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς ὑμᾶς καὶ εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας ὑβρικότεα, βοηθῆσαι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς. (21.7; cf. 227)

So I beg you all, men of the jury, and I supplicate you, first to listen to my speech with goodwill, and secondly, if I show that this man Meidias has treated insolently not only me but also you and the laws and everyone else, to help both me and yourselves.

Although Demosthenes is not the only Athenian litigant to propose that jurors can help themselves by helping him,<sup>46</sup> his analysis of helping as a critical social and civic value goes further than that of other litigants. Demosthenes not only calls on jurors to help him as the wronged party but also offers them a model according to which the proper exercise of help binds victims of insolent assault, juries, and the laws together in a nexus of mutual support: the victim should exercise restraint in helping himself when assaulted and abused, and turn to jurors, who will render help in defense of, and in conjunction with, the laws.

As Demosthenes presents it, when an Athenian individual is hubristically assaulted, he can choose to help himself on the spot by responding physically or hold back and engage in legal self-help against the aggressor by prosecuting him before an Athenian court. Demosthenes, citing the case of Euaion, who had killed a drunk friend when struck insolently by him (21.71–3), suggests that this sort of spontaneous, physical self-help is understandable: “I fully sympathize with Euaion and anyone else who has helped himself when dishonored” (τῷ δ' Εὐαίῳνι καὶ πᾶσιν, εἴ τις αὐτῷ βεβοήθηκεν ἀτιμαζόμενος, πολλὴν συγγνώμην ἔχω) (21.74).<sup>47</sup> Preferable,

<sup>45</sup> See, e.g., Ober 1989: 208–12 and MacDowell 1990: 28–37.

<sup>46</sup> See the passages collected in note 21. For the vested interest of jurors in “helping themselves” against individuals who act with hubris, see also Isoc. 20.15: “whenever you punish men who act with hubris, you help yourselves” (ὅταν δὲ τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας κολάζητε, ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖτε).

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Pl. *Grg.* 483b1–4.

however, is the self-restraint shown by Demosthenes in choosing to engage in *legal* rather than *physical* self-help against his assailant.<sup>48</sup> Demosthenes is careful to dispel any impression that his self-restraint stemmed from passivity or cowardice by casting himself as actively and boldly helping himself through the legal process<sup>49</sup> – something that is not within reach of many of Meidias’ victims:

ἐγὼ δὲ δι’ ἧς μὲν προφάσεις ἕκαστος ἀφίσταται τοῦ βοηθεῖν αὐτῷ, πάντας ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι νομίζω· καὶ γὰρ ἀσχολία καὶ ἀπραγμοσύνη καὶ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι λέγειν καὶ ἀπορία καὶ μυρὶ ἔστιν αἴτια. (21.141)

I think you all know the excuses which an individual has for refraining from helping himself: lack of time, aversion to public business, inability to speak, lack of means – thousands of things are responsible.

Through Demosthenes’ energetic legal self-help, however, the community can protect itself by condemning its common enemy, Meidias: “Now, since he is in our grasp, he must be punished jointly by all for all, as a common enemy of the state” (κοινῇ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ περ εἴληπται, πᾶσιν ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τιμωρητέος ὡς κοινὸς ἐχθρὸς τῇ πολιτείᾳ) (21.142; cf. 21.106).

It is incumbent on the jury, according to Demosthenes, to render help to the individual exercising legal self-help in these circumstances for a variety of reasons. First, the moderate nature of the victim’s response, which is in accord with communal values of self-restraint, should inspire the jury’s gratitude and thus assistance:

εἰ τοίνυν τις ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλως πως ἔχει τὴν ὀργὴν ἐπὶ Μειδίᾳ ἢ ὡς δεόν αὐτὸν τεθνάναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει. οὐ γάρ ἐστι δίκαιον οὐδὲ προσῆκον τὴν τοῦ παθόντος εὐλάβειαν τῷ μηδὲν ὑποστειλαμένῳ πρὸς ὕβριν μερίδ’ εἰς σωτηρίαν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ὡς ἀπάντων τῶν ἀνηκέστων αἴτιον κολάζειν προσήκει, τῷ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ βοηθεῖν ἀποδιδόναι τὴν χάριν. (21.70)

If the feeling of anger which any of you has against Meidias, men of Athens, is anything less than that he ought to be put to death, you are not right. It is not just or proper that the victim’s discretion should be a contribution toward acquittal for a man who didn’t restrain himself from insolence; it is proper to punish the latter as being responsible for every disaster, and to show your gratitude to the former by helping him.

<sup>48</sup> Demosthenes is not alone in speaking of “helping himself” through litigation: see Lys. 19.1; Is. 2.1; Dem. 34.2; cf. Lys. fr. 434 Carey.

<sup>49</sup> On Demosthenes’ manly self-presentation in this speech, see Roisman 2003: 136–41.

Second, in punishing Meidias, the jury will not only allow Demosthenes to get the deferred vengeance he deserves but also set an example for others assaulted by bullies that jurors will come to their aid:

ἐμοὶ τῷ τοσαύτῃ κεκρημένῳ προνοίᾳ τοῦ μηδὲν ἀνήκεστον γενέσθαι, ὥστε μηδ' ἀμύνασθαι, παρὰ τοῦ τὴν τιμωρίαν ὧν πέπονθ' ἀποδοθῆναι προσήκει; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι παρ' ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ παράδειγμά γε πᾶσι γενέσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅτι τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας ἀπαντας καὶ τοὺς ἀσελγεῖς οὐκ αὐτὸν ἀμύνεσθαι μετὰ τῆς ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἄγειν δεῖ, ὡς βεβαιούντων ὑμῶν καὶ φυλαττόντων τὰς ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς παθοῦσι βοηθείας. (21.76)

When I exercised so much care to prevent any disastrous result that I did not defend myself at all, from whom ought I to obtain vengeance for what was done to me? From you and the laws, I think; and an example ought to be set, to show everyone else that all insolent bullies should not be fought off at the moment of anger, but referred to you, since you are the ones who guarantee and guard help for victims in accordance with the laws.

If, on the other hand, the jury fails to help litigants like Demosthenes, who has persisted in his self-help against his opponent despite his devious out-of-court maneuvering, it will send the unhappy message to citizens that “it will be best to kowtow to assailants, as they do in foreign parts, not to resist them” (προσκυνεῖν τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, οὐκ ἀμύνεσθαι κράτιστον ἔσται) (21.106).

When jurors help restrained individuals, like Demosthenes, who pursue legal self-help rather than physical self-help in the heat of the moment, they not only help persons who deserve their assistance but the laws of the city, with which jurors enjoy a relationship of mutual support:

καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἰ θέλοιτε σκοπεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, τῷ ποτ' εἰσὶν ὑμῶν οἱ αἰὶ δικάζοντες ἰσχυροὶ καὶ κύριοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πάντων, ἔάν τε διακοσίους ἔάν τε χιλίους ἔάν θ' ὅποσουςοῦν ἡ πόλις καθίσῃ, οὔτε τῷ μεθ' ὀπλων εἶναι συντεταγμένοι μόνοι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, εὐροίτ' ἂν, οὔτε τῷ τὰ σώματ' ἄριστ' ἔχειν καὶ μάλιστ' ἰσχύειν {τοὺς δικάζοντας}, οὔτε τῷ τὴν ἡλικίαν εἶναι νεώτατοι, οὔτε τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοὺς νόμους ἰσχύειν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νόμων ἰσχύς τίς ἐστιν; ἄρ' ἔάν τις ὑμῶν ἀδικούμενος ἀνακράγῃ, προσδραμοῦνται καὶ παρέσονται βοηθοῦντες; οὐ· γράμματα γὰρ γεγραμμέν' ἐστί, καὶ οὐχὶ δύναιντ' ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. τίς οὖν ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν ἐστιν; ὑμεῖς ἔάν βεβαιῶτ' αὐτοὺς καὶ παρέχητε κυρίου αἰὶ τῷ δεομένῳ. οὐκοῦν οἱ νόμοι θ' ὑμῖν εἰσὶν ἰσχυροὶ καὶ ὑμεῖς τοῖς νόμοις. δεῖ τοίνυν τούτοις βοηθεῖν ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἂν αὐτῷ τις ἀδικουμένῳ, καὶ τὰ τῶν νόμων ἀδικήματα κοινὰ νομίζειν, ἐφ' ὅτου περ ἂν λαμβάνηται, καὶ μήτε λητουργίας μήτ' ἔλεον μήτ' ἄνδρα μηδένα μήτε τέχνην μηδεμίαν εὐρῆσθαι, δι' ὅτου παραβάς τις τοὺς νόμους οὐ δώσει δίκην. (21.223–5)

For in fact, if you cared to consider and investigate the question what it is that gives power and control over everything in the state to those of you who are jurors at any time, whether the state convenes two hundred or a thousand or any other number, you would find that the reason is not that you alone of the citizens are mobilized and armed, nor that you are physically the best and strongest, nor that you are youngest in age, nor anything of that sort, but that your power is derived from the strength of the laws. And what is the strength of the laws? Is it that, if any of you is being wronged and gives a shout, they will run up and be at your side, giving you help? No; they are written documents and they could not do that. What is their strength then? *You* are, if you guarantee them and make them effective on each occasion for anyone who asks. So the laws get their power from you, and you from the laws. You must therefore help them in the same way as anyone would help himself if being wronged, and you must take the view that offenses against the laws concern everyone, no matter in whose case they are detected, and that neither liturgies nor pity nor any individual man nor any skill nor anything else has ever been discovered that will enable anyone who has transgressed the laws to escape punishment.

Although this passage is often quoted in discussions of the relationship between the *dēmos* and the laws in Athens (cf. Dem. 42.15),<sup>50</sup> the significance of βοήθεια as a communal ideal here has not been fully appreciated. In striking language Demosthenes envisions “helping” as a prime function of democratic jurors. Although jurors derive their power from the laws, only jurors as human agents are in a position to answer the cries of help from victims of injustice – after all the laws cannot run to assist them!<sup>51</sup> In lending this help, Demosthenes suggests, jurors are helping both themselves – anyone of them could be attacked and give a shout for help – and the laws, which are under attack whenever a citizen is hubristically assaulted. This imagery of helping not only vividly conveys how the laws and jurors collaborate in helping victims but also corroborates the model of the courts that this chapter has advanced, in which jurors are bystanders to a crime-in-progress and in a position to rescue victims crying out for help.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>50</sup> See, e.g., Ober 1989: 299–300.

<sup>51</sup> For the laws themselves as lending help to litigants, see Is. 4.16; cf. Isoc. 19.15, 50 (before a court in Aegina); Dem. 24.102, 107; 34.52; Hyp. *Ath.* 18; for further discussion of this, see Chapter II.

<sup>52</sup> In this passage, Demosthenes deftly blurs not only the distinction between laws and jurors but also between jurors and potential victims of violence and between intervention in the courts on behalf of men suffering wrong and intervention on the street. Demosthenes also vividly equates intervention by jurors with bystander intervention in street crime in 21.222, when he asks,

## THE FRAGILITY OF HELPING

We have seen how litigants fashion an image of the courts as venues for communal helping, in which jurors as bystanders witnessing an injustice have an opportunity and obligation to intervene for individual victims. Although litigants vary in their approaches and emphases, they draw on and exploit an understanding of the courts as places where the community can and should help individuals whose values and interests coincide with its own. The ubiquity of this construction of the courts in forensic oratory from the late fifth to the late fourth century suggests that jurors found this attractive as a way of understanding their collective role in relation to the individual litigants before them and that this vision of the Athenian community as a helping one, in which the group supports the worthy individual, was appealing. This image of the Athenian community, however, was very much a social construct that simplified and idealized the relationship between individual and community in the context of the courts. Let us consider some of the tensions evident in this construct.

Embedded in litigants' appeals to jurors for help are numerous indications that they could not assume that jurors would necessarily come to their rescue. Whether litigants beg, supplicate, or exhort jurors to hasten to save them, they display uncertainty and anxiety as to whether help will be forthcoming. Consistent with this is the fact that litigants often are not satisfied with asking for help just once in the course of a speech but make this appeal repeatedly and pointedly lest jurors fail to realize its urgency or be misled by the competing appeals for help from their opponents.

Although litigants' anxiety no doubt arises in part from the fact that they had much at stake in winning their cases, it also reflects the challenges faced by litigants attempting to convince an audience of strangers to intervene on their behalf and come to their rescue. As Chapter I argued, in day-to-day life, Athenians were expected primarily to help their kin and intimate friends, and the giving of substantial help outside these circles was not common. How then were litigants in the courts to rouse strangers to help them? One strategy, as we have seen, was to confront the problem head-on and cast jurors as surrogate kin or friends and thus provide a basis for lending support that was grounded in familiar social relationships in which helping in time of crisis was the norm.<sup>53</sup> Even those who invoke the metaphor that jurors are kin or friends, however, seem to recognize the

"What reason is there to expect me to survive after suffering this treatment, if you overlook it now?" (καὶ τίνι χρὴ με λογισμῷ περιεῖναι ταῦτα παθόντα, εἰ περιόψεσθέ με νῦν ὑμεῖς).

<sup>53</sup> See Ant. 1.3–4, quoted earlier in the text, and note 34 with further examples.

thinness of such a claim among strangers, and therefore seek to establish a bond between themselves and their audiences based on their shared values and interests as members of the Athenian community. Paradoxically, Athenian litigants who sought help from jurors on the basis of shared community had first to create and construct that community in the courtroom by forging a bond between themselves and the strangers judging them.

If, on the streets of Athens, a cry for help from a victim to bystanders was a simple, imperative utterance, which bystanders had to interpret on their own as they determined whether to intervene, in court a litigant could expand a cry for help into an entire speech and provide his audience with a social and political context for responding to that cry. The variety and range of arguments that litigants deploy as they seek to rally their audiences to come to their rescue attests not only to the ingenuity of litigants and their speechwriters but also to the challenges of eliciting action from a group of diverse strangers. Thus, litigants at times implore jurors for help, appealing for pity and compassion in light of their dire circumstances.<sup>54</sup> At other times, they appeal for help because this is right and just, as when they call on their audiences “to give just help” (βοηθῆσαι . . . τὰ δίκαια).<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, as if in recognition that pity and justice may not suffice to elicit help, litigants often appeal to jurors for help on the basis of what will best serve jurors themselves as members of the *dēmos*, urging them “to help yourselves” (βοηθῆσαι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς).<sup>56</sup> In appealing to the collective self-interests of jurors, litigants acknowledge that help may not be automatic but a matter of calculation on the part of the jurors.

Perhaps the best strategy for a litigant was to cast his net widely in seeking help from jurors because he could not be certain how his audience might respond to any single type of argument for intervention. Demosthenes, in suing his guardians over his inheritance, takes this approach,

<sup>54</sup> For appeals for help on the basis of pity and compassion, see Ant. 1.21; Isoc. 16.48; Dem. 27.68; 28.20; 36.59; 45.88; 58.60; cf. Johnstone 1999: 109–25; Konstan 2001: 27–48; Sternberg 2005b, 2006: 12–17; for the assertion that jurors should direct their help elsewhere and *not* show pity to a litigant’s opponent, see Lys. 12.79–80; 15.9; 29.8; Isoc. 18.4, 37; Lyc. 1.150.

<sup>55</sup> For the appeal βοηθῆσαι . . . τὰ δίκαια, see Lys. 32.3; Is. 7.4; 8.5; Dem. 27.3, 68; 30.25; 35.5; 38.2; 40.61; 45.1; 54.2; 58.7; cf. Ant. 1.4; 5.80; Lys. 5.1; 19.63; fr. 286.4 Carey; Is. 2.47; 8.45; Dem. 28.20; 34.40; 40.5; 42.32; 43.84; 44.3; 54.42; [Dem.] 46.28. In such cases, the idea of giving just help is nearly synonymous with rendering a just verdict (δικάζειν τὰ δίκαια; see Ant. 1.31). As we have seen in our case studies, the appeal for just help can be presented as avenging a wrong done to victim and city; rewarding an individual for his prior service to the city; or as an act of solidarity against an enemy of the community.

<sup>56</sup> For the exhortation to jurors to help themselves, see the passages collected under this rubric in note 21.



begging and supplicating jurors for help on the basis of pity, justice, and self-interest:

βοηθήσατ' οὖν ἡμῖν, βοηθήσατε, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ ἡμῶν καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ τετελευτηκότος. σώσατε, ἐλεήσατε, ἐπειδὴ μ' οὔτοι συγγενεῖς ὄντες οὐκ ἤλέησαν. εἰς ὑμᾶς καταπεφεύγαμεν. ἴκετεύω, ἀντιβολῶ πρὸς παίδων, πρὸς γυναικῶν, πρὸς τῶν ὄντων ἀγαθῶν ὑμῖν. οὕτως ὄναισθε τούτων, μὴ περιίδητέ με, μηδὲ ποιήσητε τὴν μητέρα καὶ τῶν ἐπιλοίπων ἐλπίδων εἰς τὸν βίον στερηθεῖσαν ἀνάξιον αὐτῆς τι παθεῖν. (28.20)

So, help us! Help us for the sake of justice, and of yourselves, and of us, and of my deceased father. Save me, pity me, since these men [i.e., my guardians] have taken no pity, though they are relatives. It is to you that we have turned for refuge. I supplicate you, I entreat you by your children, by your wives, by the good things you have: may you have full enjoyment of them, if you do not look on me with indifference and do not cause my mother to be deprived of her remaining hopes in life and suffer a fate unworthy of her.

In offering the juror-bystanders in his case multiple grounds for answering his cries for help and not “just looking on” (μὴ περιίδητε) him in his distress,<sup>57</sup> the young Demosthenes astutely gauges the complexity of communal helping in an Athenian context and effectively reaches out to the jurors who ultimately cast their votes in his favor.<sup>58</sup>

Notwithstanding the challenges that litigants faced in appealing for help from the strangers judging their suits, they persisted in invoking an image of the Athenian community as it should be whenever they called on jurors to rescue them. Although litigants clearly did so in pursuit of their own specific legal ends, they simultaneously played an important role in advancing and promulgating an ideal vision of the Athenian community and its readiness to help wronged individuals that reflected and reinforced democratic notions of the proper relation between the *dēmos* and its individual members.

An examination of the poetics of helping in forensic oratory can lead us to a better understanding of both the Athenian courts and democratic ideals concerning the proper role of helping in the city. The frequency with which litigants appeal for help from jurors suggests that the courts played a complex role in Athens, functioning not only as enforcers of laws and settlers of

<sup>57</sup> Note how Demosthenes' repeated cries for help at the start of this passage resemble an appeal from a victim of street crime or other violence, who would naturally call out repeatedly for help.

<sup>58</sup> On Demosthenes' success in this case, see MacDowell 2004: 11.

disputes but as venues in which ideals of community and solidarity among citizens were constructed and exploited. The specific vision of community that litigants regularly invoke in the courts, according to which jurors, as bystanders, collectively intervene in the troubles of fellow Athenians and lend them help, offers an idealization of the relationship between community and individual under the democracy. The community, it proposes, stands poised to protect individuals from injustice and wrongdoing, and to join energetically with them in opposing those, including the rich and powerful, who disregard the laws and threaten other citizens. In so doing, the community stands up for what is right and decent and simultaneously serves its best interests and those of the individual citizens who constitute it.

# IV

## “HELPING OTHERS” IN ATHENIAN INTERSTATE RELATIONS

Up to this point, this study has focused on helping within Athens and among Athenians. We now turn to Athenians helping outside the city and, in particular, to the question of Athenian military aid to other city-states. Athenians in the classical period were drawn to an image of themselves as a generous and benevolent people who had from time immemorial come to the rescue of wronged Greeks. This perspective comes across vividly in the city’s funeral orations for its war dead and on the tragic stage, where Theseus and others heroically intervene on behalf of Greeks in distress, and speakers in the law courts and Assembly sometimes invoke this same ideal as they seek to sway large popular audiences. One can have little doubt that Athenians found this heroic image of themselves appealing, given its iterations in diverse contexts over time. How far this actually affected Athenian interstate behavior, however, is open to debate. This chapter explores the Athenian discourse of helping others and its relation to Athenian interstate behavior.

It is natural to turn from the question of helping on the domestic front in Athens to that of helping in the city’s interstate relations, not least because Athenians speak of helping in these two spheres in similar terms.<sup>1</sup> Most strikingly, Athenians conceptualize helping other states in a manner that evokes the vision of Athenian corporate helping that is so prevalent in Athenian courts. As noted in the previous chapter, litigants, drawing on the language and imagery of bystander intervention in street violence, vividly represent their trials as crimes-in-progress to which jurors are witnesses and plead that they should not just stand by and look on (περιοράω) but

<sup>1</sup> On the Athenian tendency to conceptualize and evaluate interstate relations in terms drawn from the domestic sphere, see Dover 1974: 310–11, 313; Low 2007: 129–74; cf. Hunt 2010: 2–3, 108–33.

rather run to their rescue (βοηθέω) and save (σώζω) them with their votes. Athenians often use the same vocabulary and nexus of images in speaking of collective action on behalf of other states.<sup>2</sup> If Athenians could envision helping within the city and outside of it in similar terms, however, it is reasonable to ask how expectations of helping may have diverged in these distinct contexts.

Our examination of helping among Athenians in the preceding chapters suggests that caution is warranted in approaching the Athenian discourse about helping others outside the city. If Athenians tended, as a practical matter, to lend substantial help only to their intimates within the city and not significantly to their fellow citizens, were they likely collectively to lend help readily to other Greeks in distress?<sup>3</sup> It was one thing for Athenian jurors to embrace the notion that they were heroic rescuers of wronged litigants as they cast their votes risk-free in the law courts, but quite another for Athenians to run to the rescue of other Hellenes who had “suffered wrong” and to risk their lives in battle to save them. Indeed, it is important to be aware that Athenian claims about helping others in interstate relations may tell us more about Athenians’ ideal image of themselves and their city than about the principles that guided them in their actions abroad.

The analysis that follows begins by locating the current investigation within the ongoing scholarly debate concerning the general nature of Greek interstate relations and the significance of Athenian claims of helping other states. It then turns to consider the ancient evidence, examining first the salience of these Athenian claims in the Attic funeral orations and the tensions surrounding them. Next, it examines how the contemporary historians Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon represent Athenian helping and its limitations in several historical instances in which Athenians provided military support to other states. Finally, it argues that the emphasis these historians place on Athenian pragmatism and caution in such situations is consistent with the evidence of Demosthenes’ speeches to the Athenian Assembly concerning intervention abroad, which appeal sometimes to the ideal of helping wronged states

<sup>2</sup> See Thuc. 1.53.4; 2.73.3; Isoc 4.55; Dem. 9.28–9; 10.3, 8; 16.24–5; 18.63; 19.64; cf. Isoc. 14.1; Hdt. 6.106.5; Thuc. 8.26.3; Lys. 2.44–6; X. *HG* 6.3.1; 6.5.46. Greek historians sometimes also attribute this vocabulary and imagery to non-Athenians speaking of interstate intervention that does not involve Athenians: see Hdt. 7.168.1–2; Thuc. 8.40.1; X. *HG* 4.8.20; cf. Low 2007: 183–5.

<sup>3</sup> On the favorable treatment of one’s “in-group” over those outside it, see Dovidio et al. 2006: 294–307 and Dovidio et al. 2010; cf. the essays in Stürmer and Snyder 2009.

but place a clear priority on the city's protection and pursuit of its own interests.

## ATHENIAN INTERSTATE RELATIONS

Any discussion of Athenian interstate relations in the classical period necessarily entails some assessment of the nature of relations among Hellenes in general. A bone of contention among classical scholars is how far one may speak of an international Hellenic community in which moral, social, or legal constraints operated.<sup>4</sup> “Realists” argue that the multitude of Greek city-states, anxious concerning their survival in a hypercompetitive, anarchic, and dangerous environment, acted primarily on the basis of self-interest to ensure their own security and that there was little to constrain them from doing so. Consider, for example, Arthur Eckstein's (2006: 75–6) bleak assessment:

The Greek city-state world fulfills the most pessimistic paradigms posited by Realist international-relations theorists. Amid a large multitude of states, there was no international law, and the few restrictions on interstate behavior that existed by informal custom had no means of being enforced. Thus all poleis existed in a self-help regime: survival and security depended only upon each state's own efforts; trust in others did not exist; and no help was forthcoming to ameliorate conflict from international institutions (for they either did not exist or were ineffective). The resulting situation possessed all the negative elements predicted by modern Realism: intense interstate competition for power and status; heavy and widespread militarization; widespread power-maximizing behavior; an atmosphere of fear, a major fear being that the enhancement of the power and security of one state meant the diminishment of the security of everyone else (the “security dilemma”). Because of the primitiveness of institutions of interstate diplomacy, the opaqueness of Greek states to one another was far more intense than in modern states, while the crises that built up were often mishandled, out of mutual incomprehension and/or the pressures among states of honor culture. Insofar as interstate life was regulated at all, it was by shifting and complex balances of power between ferociously independent polities.

Under such conditions war was frequent among the Classical poleis, and indeed normal – in the sense that it was the natural way by which serious interstate disputes were settled, for the test of war revealed which polity was actually powerful enough to impose its will.

<sup>4</sup> For a good summary of this debate, see Low 2007: 7–32; cf. Hunt 2010: 1–7. For a recent overview of Greek interstate relations, see Giovannini 2007; cf. Adcock and Mosley 1975.

Realists, like Eckstein (48–57), often cite Thucydides as a contemporary proponent of this perspective, who insightfully recognized the true nature of interstate relations.<sup>5</sup>

Critics of the Realist approach argue, however, that Thucydides’ portrayal of interstate relations is skewed, and his portrayal of expedience as decisive in interstate relations is reductive.<sup>6</sup> Without denying the brutality that sometimes characterized interstate relations in the Greek world, these scholars argue that international relations did not operate in a moral vacuum but rather were influenced by values, including those of honesty and decency, that were prominent in regulating life within city-states, and that cities, like individuals, were reluctant to incur shame in the eyes of their peers. Polly Low, for example, has argued that there is considerable continuity in our sources “between the morals (and ethics) of domestic life and those which apply beyond the *polis*” (2007: 173; cf. 25) and that “A wide range of customs, beliefs and expectations shaped the practice and the representation of interstate politics in the classical Greek world” (252; cf. 3).<sup>7</sup> Of particular importance in the interstate sphere is “the pervasive influence of an ethics of reciprocity” (253).<sup>8</sup> Although it is appropriate in this context, according to Low, to speak of a “society of states” arising from “various forms of reciprocal action and justification” (254),<sup>9</sup> she acknowledges that

The appeal to moral criteria frequently relies upon, and more often is used to create or sustain, a position of power in the interstate system. This phenomenon is most clearly and consistently visible in the case of Athens, whose claims to primacy throughout this period are often intimately connected with assertions to be the arbiter and guarantor of appropriate behaviour in interstate affairs. . . . While, therefore, the existence of the normative framework discussed here may sometimes seem to even out inequalities of pure force in

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., de Ste. Croix 1972: 5–34; Green 1999; Piccirilli 2002: 92–6; cf. Finley 1985; J. Hall 2007: 104–7.

<sup>6</sup> For recent criticism of Thucydides’ picture of interstate relations, see Low 2005 and 2007: 222–33. It is also controversial whether Thucydides can legitimately be viewed as a Realist: see Doyle 1991; Orwin 1994; Crane 1998; Ober 2001; Low 2007: 20–1, with 21 n. 59.

<sup>7</sup> For earlier work that argues that Greek interstate relations are rooted in morality, see Karavites 1982, 1984, and 2003, and Nakategawa 1994.

<sup>8</sup> On the role of diverse reciprocal bonds in Greek interstate relations, see Herman 1987 (*xenia*); Mitchell 1997 (*philia*); and C. Jones 1999 (kinship); cf. Bolmarcich 2010. On the implications of these bonds for the debate over Realism in Greek interstate relations, see Lendon 2002 and van Wees 2004: 6–18.

<sup>9</sup> Van Wees (2004: 6) similarly speaks of Greek city-states as “a *society* of states – an international community with its own hierarchy and internal networks, shared rules and rituals, and, inevitably, tensions and conflicts which sometimes turned violent” (emphasis in original).

the Greek society of states, it does not lessen the importance of power, or of self-interest. (254–5)

In Low's view, however, even when states, like Athens, seek to manipulate this system of values to justify their behavior and advance their interests, they confirm the centrality of norms in Greek interstate relations (255).

Although this is not the place to attempt to resolve the debate between Realists and their opponents, in my view each position has its appeals and limitations. Realists legitimately point to the often brutal realities of interstate relations in Greece. Because Greek states were destroyed in war with some frequency, Greeks had some reason to fear for their survival.<sup>10</sup> There were indeed few formal constraints on interstate behavior in the absence of written international law or any central authority that could impose penalties on aggressive states.<sup>11</sup> Treaties, backed by oaths, could temporarily set the terms for cessation of hostilities between states, but a state's compliance was ultimately voluntary and subject to its interpretation of the language of the treaty-oath, which was inevitably affected by its perceptions of its interests.<sup>12</sup> Although diplomacy was sometimes effective, it was, by modern standards, limited in scope and sophistication and may have provoked conflict as often as it helped avert it.<sup>13</sup> Perhaps the greatest strength of Realist theory is that it offers a model for understanding broad patterns of behavior on the part of Greek city-states, including their frequent conflict with one another, and the ultimate failure of the city-state system as larger players appeared on the scene and capitalized on the disunity of, and discord among, the Greek city-states.

<sup>10</sup> Eckstein goes too far, however, in asserting that "a stunning number" of Greek states were destroyed in war in the classical period (2006: 53, with n. 72). Although he catalogs forty Greek states that were destroyed in this period, some of the states on his list were actually destroyed by the Persians before the classical period; van Wees (2004: 8; cf. 28–9) estimates that "some two dozen small cities were annihilated in the classical period alone." Hansen and Nielsen (2004: 120–3) provide a thorough survey of the evidence and argue that full-fledged destruction was relatively uncommon (122); it must be remembered that the number of Greek city-states was large (Hansen and Nielsen include 1,035 city-states in their inventory for archaic and classical times), so that even Eckstein's high estimate of the number of states destroyed would be a small percentage of all city-states.

<sup>11</sup> Although some scholars have argued that Greeks had a system of international law (Sheets 1994; Bederman 2001: 11–15; Alonso 2007; Low 2007: 94, 102; Hunt 2010: 228), I am not persuaded that Hellenic customs and conventions concerning the relations of states constitute "international law" in a meaningful sense.

<sup>12</sup> Low (2007: 118–26; cf. Bederman 2001: 48–87) speaks of strong religious pressures to observe oaths, but as Bolmarcich (2007; cf. Hunt 2010: 188–9) argues, states were free to interpret their oaths in light of their changing circumstances and interests.

<sup>13</sup> See Eckstein 2006: 58–65; cf. Lebow 1991: 144–5.

Realist theory, however, is too blunt an instrument for probing the subtleties of Greek interstate relations, with its sweeping view of the struggle of states for survival and its emphasis on security and self-interest as ultimate driving forces.<sup>14</sup> As bad as Greek interstate relations often were, they could have been far worse. What kept Greek states from spiraling ever deeper into violence and chaos? To the extent that Greek states sometimes exercised restraint in their interstate behavior, for example, by observing treaties or imposing less harsh terms on conquered peoples than they might have, it is worth considering why they did so.<sup>15</sup> To be sure, a strict Realist might argue that even moderate behavior was adopted simply to achieve strategic ends, but this is not a fully satisfactory explanation for restraint on the part of Hellenic states. It seems plausible, as Low argues, that a common set of “customs, beliefs and expectations” might have helped restrain, if not altogether suppress, harsh behavior in interstate relations. To dismiss the ubiquitous invocations of traditional values in interstate discourse as mere rhetoric and posturing would be to overlook the desire of Greek states, like Greek individuals, to be respected and admired by their peers. Greek culture fostered competition not only for power but also prestige, which could itself help sustain power, and to win prestige an individual or city-state was under pressure to act – or at least to be able to claim to act – honorably rather than shamefully. Thus, although the pursuit and defense of honor could heighten interstate conflict as Eckstein posits (2006: 75–6, quoted earlier; cf. Lendon 2000), concerns over honor could also inhibit bad behavior on the part of a state.<sup>16</sup> Although I am more pessimistic than Low concerning the impact of the value-laden discourse of Greek interstate relations on the behavior of states, she is right in my view in arguing that this discourse deserves our close attention and should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. van Wees 2004: 4: “a ‘realist’ approach . . . cannot explain fully how and why wars were fought in ancient Greece.”

<sup>15</sup> Van Wees (2004: 43) reasonably observes: “if the city-states did not fight even more often than they did, it was not least because they were inhibited by obligations of kinship, friendship, treaty and alliance which, despite the scepticism of ancient and modern Realists, prevented Greek international relations from degenerating into a free-for-all.” Cf. Low’s comments (2007: 27) on the approach of the English School to the study of international society: “Such a study immediately complicates the basic Realist assumption of unchanging and inevitable international anarchy, not, necessarily, by denying that such anarchy exists, but by exploring how systems and societies of states could operate within that anarchic environment.”

<sup>16</sup> On avoidance of shame as a factor in interstate relations, see Low 2007: 149–51; cf. van Wees 2004: 4. In general, it is important to appreciate that the motivations of Greek states, like those of Greek individuals, are complex and not easily reduced to a simple hierarchy: see van Wees 2004: 3–4, 19–33; Hunt 2010: 7.



The common Athenian claim of helping other states provides a particularly interesting case study in the relationship between discourse and behavior in interstate relations. This is, after all, a remarkable claim: it was one thing for Athenians to assert that they acted with restraint toward other states (cf. Thuc. 1.76.3–77) but quite another for them to make claims of outright benefaction and charity toward other Greeks. Athenians were not alone in advancing such claims, but they appear to have done so with great frequency and conviction through the classical period. Why did Athenians make these claims, and what, if any, impact did these have on their treatment of other city-states?

The interpretation of the Athenian discourse of helping other states remains controversial in contemporary scholarship. Some scholars have responded cynically to Athenian claims of helping, especially under the city's fifth-century empire, viewing them as part of a thinly veiled hegemonic discourse that justifies Athenian domination of other states on the basis of a history of benevolence toward them.<sup>17</sup> Low, however, has argued that the rhetoric of “helping the wronged” (βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις), which appears conspicuously in Athenian discourse about the city and which our sources sometimes attribute to other states as well (183–5), reflects widely held Hellenic values (186):

Appeal to the principle of “helping the wronged” seems . . . to be a widespread phenomenon in Greek interstate relations: the concept not only functions as an ideal, but can even sometimes be argued to involve some obligation. It can, then, be claimed that there existed a norm of intervention in classical Greece.<sup>18</sup>

Low acknowledges that intervention on behalf of a wronged party “could bring advantages more tangible than simply a warm glow of moral superiority” (200). For example, this could serve imperial purposes, as an intervening state could “expect or demand something in return” from a rescued state (201). Intervention, moreover, might bolster the image of the intervener because “being in a position to intervene in the affairs of others

<sup>17</sup> On these claims as part of a hegemonic discourse, see de Romilly 1979: 100; Loraux 1986: 67–75; Mills 1997: 63–6, 2010: 163, 166–76; Tzanetou 2005; Forsdyke 2005a: 256–9; Todd 2007: 249; Lape 2010: 180, 241–2; cf. Adcock 1963: 52; Piccirilli 2001: 20; van Wees 2004: 11; Hunt 2010: 178, 194.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Karavites 1982: 114–17; Missiou 1992: 112–13; van Wees 2004: 10–12, 20–2 (“These self-appointed defenders of justice clearly did not always, and probably not often, act from strictly altruistic motives, but they were not always merely cynical either” [21].); Hunt 2010: 177–80.

can be seen as a marker of stability and power” (202). Nonetheless, Low maintains:

The ideal itself – that helping the wronged is, when all other things are equal, an acceptable and even admirable principle of interstate relations – is never openly challenged. When, as is more usually the case, things are not equal, the greater burden of proof, or of justification, lies not with those wanting to intervene, but with those attempting to argue against such behaviour. (210)

Thus, in Low’s view claims of helping the wronged, if subject to manipulation and potentially self-serving, are deeply grounded in shared cultural values and reflect real pressures on Greek states to intervene for wronged parties.

Although Low makes a good case for the ubiquity of claims of “helping the wronged” in our sources and is right to point to the moral dimensions of this claim, the discourse of rescuing other states is in my view more slippery than she allows. First, it seems questionable to infer on the basis of these claims that there was a “norm of intervention.” In my view, our sources attest not so much to a “norm of intervention in classical Greece” as much as to a norm of *talking* about intervention on behalf of the wronged. That humane values crop up in this context indicates that Greeks were not amoral in conceptualizing interstate relations, but this does not convince me that intervention on behalf of wronged fellow Greeks was, in fact, normative or obligatory in practice. It is difficult, as we shall see, to find compelling evidence of Athenians “helping the wronged” at any great risk to themselves or in conflict with their own strategic interests, as one might expect to if this were normative or obligatory; Low, in focusing primarily on the discourse of helping, does not look closely at the question of whether this affected Athenian practice. Only by juxtaposing Athenian ideals of helping with Athenian behavior can we fully assess the nature and significance of Athenian claims.

Second, although Low rightly acknowledges the “indistinctness” and flexibility of claims of helping as part of their appeal to the states employing them,<sup>19</sup> in my view she underestimates their ideological character as culturally appealing representations and simplifications of civic values and

<sup>19</sup> See Low 2007: 211: “there is, it seems to me, little sign that there was much agonising over the imprecision of intervention. Rather, it is its indistinctness, its openness to perpetual redefinition and recharacterisation, which gives it much of its usefulness as a tool of practical interstate politics.”

collective experience.<sup>20</sup> It is important to consider the possibility that this material tells us more about Athens' ideal image of itself and pride in its own superiority and power than about its sense of moral obligation to render assistance to other states. An important clue to the ideological dimension of these claims is the frequency with which Athenians apply them to the past – and often to the distant past – which they mold to fit the paradigm that Athenians help others. Let us consider first the ideological facet of these claims as manifested prominently in the Attic funeral orations and then turn to the question of Athens' helping behavior in practice as represented by the Greek historians and as attested more directly by the arguments concerning intervention that Demosthenes makes before Athenian audiences in the Assembly.

## “HELPING THE WRONGED” IN ATHENIAN CIVIC IDEOLOGY

In Euripides' *Suppliant Women* (423 B.C.?), the Argive king Adrastus and the mothers of the Seven who fell in their assault on Thebes supplicate the Athenian hero Theseus to intervene on their behalf to retrieve the corpses from the victorious Thebans, who defy Hellenic custom in refusing to release these. Although Theseus is initially reluctant to get involved in others' troubles (248–9), his mother, Aethra, successfully prods him to do what is right and honorable in taking up this cause (297–331), and Theseus easily persuades his Athenian fellow citizens to join in an expedition (334–58; 391–4) that leads to the defeat of the Thebans and release of the disputed corpses. On the one hand, this tragedy ultimately confirms and promotes the idea that Athenians nobly intervene to help oppressed Hellenes – an idea that is also advanced in other Athenian tragedies. On the other hand, it hints at the fragility of this idealization of Athenians. Theseus, the city's leader and representative, at first refuses to help the suppliants, and when he does agree to do so, he appears to be inspired as much by concern over his own reputation (334–45; cf. 306–25; 779–81) and fulfilling his filial duty to his mother (361–4) as by concern for justice, piety, or the suffering of others (339–41; 526–7; 558–9; cf. 304–5; 326–7). The help that he and the Athenians provide, moreover, is intimately connected with advancing the city's interests: it creates a debt of

<sup>20</sup> On ideology as a “cultural system,” see Geertz 1973; cf. Duby 1985. On the challenge of defining “ideology,” see Ober 1989: 38–40, who proposes that “Ideology... consists of a set of ideas sufficiently well-organized to facilitate decision and action” (39).

*charis* that the Argives must repay in the future as all parties agree (373–4; 1167–75; 1178–9), and Athena, appearing as *deus ex machina*, (1183–1209), persuades Theseus that it is essential to help Athenian interests (ὠφελεῖν τὰ σά) (1184) by extracting an oath on the spot from the Argives that they will never invade Attica.<sup>21</sup> The tension here between helping others as a matter of principle and doing so for more selfish reasons is emblematic of the complex place of “helping the wronged” in Athenian discourse about the city and its relations with other Hellenes.

That Athenians were drawn to the idea that they were a benevolent people is evident not only on the tragic stage but also in orations presented to large popular audiences in a variety of civic contexts. This is nowhere more clear than in the Attic funeral orations (*epitaphioi*), which were delivered regularly in honor of the city’s war dead and provided a vehicle for the articulation and transmission of civic ideology. As scholars have observed, an important part of Athenian self-presentation in these speeches is the casting of Athenians as benefactors of other Hellenes.<sup>22</sup> The most striking claims of benefaction and the most interesting ones for our purposes are those that assert Athenians intervene directly on behalf of wronged parties and rescue them from aggressors. A survey of these claims confirms their appeal to Athenian audiences and at the same time points to some of the tensions involved in casting Athenians in these terms.

Our six surviving examples of the epitaphic genre diverge in the extent to which they speak of Athenians as helping wronged Greeks. Four of the six speeches touch briefly on the topic. Gorgias’ *epitaphios*, a short rhetorical display piece from the late fifth century, characterizes the war dead as “at the service of those unjustly in distress, punishers of those unjustly prospering” (θεράποντες μὲν τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχοῦντων, κολασταὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχοῦντων) (82 fr. 6.18 D–K). Demosthenes, in his funeral oration after Chaeronea (338 B.C.), lauds the ancestors of the current war dead on the grounds that they never wronged any Hellenes or barbarians (60.7); in fact, they avenged the wrongs done by Persians against other Greeks and checked the excesses of Greeks against fellow Greeks, abiding all dangers and “placing themselves wherever justice was stationed” (ὅπου τὸ

<sup>21</sup> On the role of personal interests in motivating Theseus’ intervention in *Suppliant Women*, see Croally 1994: 186–7 and Konstan 2005: 54–60. On the portrayal of Theseus and Athenian ideals in this tragedy, see also Walker 1995: 146–70; Mills 1997: 87–128; Bowie 1997: 45–56; Pelling 1997b: 230–4; Christ 2006: 83–5. Athens’ noble tradition of helping others is also prominent in Euripides’ *Heraclidae* and Sophocles’ *Oedipus at Colonus*. Tzanetou 2005 surveys the tragic material; cf. Blundell 1993.

<sup>22</sup> See Ziolkowski 1981: 102–10; Loraux 1986: 67–75; Tzanetou 2005: 99–104; Todd 2007: 155, 225.

δίκαιον εἶη τεταγμένον, ἐνταῦθα προσνέμοντες ἑαυτούς) (60.11). Hyperides, in his *epitaphios* for Athenians who had died in the Lamian War (322 B.C.), asserts, “our city consistently punishes the bad and helps the just” (ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν διατελεῖ[τὶ το]ῦς μὲν κακοῦ<ς> κολάζο[υσσα, τοῖς] δὲ δίκαιο<ι>>ς β[οηθοῦσα]) (5).<sup>23</sup> Thucydides’ Pericles, in his *epitaphios* at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War (431/0 B.C.), invokes the same commonplace in generalizing about Athens’ relations with other states: “We alone, not upon a calculation of the advantage to us, but rather with the confidence of freedom, fearlessly assist someone” (καὶ μόνοι οὐ τοῦ συμφέροντος μάλλον λογισμῷ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ ὁδεῶς τινὰ ὠφελοῦμεν) (2.40.5). This passage is noteworthy in that it not only asserts that Athenians help other peoples, as do the other epitaphic passages, but explicitly and emphatically rejects the idea that they seek to gain through this.<sup>24</sup> In rejecting Athenian self-interest as a motivation for assisting other states, Thucydides’ Pericles polemically refutes any critics of the city who might insist that Athenians lend assistance only when this benefits them and thus obliquely acknowledges less flattering interpretations of Athenian interstate intervention.<sup>25</sup>

Lysias, in his *epitaphios* for the city’s war dead sometime during the Corinthian War (395–386 B.C.), elaborates at greater length on Athens’ helping of the wronged in his survey of Athens’ noble actions over time.<sup>26</sup> Athenian intervention on behalf of the weak figures most prominently in Lysias’ review of the mythical past, first (2.7–10) with the Athenians piously and justly intervening against Thebes to retrieve the corpses of the Seven for proper burial and then (2.11–16) with the Athenians courageously risking their lives for the suppliant Heraclidae whom Eurystheus was pursuing:

καὶ ἡξίουں ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου διαμάχεσθαι μάλλον ἢ τοῖς δυναμένοις χαριζόμενοι τοὺς ὑπ’ ἐκείνων ἀδικουμένους ἐκδοῦναι. (2.12)

They thought it right to fight for those who were weaker, on the side of justice, rather than to please the powerful by surrendering to them people who had been wronged by them.

<sup>23</sup> The restoration of β[οηθοῦσα] is clearly tentative.

<sup>24</sup> The placement of the phrase οὐ τοῦ συμφέροντος μάλλον λογισμῷ early in the sentence highlights it. I follow Gomme (1956: 2.124–5; contra Rusten 1989: 156) in taking 2.40.4–5 to refer to Athens’ relations with other states (cf. Lys. 2.23).

<sup>25</sup> Thucydides provides a more cynical view of Athenian helping of others in his own voice when he presents this as a pretext for Athens’ launching of the Sicilian expedition (6.6.1, quoted later in the text).

<sup>26</sup> On the question of whether this is an actual funeral oration or a display speech modeled on the *epitaphioi*, see Chapter II, note 25.

Lysias, like Thucydides’ Pericles, rules out any base motivation for Athenian helping, emphasizing that Athenians acted in this way simply because this was just, “with no profit in view but good reputation” (οὐδὲ κέρδους προκειμένου πλὴν δόξης ἀγαθῆς) (2.14; cf. Dem. *Ex.* 16); they thought it right “to come to the rescue of the wronged” (τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις βοηθεῖν) because “they pitied those who were suffering wrong and hated those acting with hubris” (τοὺς μὲν ἀδικουμένους ἐλεοῦντες, τοὺς δ’ ὑβρίζοντας μισοῦντες) (2.14).<sup>27</sup>

Although Lysias presents these mythical episodes as paradigmatic examples of Athenian behavior, the remainder of his speech, which deals with much more recent times, is less expansive and more vague concerning the Athenian predilection for helping the weak. For example, Lysias takes for granted this facet of the Athenian national character as he reconstructs the Persian motivation for attacking Athens before other Greek states: they recognized from the city’s prior deeds that Athenians “would zealously come to help those wronged” (προθύμως γὰρ τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἤξουσιν βοηθήσοντες), whereas others were unlikely to do so out of fear of Persian retaliation (2.22; cf. Isoc. 4.67).<sup>28</sup> In his account of the Persian Wars that follows, Lysias portrays the Athenians as saving the other Greeks by courageously opposing the barbarian (2.23, 2.30; cf. 2.44–6), but he stops short of characterizing this as “helping the wronged.” One explanation for this is that because Athens’ opposition to the Persians was manifestly a fight for its own survival under direct assault, this made it hard to present Athenian heroism as a purely benevolent intervention for others, even though others benefited from Athens’ actions.

Only near the end of his speech does Lysias once again stake the claim that Athenians help the wronged, as he speaks of how the current war had perished while helping the Corinthians against the Lacedaemonians:

οἱ δὲ νῦν θαπτόμενοι, βοηθήσαντες Κορινθίοις ὑπὸ παλαιῶν φίλων ἀδικουμένοις καινοὶ σύμμαχοι γενόμενοι, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔχοντες (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτοῖς ἐφθόνουν, οἱ δὲ ἀδικουμένους αὐτοὺς ἠλέουν, οὐ τῆς

<sup>27</sup> On the regular appearance of these myths in the *epitaphioi* and elsewhere (e.g., Hdt. 9.27 and Isoc. 4.54–60), see Todd 2007: 212–14; cf. Tzanetou 2005. For Athens as a place of refuge for the weak, see also X. *Mem.* 3.5.12 and Aeschin. 3.134.

<sup>28</sup> Todd (2007: 232) is probably right that Lysias is asserting that the Persians were mindful of the mythological instances of Athens’ helping of others that he has just surveyed (2.7–16) rather than of the city’s short-lived assistance to the Ionians during the Ionian revolt (Hdt. 5.97–103.1, discussed later in the text), which Lysias passes over. Lysias suppresses the fact that Darius’ forces reduced Eretria before moving on to attack Athens (Hdt. 6.100–101, discussed below in the text; cf. Pl. *Mx.* 240a5–c8; Todd 2007: 232).

προτέρας ἔχθρας μνησθέντες, ἀλλὰ τὴν παροῦσαν φιλίαν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμενοι) πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις φανερὰν τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπεδείξαντο. (2.67)

The men who are now being buried brought help to the Corinthians when they were wronged by former friends, and became their new allies. The Athenians did not share the attitude of the Spartans, who envied the good things that belonged to the Corinthians; rather they pitied the Corinthians because of the wrong done to them, forgetting their previous enmity and placing a high value on their current friendship, and thus made their own excellence clear to all mankind.

The vagueness of this passage concerning the wrong done to the Corinthians and the circumstances under which Athens came to intervene (cf. Todd 2007: 266–7) reflects the difficulties inherent in applying the mythical paradigm of helping others to recent Athenian history. Lysias is necessarily vague here as he attempts to cast Athens’ opportunism in capitalizing on the shifting alliances of the early fourth century as “helping the wronged”;<sup>29</sup> to be any more specific might invite scrutiny of Athens’ alleged benevolence and undercut Lysias’ praise of the city. Similar considerations may have deterred the composers of our other *epitaphioi* from pressing too far the case for Athenian helping of the wronged after the mythical period even before an Athenian audience inclined to believe the best of themselves and their ancestors (cf. Pl. *Mx.* 235d, 236a).

An interesting exception to this general rule is found in the imitation *epitaphios* that Plato’s Socrates attributes to Aspasia in the *Menexenus*. Scholars have long suspected that this Platonic exercise, which shows an intimate familiarity with epitaphic conventions, not only plays off the genre but at times parodies it.<sup>30</sup> This is nowhere more true, I would suggest, than in its presentation of the Athenian claim of “helping the wronged.” Although Plato passes over the mythical episodes of Athenian helping of the weak that Lysias expounds upon, leaving it to the poets to address these (239b3–c3), his historical Athenians come across as avid helpers of others. After the Persian Wars, they help other Greeks against Greeks in the cause of justice and freedom (242b1–c2; cf. Dem. 60.11), and during the Peloponnesian War they act on behalf of the freedom of the people of Leontini, to whom they are bound by oaths, by coming to their aid

<sup>29</sup> On “helping the wronged” in Athens’ shifting alliances of this period, see further below in the text.

<sup>30</sup> Todd (2007: 153–7) argues that although the funeral oration in the *Menexenus* is especially playing off the Lysianic *epitaphios*, it is also responding to the Periclean funeral oration in Thucydides; for earlier bibliography on the *Menexenus* and the problematic nature of its parody, see *ibid.* 154.

(243a2).<sup>31</sup> One suspects, in light of Plato’s critical assessment of the Athenian empire elsewhere (*Gr. g.* 519a)<sup>32</sup> that this happy picture of Athenian helping abroad is less than sincere, and this is confirmed by his hyperbolic depiction of Athens’ charitable helping of others after its defeat in the Peloponnesian War. Plato’s Athenians briefly abandon helping others after their defeat out of anger at the other Hellenes, who had destroyed Athens’ walls and eliminated its fleet instead of sparing these in appreciation for the city’s services to the Hellenes in the Persian Wars (244b–c). Their charitable instinct prevails, however, as they soon come to the rescue of those oppressed by the Lacedaemonians:

καὶ δὴ καὶ εἴ τις βούλοιτο τῆς πόλεως κατηγορῆσαι δικαίως, τοῦτ’ ἂν μόνον λέγων ὀρθῶς ἂν κατηγοροῖ, ὡς αἰεὶ λίαν φιλοκτίρμων ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ ἥττονος θεραπείς. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ οὐχ οἷα τε ἐγένετο καρτερῆσαι οὐδὲ διαφυλάξαι ἃ ἐδέδοκτο αὐτῇ, τὸ μηδενὶ δουλουμένων βοηθεῖν τῶν σφῶς ἀδικησάντων, ἀλλὰ ἐκάμφθη καὶ ἐβοήθησεν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας αὐτῇ βοηθήσασα ἀπελῦσας δουλείας, ὥστ’ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι μέχρι οὗ πάλιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς κατεδουλώσαντο, βασιλεῖ δὲ αὐτῇ μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμησεν βοηθῆσαι, αἰσχυνομένη τὰ τρόπαια τὰ τε Μαραθῶνι καὶ Σαλαμῖνι καὶ Πλαταιαῖς, φυγάδας δὲ καὶ ἐθελοντὰς ἔασσας μόνον βοηθῆσαι ὁμολογουμένως ἔσωσεν. (244e)

And in truth, if someone wished to make a just accusation against the city, the only true accusation he could bring would be that it has always been compassionate to excess and the handmaid of the weak. And in fact, on that occasion, it was unable to harden its heart and adhere firmly to its resolved policy of refusing to help any of those who had wronged it who were now in danger of enslavement, but rather it gave way and provided help. The Greeks it helped itself and rescued them from slavery, so that they remained free until such time as they enslaved each other once more; but to the King it could not bring itself to lend official help for fear of disgracing the trophies of Marathon, Salamis and Plataea, but it permitted exiles only and volunteers to help him, and thereby saved him as is widely agreed.

Although it is difficult in a genre given to exaggeration to identify intentional excess on the part of an author, there is an over-the-top quality to Plato’s claims on behalf of Athens here that suggests parody. Plato’s Athenians go well beyond Lysias’ heroic Athenians in the Corinthian War, who simply pity the Corinthians for the wrong they suffer and lend help on this basis (2.67, quoted earlier); his Athenians pity others “to excess” and

<sup>31</sup> This puts a happy spin on what was to lead to Athens’ disastrous Sicilian expedition. Thucydides (6.6.1, discussed later in the text) portrays the helping of kinsmen and allies as a mere pretext for the Athenians to launch this expedition. Aeschines (2.74–7) portrays this expedition of helping as a mistake because Athens faced enemies at home.

<sup>32</sup> Balot (2008: 6) may be right, however, that Plato is not critical of imperialism *per se*.



are “the handmaid of the weak” (cf. Gorg. 82 fr. 6.18 D–K; Isoc. 4.53). This prompts them to come to the rescue not only of the Greeks but even, through their agents, the king of Persia – who was not a traditional object of Greek pity and not normally thought of as weak. The fivefold repetition of the verb “help” (βοηθέω) in a short space, moreover, calls attention to the banality of the claim of Athenians to be helpers of others and invites scrutiny of it.<sup>33</sup> On this reading then, Plato both confirms in his *epitaphios* the centrality of the claim of “helping the wronged” in the epitaphic genre and provides a satirical critique of it in his application of it to historical material.

If the epitaphic invocations of Athens “helping the wronged” leave little doubt as to the appeal to Athenians of this vision of their city, several aspects of this discourse of helping others suggest that it lies at some distance from reality. First, as we have seen, composers of *epitaphioi* exercise restraint in applying the paradigm of “helping the wronged” to Athenians in the historical period, as if in recognition of the difficulty of translating historical experience into these terms; when they do invoke it in a historical context, moreover, they are necessarily vague concerning its applicability. Second, although these speeches make extraordinary claims about the other-orientation of Athenians – indeed these come close to claims of what some moderns would label “pure altruism”<sup>34</sup> – they focus far more on Athenians and the credit due them for pitying others than on the objects of their pity (see, e.g., Lys. 2.14, 67). Indeed, not far below the surface of this discourse lies an assertion of Athenian superiority, both martial and moral. The Athenian ability to intervene successfully on behalf of the wronged attests to the city’s military power, and consistent with this is the proud epitaphic claim that Athens helps others but does not itself need help (Thuc. 2.40.4; Lys. 2.23).<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, Athens’ unique willingness to intercede for the weak and even to help former enemies when they are wronged establishes its moral superiority to other states. To vaunt Athenian martial and moral superiority relative to other Greek states in the context of Athens’ fifth-century empire and its efforts in the fourth century to reestablish itself as the leader of Greek states is to promote the case for the city’s political domination of other states.<sup>36</sup> The Athenian

<sup>33</sup> No other extant *epitaphios* shows such a dense concentration of instances of βοηθέω. Lysias uses this verb seven times in his entire *epitaphios*, including four times to refer to Athenian helping of other Greeks (2.14, 22, 30, 67).

<sup>34</sup> On the modern discussion of altruism, see Introduction.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Isoc. 8.139 and Dem. 3.8–9.

<sup>36</sup> On Athenian claims of helping other states as part of a hegemonic discourse, see note 17.

discourse of helping other states is thus intimately connected with the city’s advancement of its own power.

Isocrates frequently invokes the Athenian claim of helping the wronged in his political pamphlets to advance his own agenda before an Athenian readership. Although Isocrates is critical of the Athenian democracy, as noted in Chapter II, and is idiosyncratic in the advice he offers the city concerning its internal affairs and external policies, his treatment of the Athenian ideal of helping the wronged confirms the broad appeal of this ideal and is illuminating both when it converges with, and diverges from, what we find in popular discourse in Athens.

Consider, for example, how Isocrates deploys this ideal in his *Panegyricus* (ca. 380 B.C.) to establish Athens’ worthiness to lead the Panhellenic expedition against Persia that he proposes. Isocrates draws freely on epitaphic conventions in making his case for Athenian hegemony of the expedition. He asserts, for example, that “through all time, Athenians have persisted in making their city common to all and a defender of the Hellenes whenever wronged” (ἅπαντα γὰρ τὸν χρόνον διετέλεσαν κοινὴν τὴν πόλιν παρέχοντες καὶ τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις αἰεὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπαμύνουσιν) (4.52) and observes in connection with this:

διὸ δὴ καὶ κατηγοροῦσιν τινες ἡμῶν ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευομένων, ὅτι τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους εἰθίσμεθα θεραπεύειν, ὥσπερ οὐ μετὰ τῶν ἐπαινέειν βουλομένων ἡμᾶς τοὺς λόγους ὄντας τοὺς τοιούτους. οὐ γὰρ ἀγνοοῦντες ὅσον διαφέρουσιν αἱ μείζους τῶν συμμαχιῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, οὕτως ἐβουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκριβέστερον εἰδότες τὰ συμβαίνοντ’ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὁμῶς ἡρώμεθα τοῖς ἀσθενεστέροις καὶ παρὰ τὸ συμφέρον βοηθεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς κρείττοσιν τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος ἕνεκα συναδικεῖν. (4.53)

It is for this very reason that some accuse us of adopting a foolish policy in that we are accustomed to attend to weaker parties – as though such charges do not support those who wish to praise us. For it was not because we were ignorant of how much more advantageous great alliances are in point of security that we pursued this policy in regard to the weak; no, although we realized much more exactly than our rivals the consequences of such a course, we nevertheless chose to help the weaker even against our interests rather than to join the stronger in oppressing others for our own advantage.

Like epitaphic encomiasts of Athens, Isocrates “defends” the city against those who might accuse it of too readily assisting the weak (cf. Pl. *Mx.* 244e), lauds it for choosing to support the wronged rather than their mighty oppressors (cf. *Lys.* 2.12), and presents this as a self-conscious

moral decision made without consideration of what is most expedient for the city (cf. Thuc. 2.40.5; Lys. 2.14).<sup>37</sup>

Isocrates diverges from his epitaphic models, however, in speaking with candor of Athenian helping of others as an indicator of Athens' power and worthiness of leading other Greeks. Thus, he prefaces his survey of Athenian helping of others in the mythological period with the direct assertion: "One could judge the character and power of the city from the supplications that people have in times past made to us" (γνοίη δ' ἄν τις καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν ῥώμην τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐκ τῶν ἱκετειῶν ἃς ἦδη τινὲς ἡμῖν ἐποιήσαντο) (4.54; cf. 56–7, 67). The city's willingness and ability to help others is, in Isocrates' view, directly linked to its political power in the Greek world. Athens, he asserts, received its fifth-century empire as a prize (ῥις τεῖα) for saving the Greeks from the invader in the Persian Wars (4.72); the other Greeks willingly submitted to it because of its benefactions (4.72, 81).<sup>38</sup> This tradition of helping others, Isocrates posits, now justifies Athens' leadership of the expedition against Persia that he advocates (4.99). Whereas the *epitaphioi* tend to stop short of explicitly linking the helping of others to the city's power and its right to dominate other Greeks,<sup>39</sup> Isocrates bluntly makes this connection.

Although Isocrates endorses the epitaphic view of Athenians as helpers of the Greeks from early times in his *Panegyricus*, he presents the city's record of helping other states as much more checkered in his *On the Peace* (355 B.C.). Writing in the aftermath of the Social War (357–355 B.C.), Isocrates depicts the city's recent treatment of others as anything but charitable. The city, he asserts, in its efforts to dominate other Greeks and extort "contributions" (συντάξεις) from them (8.29, 36), is guilty of grasping after empire (8.6, 26) and of meddling in others' affairs (26, 58); it has become an unjust and hated oppressor of others (8.28–9; cf. 42–4) rather than their savior (8.141; cf. 144, 12). Although one might expect Isocrates simply to characterize this as a deviation from the city's noble tradition of helping others and call on Athenians to imitate their ancestors' virtues, he presents a more complex view of the Athenian past, distinguishing

<sup>37</sup> For the possibility that Isocrates' *Panegyricus* is playing directly off Lysias' *epitaphios*, see Todd 2007: 157–63. On Athens' tradition of helping the weak, see also Isocrates' *Plataicus*, which is discussed later in the text. For a radically different perspective on Athens' support of the weak, see And. 3.28 and Dem. 20.3, which present this as a consequence of bad decision making on the part of Athenians.

<sup>38</sup> For the link between helping others and Athenian political power, see also Isoc. 4.88; 8.30, 42–4, 136–40; Thuc. 6.18.1–2; cf. X. *HG* 3.5.9; *Vect.* 5.5–10; Low 2007: 202–10.

<sup>39</sup> Lys. 2.47 (cf. 2.55), however, explicitly presents Athens' service to the Greeks in the Persian Wars as justification for Athenian hegemony over the Greeks.

between the generous helping behavior of the generation that won the Persian Wars and the self-serving and oppressive behavior of the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War (8.36–8). The virtues of the former, Isocrates asserts, led the Hellenes to give the city hegemony over them:

ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δικαίαν τὴν πόλιν παρέχειν καὶ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις καὶ μὴ τῶν ἄλλοτριῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν παρ' ἐκόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐλάβομεν. (8.30; cf. 42–4, 76; 4.72, 81)

As the result of showing our city to be just and of helping those wronged and of not coveting the possessions of others, we received the hegemony by the willing consent of the Hellenes.

In contrast, Athenians in the time of the Peloponnesian War, far from helping other states, did them wrong (8.78–9), and by their grasping and meddlesome behavior (8.30, 82, 108) made the city hated (8.82–3) and drove states to join Sparta against Athens (8.108, cf. 36–8).<sup>40</sup> It is, therefore, the ancestors who won the Persian Wars and not those who were later guilty of imperial greed, whom Isocrates urges Athenians to emulate (8.36–8, 42–4; cf. Aeschin. 2.74–7). Isocrates' assertion here that Athenians have not always been helpers of others directly conflicts with the claims of the *epitaphioi* and his own claims in the *Panegyricus* and serves as a reminder that critics of the city might well challenge its claim to be the unfailing champion of the weak.

Isocrates not only problematizes the Athenian claim of helping others in his survey of fifth-century Athenian behavior in *On the Peace* but also lays bare the intimate connection between helping others and helping oneself. Throughout this work, Isocrates is at pains to show that the city's true advantage (8.10, 28–9) lies in treating other Hellenes justly and that those who believe unjust behavior is advantageous are mistaken (8.17, 26):

κακῶς εἰδότες ὥς οὔτε πρὸς χρηματισμὸν οὔτε πρὸς δόξαν οὔτε πρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν οὔθ' ὅλως πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδὲν ἂν συμβάλαιτο τηλικαύτην δύναμιν ὅσην περ ἀρετὴ καὶ τὰ μέρη ταύτης. (8.32)

They fail to recognize that nothing would contribute so powerfully to material gain, to good repute, to right action, in a word to happiness, as virtue and the qualities of virtue.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Demosthenes' acknowledgment (9.23) that Athens strayed from helping the wronged under its fifth-century empire: “When you, or rather the Athenians of that day, were thought to be dealing immoderately with others, all thought it their duty, even those who had no grievance against them, to go to war together with those who had been wronged” (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὑμῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς τότε οὖσιν Ἀθηναίοις, ἐπειδὴ τισιν οὐ μετρίως ἐδόκουν προσφέρεισθαι, πάντες ᾤοντο δεῖν, καὶ οἱ μὴδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν ἔχοντες αὐτοῖς, μετὰ τῶν ἡδίκημένων πολεμεῖν).

In keeping with this prudential ethics, Isocrates presents a policy of “helping the wronged” as a shrewd strategic move on Athens’ part (8.136–40).<sup>41</sup> If Athens refrains in the future from excess and stands ready with its power to “help the wronged” (τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις βοηθεῖν) (8.137), this may deter other states from aggression and Athens will gain in reputation from this. If, however, this does not deter aggressive states, Athens’ stance will draw the oppressed to it and this will enhance the city’s power and prestige:

ἦν τ’ ἐπιχειρῶσιν ἀδικεῖν, ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς ἅπαντες οἱ δεδιότες καὶ κακῶς πάσχοντες καταφεύζονται, πολλὰς ἱκετείας καὶ δεήσεις ποιοῦμενοι, καὶ διδόντες οὐ μόνον τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς. ὥστ’ οὐκ ἀπορήσομεν μεθ’ ὧν κωλύσομεν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας, ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς ἔξομεν τοὺς ἐτοίμως καὶ προθύμως συναγωνιζομένους ἡμῖν. ποία γὰρ πόλις ἢ τίς ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσει μετασχεῖν τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς συμμαχίας τῆς ἡμετέρας, ὅταν ὀρώσι τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀμφοτέρω, καὶ δικαιοτάτους ὄντας καὶ μεγίστην δύναμιν κεκτημένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους σώζειν καὶ βουλομένους καὶ δυναμένους, αὐτοὺς δὲ μηδεμιᾶς βοηθείας δεομένους; πόσῃ δὲ χρή προσδοκᾶν ἐπίδοσιν τὰ τῆς πόλεως λήψεσθαι, τοιαύτης εὐνοίας ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπαρξάσης; πόσον δὲ πλοῦτον εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσρυσέσθαι, δι’ ἡμῶν ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος σωζομένης; τίνας δ’ οὐκ ἐπαινέσεσθαι τοὺς τοσοῦτων καὶ τηλικούτων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους γεγενημένους; (8.138–40)

But if, on the other hand, they [other Greek states] attempt to act unjustly, then all who fear them and suffer evil at their hands will come to us for refuge, with many supplications and entreaties, offering us not only the hegemony but themselves. So that we shall not lack for allies with whom we shall check the wrongdoers but shall find many ready and eager to join their forces to our own. For what city or what men will not desire to share our friendship and our alliance when they see that the Athenians are at once the most just and the most powerful of peoples and are at the same time both willing and able to save the other states, while needing no help for themselves? What a turn for the better should you expect the affairs of our city to take when we enjoy such goodwill from the rest of the Hellenes? How much wealth will flow into Athens when through it all Hellas is rescued? And who among men will fail to praise those who have been responsible for benefits so many and so great?

Although Isocrates leaves no doubt that “helping the wronged” is a just course of action for Athens, his extended elaboration on the strategic benefits this will bring the city suggests that in his view the desire to do right by itself may prove insufficient to sway his imagined Athenian audience.

<sup>41</sup> On the prevalence of prudential ethics in a Greek context, see T. Irwin 1995; cf. Christ 2006: 24.

Isocrates thus presents a more complex picture of what may motivate Athenians to help others than the *epitaphioi* do, with their emphasis on helping others as a noble and generous impulse on the part of Athenians. Demosthenes, as we shall see, in his efforts to rouse the Athenians in Assembly to intervene abroad is equally pragmatic in his assessment of what might induce Athenians to help others.<sup>42</sup>

This survey suggests that Athenians were genuinely drawn to the idea that they were noble helpers of other Greeks, who magnanimously intervene to help the wronged with no thought of benefiting from this. The epitaphic discourse that most eloquently advances this view of Athenians, however, itself exhibits some uneasiness about applying this paradigm to historical events and thereby hints at a gap between civic ideology and historical experience. Although Isocrates embraces this epitaphic history of Athenian helping in his *Panegyricus*, in his *On the Peace*, he illustrates how fragile this construct is as he indicts Athenian behavior under the fifth-century empire and in the period leading up to the recent Social War as gross deviations from it. Further tensions are evident in the way the *epitaphioi* represent the motivations behind Athenian helping, proclaiming its selflessness while vaunting it as evidence of the city’s martial and moral superiority. Isocrates, in his *Panegyricus*, explicitly acknowledges the link between helping others and advancing Athenian power and political privilege and in his *On the Peace* even offers a program through which the city can augment its power and prestige by helping others. All of this suggests that the Athenian ideal of helping the wronged is part of a civic ideology that simplifies historical experience and the complex motivations that might lead Athenians to intervene abroad.

## ATHENIAN HELPING IN THE GREEK HISTORIANS

If Athenians were unmistakably drawn to the idea that helping the wronged was central to their national character, how much did this affect their treatment of other states? Did Athenians, in fact, intervene to help states that were in distress? Treaties of alliance between Greek states often included a clause of mutual aid (βοήθεια), and Hellenes routinely spoke of military expeditions abroad as “helping” (βοήθεια).<sup>43</sup> This common

<sup>42</sup> Isocrates, however, goes well beyond Demosthenes in arguing for the ultimate convergence of justice and advantage: see Hunt 2010: 21–2, 25.

<sup>43</sup> On the promise of mutual assistance (βοήθεια) in treaties between states, see Low 2007: 178 n. 8; 185, with 185 n. 21; cf. van Wees 2004: 12–15; Hunt 2010: 103, 188; Bolmarcich 2010:

characterization of military support, however, tells us little about the grounds on which a state determined to intervene abroad and its readiness to sustain support once it was undertaken.

Two types of evidence are especially useful in assessing the motivations behind, and the nature of, Athenian intervention abroad: the historical accounts of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon that treat Athens' interstate interventions from the late sixth to the mid-fourth centuries B.C. and the numerous surviving deliberative orations that Demosthenes presented to Athenian audiences in the Assembly between 354 and 341 B.C. The latter body of material, as we shall see later in this chapter, is especially valuable because it provides direct evidence of the sorts of arguments that appealed to Athenians as they considered whether to intervene abroad in a variety of circumstances. The accounts of Athenian interventions in contemporary historians, which we consider here, also provide important information about Athenian helping and its limits but present interpretive challenges.

Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon offer their readers a representation of the past that is shaped by the emerging conventions of the genre of historiography and colored by their own biases and interests.<sup>44</sup> These writers all place a premium on "truth" while allowing for the vivid re-creation of events in narrative and of speeches in direct discourse. What they view as the truth, moreover, necessarily depends on their worldviews and political perspectives. Herodotus, for example, a cosmopolitan Greek from Halicarnassus, praises Athenian freedom (5.78) but is skeptical of mass rule (5.97.2); Thucydides and Xenophon, both Athenians and both for a time in exile from Athens, are critical of the city's democracy, although often admirers of the city in its successes and its resilience in defeat. As we assess these historians' accounts of Athenian intervention abroad, we must be aware that their biases may slant their accounts in various ways. Although they may be unlikely to misrepresent basic information concerning when and where Athenians intervened – to do so would be to violate generic codes of truthfulness and risk alienating a reading audience that might recognize outright falsification – they may offer only a selective picture of Athenian intervention abroad, for example, by focusing on interventions that cast Athens in a negative light. When these historians speak of

124. Greek historians regularly speak of military expeditions in support of another state in terms of "helping" (βοηθεῖω and cognates): see Hdt. 5.65.5; 5.97.3; 6.100.1; 6.106.2; 6.108.1–6; 7.145.2; 7.168.2; Thuc. 1.35.4; 1.45.1; 2.73.3; 5.105.3; 6.6.1; 6.18.1–2; 8.26.3; X. *HG* 1.6.24; 3.5.16; 4.2.4; 6.5.49. Low (2007: 178 n. 8) observes that βοηθεῖα was a popular name for Athenian triremes.

<sup>44</sup> For an overview of ancient historiography, see Marincola 1997.

Athenian motivations for intervention directly in their own voices or through the speeches they attribute to characters, there is also plenty of potential for distortion; it was often difficult for these writers to identify the motivations of historical actors, individual and group, and their own assumptions about human nature and about the Athenian character in particular shaped their reconstruction of Athenian motivations. Although we must therefore always be alert to the possibility of distortion, it would be extreme in my view to reject out of hand these historians’ depictions of Athenian intervention abroad and the motivations behind it. In fact, they present a fairly consistent and plausible picture of Athenian pragmatism in intervening on behalf of others, which, as we shall see, is broadly consistent with the way Demosthenes’ frames his appeals to the Athenian Assembly.

In what follows, we consider three case studies in which Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, represent Athens’ relations with other states and the role of helping within these. The first two case studies examine the extent to which Athenians supported states that enjoyed close relations with them, their “kin” the Ionians in the ill-fated Ionian Revolt and their close friends and allies the Plataeans from the late sixth to the early fourth centuries B.C. The third case study focuses on Athens’ assistance of its former enemies – first Thebes, then Sparta – in the ongoing power struggle among Greek city-states in the opening decades of the fourth century.

### *Helping the Ionians*

The limits of Athenian helping of the wronged in interstate relations are well illustrated by the behavior of the Athenians during the Ionian revolt against Persia (499–494 B.C.) as portrayed by Herodotus, who is our primary source for what transpired.<sup>45</sup> This episode provides interesting evidence of how far Athenians might help their “kin” – the Ionians were thought to be descendants of Athenians (Hdt. 1.147).<sup>46</sup> Although the obligation of individuals to help their relatives, as we have seen, is strong in Athens, Herodotus’ account suggests a much more limited obligation among “kindred” states to help one another.

<sup>45</sup> On the problematic nature of Herodotus’ account of the Ionian revolt, see Cawkwell 2005: 61–86.

<sup>46</sup> On Athens’ kinship with the Ionians as a social construct, see Sakellariou 1990: 137; Connor 1993; J. Hall 1997: 51–6. Notwithstanding this putative connection, Athenians were ambivalent toward Ionians and Ionianism: see Hdt 1.143.3; 5.69; Alty 1982: 7–11; Connor 201–4; Munson 2007: 149, with 149 n. 18. On kinship in interstate relations, see Curty 1995; C. Jones 1999; van Wees 2004: 8–10; Low 2007: 48–51.



According to Herodotus, after Aristagoras the Milesian failed to dupe the Spartans into lending help to the Ionians in their revolt against Persia (5.49–50), he came to Athens to seek assistance.<sup>47</sup> The Athenians, Herodotus reports (5.96.7), were already at odds with Persia over its attempt to force the return of Hippias and had decided to be openly at war with Persia:

νομίζουσι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ διαβεβλημένοισι ἐς τοὺς Πέρσας ἐν τούτῳ δὴ τῷ καιρῷ ὁ Μιλήσιος Ἀρισταγόρης ὑπὸ Κλεομένεος τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου ἐξελασθεὶς ἐκ τῆς Σπάρτης ἀπίκητο ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ πόλις τῶν λοιπέων ἐδυνάστευε μέγιστον. ἐπελθὼν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον ὁ Ἀρισταγόρης ταῦτα ἔλεγε τὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ Περσικοῦ, ὡς οὔτε ἀσπίδα οὔτε δόρυ νομίζουσι εὐπετέες τε χειρωθῆναι εἴησαν. ταῦτά τε δὴ ἔλεγε καὶ πρὸς τούτοισι τάδε, ὡς οἱ Μιλήσιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰσι ἄποικοι, καὶ οἶκός σφεας εἶη ῥύεσθαι δυναμένους μέγα· καὶ οὐδὲν ὃ τι οὐκ ὑπίσχετο οἷα κάρτα δεόμενος, ἐς ὃ ἀνέπεισέ σφεας. πολλοὺς γὰρ οἶκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἓνα, εἰ Κλεομένεα μὲν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον μόνον οὐκ οἶδς τε ἐγένετο διαβάλλειν, τρεῖς δὲ μυριάδας Ἀθηναίων ἐποίησε τοῦτο. Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν δὴ ἀναπεισθέντες ἐψηφίσαντο εἴκοσι νέας ἀποστεῖλαι βοηθοὺς Ἴωσι, στρατηγὸν ἀποδέξαντες αὐτέων εἶναι Μελάνθιον, ἀνδρα τῶν ἀστῶν ἐόντα τὰ πάντα δόκιμον. αὗται δὲ αἱ νέες ἀρχὴ κακῶν ἐγένοντο Ἑλλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροισι. (5.97)

They being thus minded, and the Persians hearing an evil report of them, at this moment Aristagoras the Milesian, driven from Sparta by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, arrived in Athens; for this city was more powerful than any of the rest. Coming before the people, Aristagoras spoke to the same effect as at Sparta, of the good things of Asia, and how the Persians in war were wont to carry neither shield nor spear and could easily be overcome. This he said, and added that the Milesians were settlers from Athens, and it was right to save them, since they were very powerful;<sup>48</sup> and there was nothing that he did not promise in the earnestness of his entreaty, until at last he won them over. Truly it seems that it is easier to deceive many than one; for he could not deceive Cleomenes of Lacedaemon, one single man, but thirty thousand Athenians he could. The Athenians, then, were won over, and voted to send twenty ships to help the Ionians, appointing for their admiral Melanthius, a citizen of Athens in all ways of good repute. These ships were the beginning of evils for Greeks and barbarians.

<sup>47</sup> On Aristagoras at Sparta, see recently Pelling 2007 and Branscome 2010.

<sup>48</sup> Baragwanath (2008: 168) observes that the phrase δυναμένους μέγα (“being very powerful”) refers (most naturally) to the Athenians, who being so powerful ought to help out; but it might potentially refer instead to the Milesians, who being so powerful would prove a worthwhile asset for Athens if she helps them out.” Herodotus’ explicit reference in his own voice just a few lines earlier to Athenian power makes the latter interpretation less likely in my view.

Herodotus’ dark picture of the devious Aristagoras duping a gullible Athenian *dēmos* is suspect because it is clearly colored by the fact that, in the historian’s view, the Athenian intervention would lead Persia to seek vengeance against Athens in the Persian Wars (6.94, 7.8β2). Interestingly, however, Herodotus’ account of Athenian motivations for intervening is not so far-fetched, although we have no way of corroborating it. Herodotus allows for a multiplicity of motivations that might have prompted the Athenians to intervene on behalf of the Ionians: 1) Athens’ preexisting open enmity with the Persians, 2) the prospect of a profitable expedition that would not be too difficult to carry out, and 3) Athenian kinship with the Milesians (cf. 9.106.3). Although Herodotus does not explicitly privilege any of these motivations, his presentation suggests that pragmatic grounds dominate, with the Athenians seeing an opportunity to strike out against their enemy Persia with little risk (a serious miscalculation, as it turned out); he presents Aristagoras’ appeal to kinship as an afterthought (πρὸς τοῦτοισι), as if to suggest it was subordinate to his appeal for intervention on the basis of expedience.<sup>49</sup>

Consistent with this reading of Herodotus’ presentation of the Athenian motivations for helping the Ionians is his account of the pragmatic behavior of the Athenians in helping the Ionians. The Athenians, according to Herodotus, voted to send twenty ships as “helpers” (βοηθοὺς), which could be characterized as a substantial but probably not overwhelming commitment of Athenian resources.<sup>50</sup> The mission of support, moreover, turns out to be short-lived. After the Athenians, accompanied by five triremes of the Eretrians, join the Ionians in their march against Sardis (5.99) and participate in its burning (5.102), the Ionians are badly defeated in battle at Ephesus and scatter in flight, each to his own city, and the Athenians depart. Herodotus tersely describes the Athenian withdrawal: “After this the Athenians completely deserted the Ionians and said they would not aid them, though Aristagoras appealed to them often through messengers” (μετὰ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν τὸ παράπαν ἀπολιπόντες τοὺς Ἴωνας ἐπικαλεομένου σφέας πολλὰ δι’ ἀγγέλων Ἀρισταγόρῳ οὐκ

<sup>49</sup> On the predominance of pragmatic grounds for intervention in Aristagoras’ appeal, see Baragwanath 2008: 168. At Sparta, Aristagoras offers a similar mix of arguments for intervention: he invokes kinship briefly at the opening of his appeal (5.49.3) and then speaks at greater length of the ease of an expedition against Persia and the profit to be had from it (5.49.3–4). He likewise emphasizes ease and profit to entice Artaphrenes to Greek conquests (5.31): see Munson 2007: 155–9 and Baragwanath 2008: 170.

<sup>50</sup> Although no figures are available for the total size of the Athenian fleet at this time, by 489 B.C. the fleet appears to have consisted of at least 70 ships: see Hdt. 6.132–3, with Gabrielsen 1994: 32–3.

ἔφασαν τιμωρήσειν σφι) (5.103.1). Although Herodotus does not interrupt his narrative to condemn the Athenian withdrawal, his choice of words conveys his negative judgment of it: the Athenians not only “desert” their allies – a highly evocative claim to make in a military context (cf. Hdt. 7.222, 8.5.2; Lys. 14.15) – but do so “completely,” notwithstanding appeals to them.<sup>51</sup> As Emily Baragwanath (2008: 170) observes, the Athenian decision to support the Ionian revolt may in Herodotus’ view be “the beginning of evils for Greeks and foreigners” (ἀρχὴ κακῶν... Ἑλληνί τε καὶ βαρβάροισι) (5.97.3) “not only in that it would provide Darius with a useful pretext for extending the reach of his campaign, but also in offering a misleading gesture to the Greeks of Ionia, one that implied a degree of Athenian support which would not eventuate.”<sup>52</sup>

That Herodotus was not alone in viewing the Athenian departure as ignoble is suggested by his report later of Athenian consternation at the ensuing capture of Miletus:

ποίησαντι Φρυνίχῳ δρᾶμα Μιλήτου ἄλωσιν καὶ διδάξαντι ἐς δάκρυά τε ἔπεσε τὸ θέητρον καὶ ἐξημίωσάν μιν ὥς ἀναμνήσαντα οἰκία κακὰ χιλίησι δραχμήσι, καὶ ἐπέταξαν μηκέτι μηδὲνα χρᾶσθαι τούτῳ τῷ δράματι. (6.21)

When Phrynicus composed his play on the capture of Miletus and produced it on stage, the audience burst into tears, fined him 1,000 drachmas for reminding them of their own evils, and ordered that no one should ever perform this play again.

Herodotus does not elaborate on why Athenians might view the fall of Miletus as “their own evils” (οἰκία κακά), but the most immediate explanation for this is that the Athenians shared in the evils suffered by the Milesians, who were thought to be their kin, and were not happy to be

<sup>51</sup> On the evocative claim of “desertion,” see Christ 2006: 88–142. How and Wells (1912: 2.59–60) suggest that the Athenian withdrawal “was caused by more pressing needs nearer home,” namely, the threat posed by Aegina and its navy (6.89); Herodotus, however, mentions no circumstances that might mitigate the shame of withdrawal. As Baragwanath (2008: 168) notes, the Athenians’ withdrawal appears to stem from the fact that they realized they had miscalculated the risks involved and wrongly assumed that success would be easy.

<sup>52</sup> Munson (2007: 149–55) proposes that Herodotus may also be looking ahead to the foundation of the Athenian empire in referring to ἀρχὴ κακῶν. The Athenian abandonment of the Ionians well illustrates the general instability of relations between the Greeks of Asia Minor and those on the Greek mainland, on which see Seager and Tuplin 1980; Low 2007: 63–4; cf. Ziolkowski 1993: 21; Munson 2007: 147.

reminded of these evils, especially because the Athenian decision to abandon Ionia contributed to the capture of Miletus.<sup>53</sup>

The question of Athenian helping comes up again later in Herodotus' narrative when Darius, seeking vengeance on Athens and Eretria for their role in the Ionian revolt, sends an expedition to enslave Athens and Eretria (6.94; cf. 5.105.2). According to Herodotus:

Ἐρετρίεες δὲ πυνθανόμενοι τὴν στρατιὴν τὴν Περσικὴν ἐπὶ σφεας ἐπιπλέουσιν Ἀθηναίων ἐδεήθησαν σφίσι βοηθοὺς γενέσθαι. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ οὐκ ἀπείπαντο τὴν ἐπικουρίην, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τετρακισχιλίους κληρουχέοντας τῶν ἵπποβοτέων Χαλκιδέων τὴν χώραν, τοὺτους σφί διδοῦσι τιμωροὺς. τῶν δὲ Ἐρετρίεων ἦν ἄρα οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς βούλευμα, οἱ μετεπέμποντο μὲν Ἀθηναίους, ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφασίας ἰδέας· οἱ μὲν γάρ αὐτῶν ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἐς τὰ ἄκρα τῆς Εὐβοίης, ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτῶν ἴδια κέρδεα προσδεκόμενοι παρὰ τοῦ Πέρσεω οἴσεσθαι προδοσίην ἐσκευάζοντο. μαθὼν δὲ τούτων ἑκάτερα ὡς εἶχε Αἰσχίνης ὁ Νόθωνος, ἐὼν τῶν Ἐρετρίεων τὰ πρῶτα, φράζει τοῖσι ἦκουσι Ἀθηναίων πάντα τὰ παρεόντα σφίσι πρήγματα, προσεδέετό τε ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι σφεας ἐς τὴν σφετέρην, ἵνα μὴ προσαπώλωνται. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῦτα Αἰσχίνῃ συμβουλευσάντι πείθονται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν διαβάντες ἐς Ὑρωπὸν ἔσφζον σφέας αὐτούς. (6.100–101)

The Eretrians, when they learned that the Persian host was sailing to attack them, entreated the Athenians to be their helpers. The Athenians did not refuse aid, but gave the Eretrians for their defenders the four thousand kleruchs who held the land of the Chalcidian horse-breeders (cf. Hdt. 5.77). But nothing was stable in the designs of the Eretrians; for they sent to the Athenians for aid, but their counsels were divided; the one part of them planned to abandon the city and make for the heights of Euboea, the other part plotted treason, expecting to get profit for themselves from the Persians. Then Aeschines, son of Nothon, who was a leading man in Eretria, out of his knowledge of both designs told those Athenians who had come how matters stood and entreated them, moreover, to depart to their own country, so that they might not perish like the rest; and the Athenians in this followed Aeschines' advice. So they saved themselves by crossing over to Oropus.

How and Wells (2.105) aptly observe of this account, “Clearly H. is anxious to justify the Athenian people for not sending succour from Attica, and the Athenian cleruchs for leaving Eretria to its fate, by emphasizing the divided counsels and positive treachery of the Eretrians.” Indeed, Herodotus may be drawing on a polemical Athenian version that seeks to

<sup>53</sup> Munson (2007: 152) suggests that οἰκία κακά “seems to have a broader meaning than simply ‘family troubles’” since this may also refer to the threat Athens faced from Persia for its role in the Ionian revolt.

portray Athens' behavior as honorable. According to this version, the Athenians were ready to give help when the Eretrians "entreated" (ἐδεήθησαν) them for it, but the Athenian kleruchs who were assigned to lend assistance withdrew when Aeschines, son of Nothion, "entreated" (προσεδέετο) them to depart in light of the divisions among the Eretrians. This justifies why the Athenian kleruchs "saved themselves" (ἔσωζον σφέας αὐτούς) rather than the Eretrians. A more critical account might have highlighted the failure of the Athenians to send any aid at all from Athens to a city that had been its ally in the earlier expedition to Ionia; the failure of the Athenian kleruchs on location to lend the assistance that the city had delegated to them; and the decision of the kleruchs to save their own skins. Although Herodotus in this case takes a more favorable view of Athenian caution than in his presentation earlier of the Athenian abandonment of the Ionians, his account confirms that prudence prevails over heroism where the city's interests are at stake: the city did not risk sending an expeditionary force to assist Eretria but rather delegated assistance to its kleruchs on location, who withdrew when local political developments made staying appear too risky.

That Herodotus' account of Athenians acting pragmatically in these episodes may be broadly accurate is suggested by the fact that the encomiastic history of the city offered by the Attic funeral orations passes over in silence Athens' measured helping behavior during the Ionian revolt and in connection with the Persian assault on Eretria. Although composers of the *epitaphioi* are ready to bend history to portray Athens in a favorable light, they may have found these two episodes too difficult to remold to fit the heroic paradigm of helping other states to which they are so drawn. Athens' manifest caution in both episodes and prudent decision to let others – even Ionian "kin" and their erstwhile allies from Eretria – fight their own battles against a powerful and unjust aggressor were testimony to Athenian pragmatism in interstate relations rather than to its unrestrained generosity; the city's encomiasts recognized this and therefore omitted these episodes from their surveys of Athenian helping of wronged peoples.

### *Helping the Plataeans*

Athens' closest interstate relationship was not with their Ionian "kin" but rather with their neighbors, the Plataeans, who lived on the Boeotian frontier with Athens. The small state of Plataea, seeking protection from nearby Thebes, bound itself to Athens in 519 B.C. and enjoyed close relations with Athens henceforth. The Plataeans, in fact, were not only allies of Athens but also eventually came to possess some form of citizenship

rights in Athens.<sup>54</sup> A survey of the relations between Athens and Plataea, as described by Herodotus and Thucydides, illustrates the practical limits of Athenian helping even toward its most intimate ally.

Herodotus, in describing how the Plataeans came to help the Athenians at Marathon (490 B.C.) against Darius’ expeditionary force, provides background on how the two states came into close relations with one another in 519 B.C. (cf. Thuc. 3.68):

Ἀθηναίοισι δὲ τεταγμένοισι ἐν τεμένει Ἡρακλέος ἐπῆλθον βοηθέοντες Πλαταιεῖς πανδημεῖ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐδεδώκεσαν σφέας αὐτοὺς τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι οἱ Πλαταιεῖς, καὶ πόνους ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι συχνοὺς ᾗδ’ ἀναραιρέατο. ἔδοσαν δὲ ὥδε. πιεζόμενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων οἱ Πλαταιεῖς ἐδίδοσαν πρῶτα παρατυχοῦσι Κλεομένει τε τῷ Ἀναξανδρίδῳ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοισι σφέας αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ οὐ δεκόμενοι ἔλεγόν σφι τάδε: ἡμεῖς μὲν ἕκαστέρῳ τε οἰκόμεν καὶ ὑμῖν τοιήδε τις γίνοιτ’ ἂν ἐπικουρίῃ ψυχρῇ· φθαίητε γὰρ ἂν πολλὰκις ἐξανδραποδισθέντες ἢ τινα πυθέσθαι ἡμέων. συμβουλευόμεν δὲ ὑμῖν δοῦναι ὑμέας αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοισι, πλησιοχώροισι τε ἀνδράσι καὶ τιμωρέειν ἐοῦσι οὐ κακοῖσι. ταῦτα συνεβούλευον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ κατὰ εὐνοίην οὕτω τῶν Πλαταιέων ὥς βουλόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔχειν πόνους συνεστέωτας Βοιωτοῖσι. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν νυν Πλαταιεῦσι ταῦτα συνεβούλευσαν, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ᾗπιστησαν, ἀλλ’ Ἀθηναίων ἰρὰ ποιούντων τοῖσι δυνάδεκα θεοῖσι ἰκέται ἰζόμενοι ἐπὶ τὸν βωμόν ἐδίδοσαν σφέας αὐτούς. Θηβαῖοι δὲ πυθόμενοι ταῦτα ἐστράτεον ἐπὶ τοὺς Πλαταιεῖς· Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ σφι ἐβοήθηον. μελλόντων δὲ συνάπτειν μάχην Κορίνθιοι οὐ περιεῖδον, παρατυχόντες δὲ καὶ καταλλάξαντες ἐπιτρεψάντων ἀμφοτέρων οὕρισαν τὴν χώραν ἐπὶ τοῖσδε, ἔαν Θηβαίους Βοιωτῶν τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐς Βοιωτοὺς τελέειν. Κορίνθιοι μὲν δὴ ταῦτα γνόντες ἀπαλλάσσοντο, Ἀθηναίοισι δὲ ἀπιούσι ἐπεθήκαντο Βοιωτοί, ἐπιθέμενοι δὲ ἐσώθησαν τῇ μάχῃ. ὑπερβάντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔθηκαν Πλαταιεῦσι εἶναι οὔρους, τούτους ὑπερβάντες τὸν Ἀσωπὸν αὐτὸν ἐποίησαντο οὔρον Θηβαίοισι πρὸς Πλαταιεῖς εἶναι καὶ Ὑσιᾶς. ἔδοσαν μὲν δὴ οἱ Πλαταιεῖς σφέας αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοισι τρόπῳ τῷ εἰρημένῳ, ἦκον δὲ τότε ἐς Μαραθῶνα βοηθέοντες. (6.108)

The Athenians were arrayed in the precinct of Heracles [at Marathon], and now the whole power of the Plataeans came to help them; for the Plataeans had given themselves over to Athens, and the Athenians had taken on frequent toils for their sake. The manner of the Plataeans’ giving themselves over was this. Since they were being hard-pressed by the Thebans, they had offered themselves to the first comers, Cleomenes son of Anaxandrides and

<sup>54</sup> For a defense of 519 B.C. as the date of this alliance, see Hornblower 1997: 1.464–6. The Plataeans appear to have enjoyed citizen rights in some form in Athens before the destruction of Plataea in 427: see Thuc. 3.55.3, 3.63.1; Amit 1973: 75–8; Hammond 1992: 145–7; Carey 1992: 139–40; Hornblower 1997: 1.449–50; but cf. Kapparis 1995: 374–5. After 427, procedures were established for the displaced Plataeans to exercise citizen rights: see [Dem.] 59.104–6 (but cf. Canevaro 2010); Isoc. 12.94; cf. 14.51.

the Lacedaemonians, but these did not accept them, and said: “We dwell far off from each other, and such aid as ours would be found but cold comfort to you, for you might be enslaved many times over before any of us heard of it. We counsel you to give yourselves over to the Athenians, who are your neighbors, and can assist you well.” The Lacedaemonians advised this not so much out of their goodwill to the Plataeans, as because they desired that the Athenians should bring trouble on themselves by making enemies of the Boeotians. The Lacedaemonians then gave them this counsel; the Plataeans obeyed it, and when the Athenians were sacrificing to the Twelve Gods they came as suppliants and sat down by the altar, and so gave themselves over. Hearing of this the Thebans made an expedition against the Plataeans, and the Athenians came to help the Plataeans; but when they were about to join battle, the Corinthians did not allow this to happen; as they chanced to be there, they made a reconciliation at the instance of both the parties, and drew a frontier line on the condition that the Thebans should not meddle with any Boeotians who did not want to be counted as part of Boeotia. Having given this judgment, the Corinthians took their departure; but when the Athenians were on their way home, the Boeotians attacked them and were worsted in the fight. The Athenians then made a frontier beyond that which had been assigned by the Corinthians for the Plataeans, and set the Asopus itself for the Theban border on the side of Plataea and Hysiae. In the manner described the Plataeans had given themselves over to the Athenians, and now they came to Marathon to help them.

Herodotus suggests that the bond between the Plataeans and the Athenians first arose on the basis of mutual interest. The Plataeans needed protection from their aggressive Theban neighbors, and when Sparta failed to provide this, they sought and received protection from Athens (cf. *Thuc.* 3.55.1). Although Herodotus is less explicit about what induced the Athenians to enter this relationship, his narrative suggests that strategic interests were decisive. The suppliant Plataeans, acknowledging their inferior power and need for Athenian patronage, “gave themselves” over to Athens, thus extending the Athenian sphere of influence and this in a critical location, between itself and rival Thebes.<sup>55</sup> The relationship between the two peoples was initiated through ritual supplication during a sacrifice, but it arose due to political and strategic exigencies.

Although Herodotus portrays the relationship between Athens and Plataea as initially grounded in mutual advantage, the historian suggests that over time it developed into a close and warm relationship of mutual

<sup>55</sup> On Athenian patronage of Plataea and the nuances of this relationship, see Crane 2001. Crane (134–8) persuasively refutes Badian’s argument (1993: 116–22) that the Plataeans, in “giving themselves” to the Athenians were, in effect, submitting to servitude.

support. Herodotus’ Athenians not only defended the Plataeans from the Thebans soon after the Plataeans “gave themselves” to Athens but also apparently aided them on other occasions before Marathon – this is the most natural interpretation of Herodotus’ statement that the Athenians had taken on “frequent toils” (πόνους . . . συχνούς) for the Plataeans (6.108.1; cf. Thuc. 3.61.2). The Plataeans for their part, as Herodotus reports, came out en masse to help the Athenians at Marathon (6.108.1, 6). Although Athenian encomiasts were ready to overlook Plataea’s role at Marathon in speaking of how the Athenians *alone* defeated the Persians there (Lys. 2.20; Pl. *Mx.* 240c5–7; Dem. 60.10; cf. Thuc. 1.73.4), Herodotus indicates that the Athenian state acknowledged the Plataean contribution: henceforth, whenever they performed sacrifices at their quadrennial festivals, they prayed for good fortune for both themselves and the Plataeans (6.111.2; cf. [Dem.] 59.94). The Plataeans did not join the Athenians against the Persians at Salamis (480 B.C.) because they were busy evacuating their city in anticipation of the Persian destruction of it (8.44.1; 8.50.1), but 600 Plataeans fought alongside the Athenians at the Battle of Plataea (9.28.5; 9.31.5). The victorious Hellenes, under their Lacedaemonian commander Pausanias, “restored to the Plataeans their land and city to hold and inhabit in independence” (ἀπεδίδου Πλαταιεῦσι γῆν καὶ πόλιν τὴν σφετέραν ἔχοντας αὐτονόμους οἰκεῖν) and swore oaths to defend them if anyone unjustly attacked them (Thuc. 2.71.2–4).<sup>56</sup>

Although the oaths sworn after the Battle of Plataea gave the Plataeans numerous potential supporters, Athens remained its primary ally in the years between the Persian Wars and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (431 B.C.). Thucydides’ Thebans thus reproach the Plataeans for their service to Athens in enslaving other Greeks under the Athenian empire, asserting “For you were being wronged, as you claim, when you invoked their aid [i.e., in 519 B.C.], but they were wronging others when you became their helpers” (ὤμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀδικοῦμενοι αὐτούς, ὥς φατέ, ἐπηγάγεσθε, τοῖς δὲ ἀδικοῦσιν ἄλλους ξυνεργοὶ κατέστητε) (3.63.4). If Athens’ enemies naturally viewed Plataea’s support of the imperial city in this way, from an Athenian perspective the Plataeans had given loyal service as allies, and therefore

<sup>56</sup> Badian (1993: 119–22) argues that this restoration entailed the liberation of Plataea from servitude to Athens, but Plataea does not appear to have been in servitude (see previous note), and the restoration of independence is likely liberation from Persia rather than Athens (see Hammond 1992: 145; but cf. Hornblower 1997: 1.358). Crane (2001: 143) argues that the restoration involved “undoing the formal gesture by which Arimnestos had caused Plataea to be annexed to Attica” immediately before the Battle of Plataea (Plu. *Arist.* 11.8–9). In any event, the restoration seems to have had little impact on the continuing relations between Athens and Plataea: see Badian 120 and Crane 144.



merited Athenian support when Plataea came under attack at the start of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides' extended account of events at Plataea, however, provides a critical view of the limits of Athenian helping in these circumstances; initial support and words of encouragement from Athens embolden the Plataeans to defy the Peloponnesians and endure a siege of their city, but Athens fails to carry through with its promise to come to the rescue of the Plataeans. Let us consider closely how Thucydides depicts and evaluates Athens' behavior in this context.

At the opening of his Plataean narrative (2.2–6), Thucydides portrays Athens as a reliable ally that is aware of its superior role in its relationship with Plataea but ready to provide support against mutual enemies. When the Thebans send a force of 300 armed men by night into Plataea to take possession of it before war was openly declared, the Plataeans rally against them and prevail, taking 180 of them captive; when Theban reinforcements approach, the Plataeans threaten to kill their prisoners and thereby force the Thebans to withdraw, but then immediately slay the captives anyway. The Athenians, who had not yet heard of the killing of the prisoners, sought to take control of the situation by sending a herald to the Plataeans with the message that they should refrain from harming their captives until the Athenians have deliberated about them. The herald, however, arrived to find the captives already dead. Although the Athenians viewed it as their prerogative to determine what to do with the Theban captives and were likely irked by their premature execution, they nonetheless assisted the Plataeans in their difficulties (2.6.4), providing a small support force (eighty Athenians, we learn later [2.78.3]), food, and a safe haven in Athens for the Plataean women, children, and men who were unable to fight.<sup>57</sup>

In the second phase of his Plataean narrative (2.71–8), Thucydides describes how the Athenians promise further assistance to Plataea when it finds itself under pressure to yield to a large Peloponnesian force led by the Lacedaemonian king Archidamus. When Archidamus sought to persuade the Plataeans to assert their independence from Athens and join the Peloponnesian forces, or at least to declare themselves neutrals (2.72.1), the Plataeans

ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτῷ ὅτι ἀδύνατα σφίσιν εἶη ποιεῖν ἃ προκαλεῖται ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων (παῖδες γὰρ σφῶν καὶ γυναῖκες παρ' ἐκείνοις εἶεν), δεδιέναι δὲ καὶ περὶ τῇ πάσῃ πόλει μὴ ἐκείνων ἀποχωρησάντων Ἀθηναῖοι ἐλθόντες σφίσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρέψωσιν,

<sup>57</sup> Hornblower (2007) persuasively refutes West (2003: 442), who argues that the Plataeans' (alleged) violation of an oath to surrender their captives on the Thebans leaving their city (2.5.5–6) made Athens less ready to assist them. On Athens' provision of a haven to various refugees in the classical period, see Hunt 2010: 177.

ἡ Θηβαῖοι, ὡς ἑνορκοὶ ὄντες κατὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρους δέχεσθαι, αὐθις σφῶν τὴν πόλιν πειράσωσι καταλαβεῖν. (2.72.2)

replied to him that it was impossible for them to do what he proposed without the consent of the Athenians – for their children and wives were in Athens – and they also feared for their entire city that, after the departure of the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians would come and not permit them to remain neutral, or else the Thebans, claiming that they were included in the stipulations about receiving both sides, would try again to seize their city.

The Plataean response highlights their precarious situation: as neutrals, they would be vulnerable not only to hostile Thebes but to Athens, which might look on this capitulation as a betrayal (cf. 2.74.1) and force the Plataeans back into alliance. The Plataeans insinuate, in fact, that if they capitulate, their children and wives, who are currently enjoying a safe haven in Athens, could become hostages (cf. 2.6.4; 2.78.3); Athenian helping, they suggest, could quickly turn into hostile action.

When Archidamus offers the further option that the Plataeans could entrust their city and land to the Lacedaemonians for safekeeping while the war lasts and migrate wherever they wish (2.72.3), the Plataeans once more indicate that they are not free to act independently of Athens and ask if they can consult with Athens to get permission to do this (2.73.1). When Archidamus accedes to this request, the Plataeans consult with the Athenians through envoys and receive the following response:

οὐτ' ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνῳ, ὃ ἄνδρες Πλαταιῆς, ἀφ' οὗ ξύμμαχοι ἐγενόμεθα, Ἀθηναῖοι φασιν ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑμᾶς προέσθαι ἀδικουμένους οὔτε νῦν περιοφessesthai, βοηθήσειν δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν. ἐπισκήπτουσί τε ὑμῖν πρὸς τῶν ὄρκων οὓς οἱ πατέρες ὥμοσαν μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν περὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν. (2.73.3)

The Athenians say, Plataeans, that neither in times past since we became allies, have they on any occasion deserted you when you were being wronged nor now will they just stand by, but rather they will help you to the best of their ability. They enjoin you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to do anything radical concerning the alliance.

Although the Athenian response is reassuring with its promise of support “to the best of their ability,” its tone is imperious (cf. ἐπισκήπτουσι), and there is an element of reproach in the Athenians’ insistence that they have always honored the alliance and the Plataeans must stand by their oaths and do nothing radical (νεωτερίζειν). The Plataeans, on the basis of this reply, determine “not to betray the Athenians, but to endure even to see their lands laid waste, if need be, and to suffer whatever else might happen” (Ἀθηναίους μὴ προδιδόναι, ἀλλ' ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ γῆν τεμνομένην, εἰ δεῖ,

ὀρώντας καὶ ἄλλο πάσχοντας ὅτι ἂν ξυμβαίνει) (2.74.1) and therefore reject Archidamus' proposals. The Lacedaemonians and their allies immediately set about building a wall around Plataea and laying siege to it (2.75–8).

In the third phase of his Plataean narrative (3.20–4), Thucydides describes how about half of the forces in Plataea boldly make an escape from the besieged city in the absence of support from Athens. His narrative opens with a description of the dire state of those under siege:

τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος οἱ Πλαταιῆς (ἔτι γὰρ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ὑπὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν) ἐπειδὴ τῷ τε σίτῳ ἐπιλείποντι ἐπιέζοντο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν οὐδεμία ἐλπίς ἦν τιμωρίας οὐδὲ ἄλλη σωτηρία ἐφαίνετο, ἐπιβουλεύουσιν αὐτοὶ τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων οἱ ξυμπολιορκοῦμενοι πρῶτον μὲν πάντες ἐξελεῖν καὶ ὑπερβῆναι τὰ τεῖχη τῶν πολέμιων, ἣν δύνωνται βιάσασθαι... (3.20.1)

During the same winter the Plataeans, who were still being besieged by the Peloponnesians and the Boeotians, began to be distressed by failure of their supply of food, and since there was no hope of aid from Athens nor any other means of safety in sight, they and the Athenians who were besieged with them at first all planned to leave the city and climb over the enemy's walls, in the hope that they might be able to force a passage.

Thucydides provides no explanation for why, when the Athenians had promised aid earlier (2.73.3), there was now “no hope of aid from Athens nor any other means of safety in sight.” One could perhaps infer that the Athenians were too heavily committed to the siege of Mytilene (3.2–19) to launch a rescue expedition or simply deemed it too risky to launch a land expedition (cf. 1.143.3–5) – and this against what was now a well-fortified position (3.21.1). Significantly, however, Thucydides chooses not to explain or justify the Athenian inaction, and his characterization of the situation of the besieged as hopeless provides a pointed commentary on Athens' failure to lend help as promised. Thucydides, in fact, suggests later in his narrative that helping the Plataeans simply is not a high priority for Athens: when the Athenians capture the Lacedaemonian Salaethus and he offers to induce the Peloponnesians to abandon Plataea, they execute him rather than pursue this possibility (3.36.1).<sup>58</sup>

In the fourth and final phase of his Plataean narrative (3.52–68), Thucydides highlights the failure of Athens to help the besieged forces, as the remaining forces in Plataea surrender when they run out of provisions and

<sup>58</sup> On this missed opportunity, see Connor 1984: 92 n. 30; West 2003: 442 n. 20; but cf. Hornblower 1997: 1.417–8; 2007: 142–3.

are condemned to death by representatives of Sparta after they hear opposing appeals from the Plataeans and Thebans. In their speech, the Plataeans justify their opposition to the Peloponnesians by speaking at length of the origins of their long-standing alliance with Athens (3.55) and their obligations under it; their absolute loyalty to this alliance stands in contrast to the Athenian neglect of it, notwithstanding their earlier claim to be utterly reliable allies (2.73.3). The pathos of the situation is heightened by the fact that the Plataeans, whom the Athenians had promised “to help to the best of their ability” (βοηθήσειν δὲ κατὰ δύναμι) (2.73.3) but who were in fact left with “no hope of aid from Athens or any other means of safety in sight” (καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐδεμία ἐλπίς ἦν τιμωρίας οὐδὲ ἄλλη σωτηρία ἐφαίνετο) (3.20.1), must now place their hope in their Spartan judges: “No one of our former allies now aids us, and as for you, Lacedaemonians, our only hope, we fear that you are not steadfast” (καὶ οὔτε τῶν τότε συμμαχῶν ὠφελεῖ οὐδεὶς, ὑμεῖς τε, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἡ μόνη ἐλπίς, δέδιμεν μὴ οὐ βέβαιοι ᾗτε) (3.57.4). Likewise, at the end of their speech the Plataeans, in the absence of Athenian rescuers, must supplicate the Spartans to fulfill this role: “we adjure . . . you to become our saviors” (ἐπισκήπτομέν . . . γενέσθαι δὲ σωτῆρας ἡμῶν) (3.59.4).<sup>59</sup> Notwithstanding these poignant appeals, the Spartans side with their Theban allies on grounds of expedience and execute the Plataean captives (3.68). Although Thucydides’ Spartans come off as presiders over a kangaroo court who look only to their own interests (cf. 5.105.3), his Athenians emerge as deficient allies, as Thucydides concludes his Plataean narrative with the barbed words: “Such was the fate of Plataea, in the ninety-third year after they became allies of Athens” (καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ Πλάταιαν ἔτει τρίτῳ καὶ ἑνενηκοστῷ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίων ζύμαχοι ἐγένοντο οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν) (3.68.5).<sup>60</sup>

What should we make of Thucydides’ critical presentation of Athenian “helping” in this episode? Throughout the *Histories*, Thucydides’ Athenians, with varying degrees of bluntness, privilege “what is advantageous” (τὸ ζύμφερον) to their city in discussing its relations with other states and, consistent with this, assist other states only when this serves the city’s strategic purposes.<sup>61</sup> This is nowhere more clear than in the historian’s

<sup>59</sup> Note how Thucydides’ Plataeans on trial use language similar to Athenian litigants who appeal to jurors to “save” them (see Chapter III). On the role of forensic *topoi* in the Plataean Debate, see Macleod 1977.

<sup>60</sup> Thucydides’ Plataean narrative also began with a reference to the Plataean alliance with Athens (2.2). On Thucydides’ biting conclusion here, see Connor 1984: 92 n. 30 and Hornblower 1997: 1.465–6.

<sup>61</sup> Thucydides’ Athenians, in fact, far from helping the wronged indiscriminately, become persecutors of the weak at Melos (see esp. 5.89); cf. Lape 2010: 58, 140, 180.

presentation of Athenian motivations for embarking on the Sicilian expedition:

ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν συγγενέσι καὶ τοῖς προγεγενημένοις συμμάχοις. (6.6.1; cf. 6.8.2; 4.61.3–4)

To give the truest explanation, they desired to attain to empire of the whole of it, but they wished at the same time to have the fair pretext of helping their own kin and their old allies.<sup>62</sup>

In the Sicilian Debate that follows, both Nicias and Alcibiades reject any romantic notion of helping the wronged as a moral imperative. Nicias, arguing against the expedition, is incredulous that Athenians would consider helping others before helping themselves:

ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἐγεσταίοις δὴ οὕσι συμμαχοῖς ὥς ἀδικουμένοις ὀξέως βοηθοῦμεν· ὅφ' ὧν δ' αὐτοὶ πάλαι ἀφεστῶτων ἀδικούμεθα, ἔτι μέλλομεν ἀμύνεσθαι. (6.10.5)

But we, it seems, are to rush to bring aid to the Egestaeans, being our allies, on the grounds that they are being wronged, while on those by whose revolt we ourselves have long been wronged, we still delay to inflict punishment.

Alcibiades, arguing in favor of the expedition, presents helping the city's allies in Sicily primarily as a means of advancing Athenian interests and expanding the city's empire:

τὴν τε ἀρχὴν οὕτως ἐκτησάμεθα καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἄλλοι ἤρξαν, παραγιγνόμενοι προθύμως τοῖς αἰεὶ ἢ βαρβάροις ἢ Ἑλλήσιν ἐπικαλουμένοις, ἐπεὶ εἴ γε ἡσυχάζοιεν πάντες ἢ φυλοκρinoῖεν οἷς χρεὼν βοηθεῖν, βραχὺ ἂν τι προσκτώμενοι αὐτῇ περὶ αὐτῆς ἂν ταύτης μᾶλλον κινδυνεύοιμεν. (6.18.2)

It was in this way that we acquired our empire – both we and all others that have ever won empire – by coming zealously to the aid of those, whether barbarians or Hellenes, who have at any time appealed to us; whereas, if we should all keep quiet or pick and choose whom we ought to help, we should add but little to our empire and should rather run a risk of losing that empire itself.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>62</sup> The “kin” are probably the people of Leontini (see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1970: 220); the “allies” may be the Camarinaeans and Sicels, and perhaps also the people of Leontini (see Hornblower 2009: 301–2). I read προγεγενημένοις with Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 220, and Hornblower 301. On the role of συγγένεια in diplomatic relations in Thucydides, especially in his account of the Sicilian expedition, see Bolmarcich 2010: 125–31.

<sup>63</sup> Alcibiades also justifies the expedition on the grounds that Athenians had sworn an oath to help their allies in Sicily (6.18.1).

Nicias and Alcibiades diverge in their assessment of whether Athens should launch the Sicilian expedition, but they share the assumption that Athens should, above all, help itself through its actions.<sup>64</sup>

Although some scholars object that Thucydides’ presentation of interstate relations is distorted by his Realist perspective,<sup>65</sup> we should not rule out the possibility that there is some truth to his depiction of imperial Athens’ calculating pragmatism in dealing with Hellenes and, in particular, in determining when and how to support other states. Whereas Thucydides presents a particularly critical view of Athens and its claims of helping others,<sup>66</sup> Herodotus’ picture of Athenian helping, as we have seen, has a Realist tint as well; and Xenophon, as we will see, presents a broadly similar image of this.

In the case of Thucydides’ Plataean narrative, moreover, even if we suspect Thucydides of presenting a hypercritical view of Athenian behavior, we should not be too quick to reject his presentation of Athenians as pragmatic and prudent in this context. Thucydides, in fact, has included enough details in his narrative that apologists for Athens might reconstruct from it a more sympathetic, but nonetheless revealing, picture of the Athenian response to the plight of the Plataeans.<sup>67</sup> Such a reconstruction might point out that Thucydides’ Athenians not only provide a safe haven for the Plataean women, children, and men unable to fight immediately after the Theban incursion but also send troops to Plataea straightaway; this military help is modest, but it is in proportion to the perceived risk at the time – only later did the threat to Plataea grow when Archidamus and the Peloponnesian forces arrived. When the Plataeans consult with Athens over how to proceed in the face of this force, the Athenians reasonably enough urge them to honor their alliance and not to yield and indicate they will come to help. When, however, Plataea is circumvallated with a double wall, one of which would confront any Athenian relief force (3.21.1), Athens views it as too risky and impracticable to lend help as originally intended, especially in light of the unexpected revolt of Mytilene and the heavy commitment of Athenian forces there. Defenders of Athens

<sup>64</sup> Thucydides (6.19.1) suggests that the Athenians are drawn to the expedition both on the basis of Alcibiades’ words and the supplication of the Eggestaeans, who remind them of their oaths.

<sup>65</sup> See note 6.

<sup>66</sup> Thucydides also presents a dark picture of the Lacedaemonian willingness to help others. In the Melian Dialogue, when the Melians assert their confidence that the Lacedaemonians will “come to help them out of kinship and shame” (τῆς γε συγγενείας ἔνεκα καὶ αἰσχύνῃ βοηθεῖν) (5.104.1), the Athenians dispute this on the grounds that the Lacedaemonians consider “what is expedient just” (τὰ δὲ συμφέροντα δίκαια) (5.105.3); as it turns out, the Lacedaemonians do not come to the rescue of the Melians, who are forced to capitulate to the Athenians (5.116).

<sup>67</sup> I build here on Hornblower (2007: 141–4), who offers a defense of Athens’ behavior.

might also note that when Plataea is taken and its defenders executed, twenty-five Athenians die together with the Plataeans (3.68.2). Later in the *Histories*, Thucydides indicates that the Athenians were not oblivious to the plight of the now homeless Plataeans: after their conquest of Scione, “they gave the land to the Plataeans to occupy” (5.32), and the Plataeans remained there until forced out at the end of the war by Sparta (X. *HG* 2.2.9; Plu. *Lys.* 14). Even if we prefer this more sympathetic interpretation of Athenian behavior to that presented by Thucydides, it seems clear that there were limits to Athens’ willingness to support even a close ally, and that, notwithstanding the common characterization of Athenians as “risk takers” (Thuc. 1.70.3; *Lys.* 2.3, 20; Dem. 18.97, 203; 60.10; Hyp. *Epit.* 29), they were not ready to overextend themselves to assist others.

Athenian support of Plataea continued to be cautious and prudent in the early fourth century B.C. Several decades after the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Plataeans once again found themselves in need of Athenian assistance. After the Lacedaemonians had refounded Plataea ca. 386 B.C. as part of their ongoing power struggle with Thebes, the Plataeans returned there from Athens (Paus. 9.1.4).<sup>68</sup> Diodorus Siculus, writing in the first century B.C., describes how in 373 the Plataeans, who apparently feared Theban aggression, invoked their alliance with Athens and appealed for military help (15.46.4).<sup>69</sup> It is not clear what, if any response, the Athenians made to this appeal; according to Diodorus, the Thebans acted swiftly to seize the city before the Athenians could act and proceeded to raze it (15.46.4–6; cf. Isoc. 14.7; Paus. 9.1.5–8). The Athenians gave safe haven to the Plataean refugees, who apparently resumed their status as Athenian citizens (D.S. 15.46.6).

The Plataeans and their advocates in Athens, however, sought to persuade the Athenians to intervene on their behalf to force Thebes to return their land to them. Isocrates’ *Plataicus* was composed on this occasion to advance the Plataean case for Athens to pressure Thebes into this course of action.<sup>70</sup> The work opens with an appeal to Athens’ tradition of helping those who have been wronged:

<sup>68</sup> On the refounding of Plataea soon after the King’s Peace of 387/6, see Amit 1973: 106–9; cf. Seager 1994: 156.

<sup>69</sup> Although the details of the episode are obscure, it seems plausible that the Plataeans, concerned over Theban aggression against Tanagra and Thespieae (Isoc. 14.9; cf. 19, 35; Seager 1994: 177), sought help from Athens.

<sup>70</sup> Although the *Plataicus* takes the form of a speech given by a Plataean before the Athenian Assembly, it is probably an Isocratean pamphlet circulated at this time to advance the Plataean cause (cf. Papillon 2004: 228–9; Low 2007: 74–6).

εἰδότες ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις προθύμως βοηθεῖν εἰθισμένους καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις μεγίστην χάριν ἀποδιδόντας, ἤκομεν ἱκετεύοντες μὴ περιιδεῖν ἡμᾶς εἰρήνης οὐσης ἀναστάτους ὑπὸ Θηβαίων γεγεννημένους. πολλῶν δ' ἤδη πρὸς ὑμᾶς καταφυγόντων καὶ διαπραξαμένων ἀπανθ' ὅσων ἐδεήθησαν, ἡγούμεθα μάλισθ' ὑμῖν προσήκειν περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως ποιήσασθαι πρόνοιαν. οὐτε γὰρ ἂν ἀδικώτερον οὐδένας ἡμῶν εὖροιτε τηλικαύταις συμφοραῖς περιπεπτωκότας, οὐτ' ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου πρὸς τὴν ὑμετέραν πόλιν οἰκειότερον διακειμένους. ἔτι δὲ τοιούτων δεησόμενοι πάρεσμεν, ἐν οἷς κίνδυνος μὲν οὐδεὶς ἔνεστιν, ἀπαντες δ' ἄνθρωποι νομιοῦσιν ὑμᾶς πειθομένους ὁσιωτάτους καὶ δικαιοτάτους εἶναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων. (14.1–2)

Since we Plataeans know, Athenians, that it is your custom not only to help the victims of injustice zealously but also to requite your benefactors with the utmost gratitude, we have come as suppliants to beg you not to stand by and look on when we have been driven from our homes in time of peace by the Thebans. And since many in the past have fled to you for protection and have obtained all for which they begged, we think it is fitting for you especially to show care for our city. You would find that no one has been more unjustly beset by great calamities than we have and that no one has been more loyal toward your city for a longer period of time. Further, we are here to request the kind of help for which there is no risk for you; in fact, all people will consider you the most pious and just of all the Greeks, if you agree.

Although the *Plataicus* repeatedly invokes an ideal view of Athens as the defender of the weak (14.39, 42, 51–5), it also argues as here that intervention will involve no risk to the Athenians (14.3, 36) and yet substantially benefit their city by raising its stature among the Hellenes (14.42; cf. 58). Any such arguments made by or for Plataeans at this time, however, do not appear to have moved the Athenians to take action. Thebes was, in fact, an Athenian ally at this time, and Athens was not willing to risk alienating it over the wrong done to Plataea (cf. 14.33). Under these circumstances, the Athenians were willing to accept the Plataean refugees back into their city but prudently did not undertake to restore their city to them through a military expedition (X. *HG* 6.3.1).<sup>71</sup> As in their earlier relations with the Plataeans, the Athenians provided help to them in a form that did not involve excessive risks or threaten Athens' strategic interests.

<sup>71</sup> On Athens' political reasons for not taking up the cause of the Plataeans, see Seager 1994: 178–9; cf. Buckler and Beck 2008: 40–1. Athens' decision not to intervene may also reflect resentment that the Plataeans had accepted the patronage of the Spartans in refounding their city and had been subservient to Sparta (Isoc. 14.11–16, 26, 45; Amit 1973: 106–14). Alexander restored Plataea to its citizens in 336 (Arr. *An.* 1.9.10; cf. Paus. 9.1.8).



## *Helping Former Enemies*

Whereas our first two case studies considered how much Athenians felt obliged to help those with whom they shared close and ongoing relations, we now turn to the question of Athens' helping of its former enemies in the ongoing struggle among Greek states for hegemony in the first several decades of the fourth century B.C. Although Athens' encomiasts present the city's assistance to former enemies as evidence of its nobility and compassion (Lys. 2.67; Pl. Mx. 244e; Dem. 18.95–101), Xenophon, whose *Hellenica* is our main contemporary source for this period, suggests that strategic objectives are paramount as Athens shifts alliances and joins others in rallying against the current dominant power. Of particular interest is Xenophon's depiction of how Athens came to provide assistance to Thebes against Sparta in the Corinthian War (395–386), and then turned to help Sparta against Thebes after the Theban defeat of Sparta at Leuctra (371). In each case, Xenophon indicates that the Athenians give help primarily on the basis of what will advance the city's interests and that strategic considerations more than charitable impulse drives Athenian decision making.

In his account of how Athens decided to support Thebes against Sparta at the opening of the Corinthian War, Xenophon indicates early on that the Athenians “were eager for war, since they thought it was their right to rule” (πρόθυμοι ἦσαν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, νομίζοντες αὐτῶν τὸ ἄρχειν εἶναι)<sup>72</sup> (HG 3.5.2) – that is, that they were eager to regain their fifth-century empire (cf. 3.5.10, quoted subsequently) – and then proceeds to describe how the Thebans, who were preparing to challenge Sparta militarily, sent an embassy to induce Athens to help. Although the speech that Xenophon attributes to the Theban ambassadors deploys a range of arguments, it is fundamentally pragmatic in its appeal to Athenian interests.

The Thebans begin their speech by seeking to dispel any prejudice on the part of their Athenian audience against them for urging the destruction of Athens after its defeat in the Peloponnesian War:

ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἃ μὲν μέμφεσθε ἡμῖν ὡς ψηφισαμένων χαλεπὰ περὶ ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ καταλύσει τοῦ πολέμου, οὐκ ὀρθῶς μέμφεσθε· οὐ γὰρ ἡ πόλις ἐκεῖνα ἐψηφίσατο, ἀλλ' εἷς ἀνὴρ εἶπεν, ὃς ἔτυχε τότε ἐν τοῖς συμμαχοῖς καθήμενος. ὅτε δὲ παρακάλουν ἡμᾶς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ, τότε ἅπασα ἡ πόλις

<sup>72</sup> I accept Laves's conjecture of αὐτῶν τὸ ἄρχειν εἶναι in place of the manuscripts' τε αὐτῶν ἄρχεσθαι; as Krentz (1995: 196) observes, this “is consistent with the Theban appeal to Athenian ambition” that follows at 3.5.8–15.

ἀπεψηφίσατο μὴ συστρατεύειν αὐτοῖς. δὲ ὑμᾶς οὖν οὐχ ἥκιστα ὀργανιζομένων ἡμῖν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, δίκαιον εἶναι νομίζομεν βοηθεῖν ὑμᾶς τῇ πόλει ἡμῶν; (3.5.8)

Men of Athens, as regards your blaming us for voting in favor of harsh measures against you at the end of the war, you do not blame us fairly, for the city did not vote in favor of those proposals, but one man proposed them, a man who happened at that time to have a seat in the assembly of the allies. But when the Lacedaemonians summoned us to join the expedition against Piraeus, the whole city voted not to go on the campaign with them. Since the Lacedaemonians are angry with us mainly because of you, therefore, we think it is just that you help our city.

Xenophon's Thebans conspicuously minimize the extent of their former hostility for the city: they do not directly acknowledge they joined in urging the destruction of Athens (cf. 2.2.19) but rather speak vaguely of the charge that they voted for “harsh measures” and proceed to blame this on a single representative. In fact, the Thebans assert, they deserve credit for not joining the Lacedaemonians in the march on the Piraeus because their refusal angered the Lacedaemonians (cf. 3.5.5); the good deed of not joining in an attack on Athens at that time, they suggest, merits active help from Athens in the current circumstances.

In case the dubious assertion that the Athenians are indebted to the Thebans and owe them a reciprocal good turn falls flat (as indeed it does; 3.5.16–17), however, the Thebans immediately speak of how the provision of assistance will serve Athenian interests:

καὶ μὴν ὅτι μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βούλοισθ' ἂν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν πρότερον ἐκέκτησθε ἀναλαβεῖν πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα· τοῦτο δὲ πῶς μᾶλλον εἰκὸς γενέσθαι ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀδικουμένοις βοηθοῖτε; (3.5.10)

Men of Athens, we all know that you would like to recover the empire that you formerly possessed. And how is this more likely to happen than by your helping those who are wronged by the Lacedaemonians?

Appealing to Athens' desire to regain its empire, which Xenophon had flagged earlier in his narrative as the primary impetus for the city to join in the fight against Sparta, the Thebans put themselves in the class of those “wronged by the Lacedaemonians” (cf. And. 3.13) and suggest that, as a general strategy, Athens is most likely to regain its empire by helping victims of the Lacedaemonians.<sup>73</sup> Notably, the Thebans pass over any explicit appeal to Athens' self-proclaimed tradition of heroism and nobility

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Thuc. 6.18.2; Isoc. 8.30; Low 2007: 202–3.

in rescuing other Greeks, and instead emphasize the advantages to Athens of stepping forward as rescuer. Indeed, the Thebans, in elaborating on this strategy, dangle before the Athenians the promise of great power:

πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰκός, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς αὖ προστῆτε τῶν οὕτω φανερώς ἀδικουμένων, νῦν ὑμᾶς πολὺ ἤδη μεγίστους τῶν πώποτε γενέσθαι; ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἦρχετε, τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν μόνων δήπου ἡγεῖσθε· νῦν δὲ πάντων καὶ ἡμῶν καὶ Πελοποννησίων καὶ ὧν πρόσθεν ἦρχετε καὶ αὐτοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχοντος ἡγεμόνες ἂν γένοισθε. (3.5.14)

Is it not likely that if you champion those so plainly wronged, you will now become by far the greatest of all the states that have ever been? For when you had your empire, you led, of course, only the people near the sea. But now you would become the leaders of all – of us and of the Peloponnesians and of those whom you ruled before and of the King himself, the man who has the greatest power.

Helping the many parties whom the Lacedaemonians have wronged, including the king of Persia himself (cf. Pl. *Mx.* 244e), the Thebans assert, will put Athens in an unprecedented position of authority and power.

Consistent with their assumption that self-interest is most likely to induce the Athenians to help them, the Thebans indicate that they themselves will be excellent allies because they will be helping themselves through the alliance. To ease any concerns that Athenians may have about forming an alliance with their former enemies, the Thebans assure them that self-interest will make them good allies “since we will be helping on our own behalf as victims of injustice” (ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀδικουμένων βοηθήσομεν) (3.5.14). If the Thebans will benefit from the alliance, however, they assert in concluding their speech that Athens will benefit even more: “Know well, men of Athens, that we think we are inviting you to benefits far greater for your city than for ours” (εὖ γε μέντοι ἐπίστασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι νομίζομεν ἐπὶ πολὺ μείζω ἀγαθὰ παρακαλεῖν ὑμᾶς τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ πόλει ἢ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ) (3.5.15). Xenophon indicates that many Athenians spoke in support of the Theban appeal, and the Athenians voted unanimously to provide help (βοηθεῖν) (3.5.16). Xenophon’s own presentation of Athenian motivation to intervene as based on a desire for hegemonic dominance (3.5.2) and the emphasis his Thebans place on how the proposed intervention will benefit Athens leave no doubt that in Xenophon’s view, Athenian help in this instance reflects a desire to advance the city’s interests.

If the Athenians were ready at the onset of the Corinthian War to overlook their past enmity with Thebes and lend it assistance to curtail

Spartan power and augment their own,<sup>74</sup> it was likewise ready after the Theban defeat of Sparta at Leuctra (371) to throw its weight behind Sparta against the new threat of Theban power. According to Xenophon, when the Thebans sent a garlanded messenger to Athens to announce their victory at Leuctra and to seek help, saying that now the Athenians could take vengeance on the Lacedaemonians for all they had suffered at their hands, the Athenian Council was greatly distressed and sent the herald away without offering him hospitality or giving an answer about the request for aid (6.4.19–20). Although Athens was not ready initially to support Sparta because there was still resentment of the Spartan defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War (6.5.1), after the Thebans and their allies invaded Laconia the Athenians became alarmed and held a meeting of the Assembly, at which they heard from Lacedaemonian ambassadors and representatives of states allied with them (6.5.33). Xenophon attributes a range of appeals to those seeking help for Sparta, but he suggests – as in the earlier decision of Athens to support Thebes in the Corinthian War – that self-interest is paramount in persuading the Athenians to provide assistance.

Xenophon reports that the Lacedaemonian ambassadors appealed to the Athenian Assembly on numerous grounds, for example,

ἀνεμίμησκόν τε γὰρ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὡς αἰεὶ ποτε ἀλλήλοις ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις καιροῖς παρίσταντο ἐπ’ ἀγαθοῖς· αὐτοὶ τε γὰρ ἔφασαν τοὺς τυράννους συνεκβαλεῖν Ἀθήνηθεν, καὶ Ἀθηναίους, ὅτε αὐτοὶ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων, προθύμως βοηθεῖν. (6.5.33)

They reminded the Athenians that always and forever the two peoples had stood by one another in the most important crises for good ends; for they on their side, they said, had aided in expelling the tyrants from Athens, while the Athenians had zealously come to help them when they were hardpressed by the Messenians.

Although Xenophon’s Athenians react skeptically to this selective and distorted history of Athenian-Spartan relations,<sup>75</sup> they are more receptive to the Lacedaemonians’ reminder that they had spared Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War when the Thebans had urged its destruction (6.5.35). Some in the Assembly are also sympathetic to the claim that the Athenians in keeping with their oaths ought to assist the Lacedaemonians

<sup>74</sup> Athens likewise aided its former enemy Corinth during the war: see D.S. 14.82.1–4; cf. Lys. 2.67; Dem. 18.96–7.

<sup>75</sup> This account gives a happy spin to Sparta’s involvement in Athens’ political turmoil at the end of the sixth century (Hdt. 5.62–76) and fails to mention Sparta’s dismissal of the Athenian force sent to help against the Messenians (Thuc. 1.102). As Dillery (1995: 246) observes, “The examples are ill-chosen.”

against the aggression of the Thebans and their allies (6.5.36). Cleiteles, a Corinthian, appeals for Athenian help on the basis of Theban aggression against Corinth, and asks, “If, therefore, you do not help us, who are so manifestly wronged, will you not surely be acting contrary to your oaths?” (πῶς οὖν, ἐὰν μὴ βοηθῆτε οὕτω περιφανῶς ἡμῖν ἀδικουμένοις, οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ὅρκους ποιήσετε) (6.5.37).<sup>76</sup> Xenophon’s Athenians respond by shouting out in approval of Cleiteles’ appeal.

It is at this point, according to Xenophon, that Procles, a Phliasian, arose and gave a long speech (6.5.38–48) urging Athenian intervention.<sup>77</sup> His speech opens with a powerful and sustained (6.38–44) appeal to Athenian interests:

ὁτι μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐκποδὼν γένοιτο Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπὶ πρώτους ἂν ὑμᾶς στρατεύσαιεν οἱ Θηβαῖοι, πᾶσιν οἶμαι τοῦτο δῆλον εἶναι· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων μόνους ἂν ὑμᾶς οἶονται ἐμποδὼν γενέσθαι τοῦ ἄρξαι αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων. εἰ δ’ οὕτως ἔχει, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον Λακεδαιμονίοις ἂν ὑμᾶς ἡγοῦμαι στρατεύσαντας βοηθῆσαι ἢ καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς. τὸ γὰρ δυσμενεῖς ὄντας ὑμῖν Θηβαίους καὶ ὁμόρους οἰκοῦντας ἡγεμόνας γενέσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πολὺ οἶμαι χαλεπώτερον ἂν ὑμῖν φανῆναι ἢ ὅποτε πόρρω τοὺς ἀντιπάλους εἴχετε. συμφορώτερόν γε μεντὰν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βοηθήσαιτε ἐν ᾧ ἔτι εἰσὶν οἱ συμμαχοῖεν ἂν ἢ εἰ ἀπολομένων αὐτῶν μόνοι ἀναγκάζοισθε διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Θηβαίους. (6.5.38–9)

Men of Athens, it is clear to everyone, I imagine, that you are the first against whom the Thebans would march if the Lacedaemonians were got out of the way; for they think that you are the only people in Greece who stand in the way of their becoming rulers of the Greeks. If this is so, I, for my part, believe that if you undertake a campaign, you would not be helping the Lacedaemonians more than your own selves. For to have the Thebans, who are unfriendly to you and dwell on your borders, become leaders of the Greeks, would prove much more grievous to you, I think, than when you had your rivals far away. Furthermore, you would help yourselves with more profit if you should do so while there are still people who would fight on your side, than if they should perish first and you should then be compelled to enter by yourselves upon a decisive struggle with the Thebans.

Procles builds on this appeal to Athenian interests by speaking of the opportunity (*kairos*) the current situation presents for Athens to help the Lacedaemonians in their time of need and to thereby acquire them as unwavering friends (6.5.41) and allies (6.5.43). Athens, by helping Sparta,

<sup>76</sup> Lewis (1997) makes a good case that the oaths that the Lacedaemonians invoke at 6.5.36 refer back to the peace made at Sparta (6.3.18), whereas those invoked by the Corinthians at 6.5.37 refer to the peace made at Athens at 6.5.1–3.

<sup>77</sup> On the speech, see Tuplin 1993: 110–13; Dillery 1995: 247–9; Low 2007: 181–2.

will also win the gratitude of Sparta’s allies who are joining in the current appeal for help, and these states can be relied on to repay this debt in the future (6.5.44). Only after establishing that it is manifestly in Athens’ interest to come to Sparta’s rescue does Procles turn to appeal to Athens’ noble tradition of helping the wronged (6.5.45) and invokes the assistance given by his audience’s ancestors to the survivors of the Seven against Thebes in retrieving their corpses from the Thebans and to the Heraclidae (6.5.46–7). Procles concludes by asserting that the Athenians will be acting nobly indeed if they assist the Lacedaemonians in their current distress and thus make a return for Sparta’s prior services to Athens and all of Greece (6.5.48).

Procles’ speech, Xenophon reports, prompted the Athenians to close debate and vote in favor of going to the aid of the Lacedaemonians in full force (6.5.49). Although Xenophon’s Athenians react favorably to earlier speakers’ arguments that intervention would be the just course to take, Procles’ appeal, which is firmly grounded in Athenian interests and only appeals to Athens’ noble tradition of helping after presenting a compelling argument on the basis of the city’s interests, clinches the case for supporting Sparta. As Xenophon indicates in his own voice (6.4.19–20), Athens was alarmed at the growth of Theban power and the threat this posed to it; consistent with this, Xenophon’s Procles persuades the Athenians to support Sparta by highlighting Athenian interests in his appeal to them.

On balance, Xenophon’s account of Athens’ shifting alliances in the fourth century emphasizes the role of the city’s strategic concerns over high ideals. He presents Athens’ alliance with Thebes as driven by Athens’ desire to regain power after its devastating defeat in the Peloponnesian War; when the Athenians vote to send help to the Thebans, they are acting to advance the interests of their own city. The idea that Athens can help itself through its shifting alliances is explicit in Procles’ appeal to the Athenians that in helping Sparta they will help themselves against the growing power of their dangerous neighbor Thebes.<sup>78</sup> Whereas Athens’ encomiasts could characterize such episodes as “helping the wronged,” pure and simple, Xenophon indicates in each of these cases that Athens was above all seeking to balance the power of the dominant state by siding with its

<sup>78</sup> MacDowell (2000: 239–40) observes that Dem. 19.75 may refer to this episode: “It was not because of their virtue that you saved the Spartans at one time, or those damned Euboians, or many other people; it was because their preservation was in the interests of Athens, as is the case with the Phocians now” (οὐδὲ γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίους διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν ποτ’ ἐσώσατε, οὐδὲ τοὺς καταράτους Εὐβοέας τουτουσί, οὐδ’ ἄλλους πολλούς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι συμφέρον ἦν σῶς εἶναι τῇ πόλει, ὥσπερ Φωκέας νυνί).

rivals.<sup>79</sup> Xenophon embraces traditional values and the idea of reciprocity between individuals and between states, but his account of shifting alliances suggests that, although these are not irrelevant to Athens' interstate relations, they are largely subordinate to the city's strategic considerations. In this respect, Xenophon can be seen as Thucydides' heir – not only in picking up the history of interstate relations in his *Hellenica* where Thucydides' account leaves off but in viewing relations between states as based primarily on expedience.<sup>80</sup>

Ancient historians thus present us with a range of views of Athenian helping in diverse circumstances. Herodotus provides a critical view of Athens' brief support of the Ionian revolt but blames the Eretrians rather than the Athenians for the withdrawal of support by Athenian kleruchs in the face of the Persian invasion. Thucydides scathingly depicts Athens' failure to help the Plataeans under siege by the Peloponnesians and goes so far in the case of the Sicilian expedition to present Athenian helping of the Egestaeans as a mere pretext for conquest. Xenophon casts his Athenians as calculating in their provision of help to the Thebans against the Spartans in the Corinthian War and to the Spartans against the Thebans after the Battle of Leuctra, but in the latter case, he suggests that "helping the wronged" plays at least a subsidiary role in prompting Athenian intervention.

Although Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon diverge in the degree of cynicism with which they portray Athenian helping, they converge in presenting Athens as an essentially pragmatic state that acts largely on the basis of its own interests, ever attentive to the risks and benefits of intervention. Some might argue that this depiction of Athens tells us more about the Realist inclinations of these historians than about Athenian values and behavior, but the broad consistency of the picture they present should

<sup>79</sup> On this common pattern of "balancing" on the part of Greek states, see Isoc. 8.108; Dem. 9.23–5; Strauss 1991: 195–201; Harding 1995: 108–9; Eckstein 2006: 65–7; Hunt 2010: 168–80; on balancing in modern international relations, see Walt 1987: 17–33. Hunt (178) may be right that "helping the weak against the strong was often congruent with calculations aimed at maintaining a balance of power" and that it would be a mistake to view "helping the weak" as "merely a cover for calculations of interest," but my position is that calculations of interest are nonetheless the driving force in these circumstances.

<sup>80</sup> Lendon (2006), focusing on *Cyropaedia* 3.1.14–31, emphasizes the role of ethics and reciprocity in Xenophon's thinking about interstate relations and on this basis distinguishes his perspective sharply from "Thucydidean realism" (95–8). In my view, however, the *Hellenica* provides much more direct evidence of Xenophon's views of Greek interstate relations than does his *Cyropaedia* and exhibits a cynicism about the role of self-interest in motivating states that is not so far from Thucydides'.

make us hesitate to reject this contemporary testimony. It is, after all, quite possible that Athens, as the builder and defender of a tribute-paying empire in the fifth century and as an active player in the interstate power politics of the fourth century, had Realist tendencies in the interstate sphere. Indeed, a similar picture of Athenian helping of other states emerges from an analysis of the speeches of Demosthenes that were delivered before, and tailored to, large Athenian audiences starting in the 350s.

## DEMOSTHENES AND THE RHETORIC OF ATHENIAN HELPING

Demosthenes often invokes the ideal of Athenian interstate helping in his orations before Athenian audiences but adapts this freely to the circumstances and objectives of his speeches. Of particular interest is the very different ways he presents this ideal in speeches before the Athenian Assembly, on the one hand, and in his *On the Crown* before an Athenian court, on the other. In seeking to persuade audiences in the Assembly that the city should intervene abroad, Demosthenes emphasizes the city's interests and appeals only in a selective and limited way to the ideal of Athenian helping. By contrast, in his defense of his past record as public speaker (*rhētōr*) and advisor to the city in *On the Crown*, Demosthenes is much more expansive in his picture of Athenian helping, as he surveys the city's history and finds in this an unbroken record of helping others. This divergence, I suggest, points to a considerable gap between the prospective pragmatism of Athenian decision making and the retrospective idealism of Athenians in envisioning their past.

### *Deliberative Speeches*

Demosthenes' surviving deliberative speeches, delivered between 354 and 341 B.C. before the Assembly, constitute our best evidence for assessing the sorts of arguments that Athenians found persuasive as they debated state policy, including frequently the question of whether to intervene abroad.<sup>81</sup> Most of our earlier examples of deliberative speeches are representations of these found in Thucydides and Xenophon and stand at some remove

<sup>81</sup> On these speeches and their usefulness for discerning popular Athenian views, see Hunt 2010: 7–10, 15–20, 270–5. On the chronology of Demosthenes' speeches, see MacDowell 2009: 12 (Table 1).



from speeches actually delivered before Athenian audiences.<sup>82</sup> Although Demosthenes and other orators apparently revised their speeches before circulating them in written form, the circulated versions probably do not radically alter the arguments of the original speeches. Because Athenian speakers were under pressure to adapt their arguments to their listeners' values and assumptions to succeed in winning them over, these arguments can provide important evidence of the attitudes of Athenian audiences. Although too little has survived of earlier deliberative oratory to determine its precise relation with Demosthenes' oratory, the basic values and beliefs of Athenian audiences probably did not change dramatically from the late fifth century to Demosthenes' time, and the types of arguments offered by Demosthenes may not be very different from those made before earlier generations of Athenians.<sup>83</sup> In any event, Demosthenes' deliberative speeches give us excellent access to how Athenians of his time viewed intervention abroad and the grounds that might warrant this.

Although Demosthenes is clearly drawn to the idea that Athenians nobly intervene for wronged peoples abroad, he is careful not to place too much weight on this appeal before audiences in the Assembly.<sup>84</sup> Demosthenes seems to recognize that Athenians will decide foreign policy primarily on the basis of what is advantageous to the city and is consequently careful to subordinate appeals to helping the wronged to the more pressing matter of protecting and pursuing the city's interests in a dangerous world. As Aristotle observes in his *Rhetoric* (1358b20–9; cf. Pl. *Alc.* 113d), deliberative oratory is concerned especially with “that which is advantageous” (τὸ συμφέρον), and Demosthenes appears to be fully cognizant of this.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>82</sup> I agree with Hunt (2010: 23), however, that “most historical speeches present arguments well within the mainstream of Athenian thinking.”

<sup>83</sup> On the apparent stability of basic Athenian values and beliefs from ca. 430–322 B.C., see Dover 1974: 30; Ober 1989: 36–8; and Hunter 1994: 6–7; Hunt (2010: 19, 163–5), however, argues that Athenian thinking about interstate relations shifted in some regards in the mid-fourth century. The ideal of “helping the wronged” crops up briefly in one of our earliest (391 B.C.) surviving deliberative speeches, Andocides, *On the Peace with Sparta*, 13.

<sup>84</sup> Hunt (2010: 178–9) observes that Demosthenes presents Athenian policy abroad sometimes as prudential (Dem. 16.32; 23.102–3; 19.75) and sometimes as altruistic (Dem. 2.24; 8.42; 10.14; 18.101, 18.72; 19.16, 307) and infers from this (180) that “the argument from Athens' noble traditions was apparently as potent as was that from the need to balance against power.” In my view, Demosthenes' arguments in his deliberative speeches are weighted heavily toward prudential considerations (cf. Dover 1974: 311–12).

<sup>85</sup> Hunt (2010: 157–8) rightly notes the prominence of arguments based on expedience: “every one of our assembly speeches invokes the interests of Athens. These references to expedience are often stressed by their placement in either the opening or the closing sections of speeches. They are thus marked as pivotal arguments for the policy proposed.” For a list of references to passages in deliberative oratory using a word related to the verb *συμφέρω*, see *ibid.* 157–8

Consider, for example, the restraint with which Demosthenes advances the case for “helping the wronged” and his emphasis on Athenian interests as he argues for military intervention in Rhodes in *Dem. 15: For the Freedom of the Rhodians* (351 B.C.). The Rhodians had revolted from Athens during the Social War (357–355 B.C.), assisted by Mausolus, ruler of Caria; after the war, an oligarchic faction, with Mausolus’ support, prevailed over the democrats, who then sought help from Athens.<sup>86</sup> Although the Attic *epitaphioi*, as we have seen, vaunt Athens’ willingness to help former enemies when they are unjustly wronged, Demosthenes’ appeal to his Athenian audience to assist the recently hostile Rhodian democrats is marked more by its calculating appeal to Athenian interests than to high moral principle.

At his speech’s opening, Demosthenes argues that assistance is warranted because this is a golden opportunity (*kairos*) to advance the city’s interests:

ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἐν ὧν ἐγὼ νομίζω χάριν ὑμᾶς τοῖς θεοῖς ὀφείλιν, τὸ τοὺς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ὕβριν ὑμῖν πολεμήσαντας οὐ πάλαι νῦν ἐν ὑμῖν μόνοις τῆς αὐτῶν σωτηρίας ἔχειν τὰς ἐλπίδας. ἄξιον δ’ ἡσθῆναι τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ· συμβήσεται γὰρ ὑμῖν, ἐὰν ἂν χρή βουλευέσθω ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, τὰς παρὰ τῶν διαβαλλόντων τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν βλασφημίας ἔργω μετὰ δόξης καλῆς ἀπολύσασθαι. ἡτιάσαντο μὲν γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς Χῖοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα συνέστησαν ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς τὸν τελευταῖον τουτονὶ πόλεμον· φανήσεται δ’ ὁ μὲν πρυτανεύσας ταῦτα καὶ πείσας Μαύσωλος, φίλος εἶναι φάσκων Ῥοδίων, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτῶν ἀφρημένος, οἱ δ’ ἀποδείξαντες ἑαυτοὺς συμμάχους Χῖοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι τοῖς ἀτυχήμασιν αὐτῶν οὐ βεβοηθηκότες, ὑμεῖς δ’, οὓς ἐφοβοῦντο, μόνοι τῶν πάντων τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτοῖς αἴτιοι. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ταῦθ’ ὑφ’ ἀπάντων ὀφθῆναι ποιήσετε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι τοῦτο ποιείσθαι σύμβολον τῆς αὐτῶν σωτηρίας, ἐὰν ὑμῖν ὦσι φίλοι· οὐ μείζον οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμῖν γένοιτ’ ἀγαθόν, ἢ παρὰ πάντων ἐκόντων ἀνυπόπτου τυχεῖν εὐνοίας. (15.2–4)

Now, it is one of the things for which, I think, the gods deserve your gratitude, that the same men who not long ago attacked you because of their *hubris*, now find in you alone the hope of their salvation. You ought to be delighted at your present opportunity because, if you decide as you should concerning it, you will by your action succeed, with glorious honor

n. 16. Hunt goes on to argue (159), however, “The Athenian assembly granted some sway to both interest and morality without the implausible, if intellectually appealing, subordination of one to the other.” In my view, although it is true that Demosthenes usually does not *directly* subordinate moral appeals to those based on interest, the latter dominate his deliberative speeches, and this reflects their relative importance.

<sup>86</sup> On the circumstances of this speech, see Radicke 1995: 33–54 and MacDowell 2009: 218–19.

to yourselves, in silencing the ugly slanders of those vilifying our city. For we were charged by the Chians, Byzantines, and Rhodians with plotting against them, and that was why they collaborated in the recent war against us; but we shall be able to prove that whereas Mausolus, the prime mover and instigator in the business, while claiming to be the friend of the Rhodians, has robbed them of their freedom, and whereas the Chians and Byzantines, who posed as their allies, never have helped them in their distress, it is you, whom they feared, you alone of all peoples, who are responsible for their deliverance. By making this clear to all, you will make the democrats in every state consider friendship with you as the pledge of their safety, and no greater good could you have than to win from all men their voluntary and unsuspecting goodwill.

In appealing to his audience that is still angry at the Rhodians and relishing their current distress, Demosthenes here passes over the city's proud history of helping even former enemies and presents the proposed intervention as a strategy through which Athenians can win the confidence and support of other democratic states and improve its own situation. As Demosthenes states later, he himself takes pleasure in the current plight of the Rhodians and would not propose helping them, if he did not think this would be advantageous (συμφέρειν) to Athens (15.15). In offering this frank assessment of the situation, Demosthenes suggests that advancing Athens' interests, not helping the wronged, is obligatory.

A further striking deviation from the ideal vision of Athens as a rescuer of any who are wronged is found in Demosthenes' restriction of Athenian helping to other democracies. Demosthenes, pointing out that oligarchic states seek to destroy Athens and that it is therefore in the city's interest to foster democracies in their place (15.19), advances the following general principle:

τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους τοὺς ἀδικοῦντάς τινας αὐτῶν τῶν κακῶς πεπονθότων ἐχθροὺς ἡγεῖσθαι χρή· τοὺς δὲ τὰς πολιτείας καταλύοντας καὶ μεθιστάντας εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κοινούς ἐχθροὺς παραινῶ νομίζειν ἀπάντων τῶν ἐλευθερίας ἐπιθυμούντων. (15.20)

Now, all other wrongdoers must be considered the enemies of those only whom they have wronged, but when men overthrow constitutions and change them to oligarchies, I urge you to regard them as the common enemies of all who love freedom.

Demosthenes, in explicitly rejecting the principle of indiscriminate helping of the wronged vaunted in the *epitaphioi* and elsewhere, provides a

revealing glimpse of Athenian pragmatism in assessing when to intervene for another state.<sup>87</sup>

Demosthenes, however, does not completely abandon a moral framework as he makes the case for Athenian intervention for the Rhodians. After offering a direct and blunt assessment of why it is in the city’s interests to support the Rhodian democrats in the first half of the speech (15.1–20), Demosthenes goes on to portray this also as the decent thing to do, at least when another democracy is involved:

ἔπειτα καὶ δίκαιον, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δημοκρατουμένους αὐτοὺς τοιαῦτα φρονούντας φαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀτυχούντων δήμων, οἷάπερ ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀξιώσαιτε φρονεῖν περὶ ὑμῶν, εἴ ποθ', ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, τοιοῦτό τι συμβαίῃ. καὶ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιά τις φήσει Ῥοδίου πεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἐπιτήδειος ὁ καιρὸς ἐφησθῆναι· δεῖ γὰρ τοὺς εὐτυχούντας περὶ τῶν ἀτυχούντων ἀεὶ φαίνεσθαι τὰ βέλτιστα βουλευομένους, ἐπειδὴ περ ἄδηλον τὸ μέλλον ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις. (15.21; cf. 16)

Then again, Athenians, it is right that you, living under a democracy, should regard democracies in distress as you would think it proper that others regard you, if ever – may it not happen – some such thing should happen to you. Even if someone shall say that the Rhodians have suffered justly, this is not the moment to exult over them, for prosperous communities ought always to show themselves ready to consult the best interests of the unfortunate, since indeed the future is hidden from all men’s eyes.

At least in the case of fellow democrats, Demosthenes suggests, it is right to intervene in their time of distress, and not least because this principle might benefit Athens should it someday fall on hard times. Only at this point does Demosthenes proceed to invoke Athens’ general reputation for rescuing the unfortunate (δόξαν ἔχοντας τοῦ σώζειν τοὺς ἀτυχούντας αἰεὶ) (15.22), linking this to Athenian courage and power (15.28) and to the city’s ancestral traditions (15.35).

Even as Demosthenes sets out this more idealized view of Athenian helping, however, he offers a bleak assessment of the principles that govern interstate relations:

τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἰδίων δικαίων τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις οἱ νόμοι κοινὴν τὴν μετουσίαν ἔδοσαν καὶ ἴσῃν καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν καὶ τοῖς ἰσχυροῖς· τῶν δ' Ἑλληνικῶν δικαίων οἱ κρατοῦντες ὀρίσται τοῖς ἡττοσι γίνονται. (15.29)

<sup>87</sup> Hunt (2010: 89–90) observes that “Athens’ actual foreign policy often took little account of other states’ political systems.”

Of private justice within a state, the laws of that state grant a common and equal share to all, weak and strong alike; but justice among Greek states is defined by the strong for the weak.<sup>88</sup>

Although Demosthenes portrays Athens as an exceptional state in its desire to do right (15.28, 30), his emphasis in the first half of the speech on helping others as a means of advancing Athenian interests suggests that even for Athenians, expedience is a higher priority than justice in its interstate relations.

Demosthenes' appeals to his audience's interests first and sense of decency second, however, did not sway them, and the Athenians chose not to intervene on behalf of the Rhodians.<sup>89</sup> The best explanation for this is that they still bore a grudge against the Rhodians, as Demosthenes acknowledges, and viewed the manifest costs and risks of the expedition, including provoking Persia (15.5–13, 23–4), as too great in any case. There were clearly limits to the Athenians' willingness to stick their necks out to help fellow Greeks, even democrats like themselves.

Demosthenes' *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics* raise further doubts about the appeal of helping others to Athenian audiences deliberating over foreign policy. Demosthenes places great emphasis on protecting and advancing Athenian interests in these speeches and does not rely heavily on appeals to helping others. In his *Olynthiacs* (349/8 B.C.), Demosthenes takes an essentially pragmatic approach in arguing that Athens should send support to Olynthus, a former Athenian ally that had joined Philip against Athens in 357/6 (RO 50; D.S. 16.8.3–4), in the face of Philip's current threat to it.<sup>90</sup> Although Demosthenes employs the vocabulary of helping in making his case for Athenian support of Olynthus, there is little in his *Olynthiacs* about Athens' tradition of intervening on behalf of the weak and a great deal instead about how helping Olynthus will serve Athenian interests. Demosthenes repeatedly observes that the current enmity of the Olynthians with Philip and their readiness to resist him provide the perfect opportunity (*kairos*, 1.2, 8; 2.2; 3.5–6, and passim) for Athens to join in defeating Philip while he is still far away from Athens (1.12, 15, 25; 3.1, 8–9); his proposed expedition in support of Olynthus thus comes across

<sup>88</sup> On this and other Realist arguments in Demosthenes and other orators (Dem. 4.5; 16.8–9, 27; 19.75; 23.117; [Dem.] 17.9; Aeschin. 3.66), see Hunt 2010: 159–63.

<sup>89</sup> See Dem. 5.25 and 13.8, with MacDowell 2009: 223.

<sup>90</sup> On Olynthus' troubled relationship with Athens in the second quarter of the fourth century B.C., see Cawkwell 1962: 136; Cargill 1981: 168; Harding 1995: 112–13, 117; Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 244–9 (on RO 50, the Alliance between Philip II and the Chalcidians, 357/6); MacDowell 2009: 229.

as a calculated and strategic move to avoid having to fight Philip on Athenian soil rather than as a humanitarian intervention. At one point, when Demosthenes does invoke Athens’ noble tradition of intervening to ensure justice for other Hellenes, he does so not to rouse his audience to defend Olynthus but rather to exhort them to look after Athens’ own interests now: “I am amazed . . . that you have so often saved other states, both all of them together and each separately in turn, but now sit down under the loss of what is your own” (ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο θαυμάζω . . . τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους σεσώκατε πολλάκις πάντας καὶ καθ’ ἑν’ αὐτῶν ἐν μέρει, τὰ δ’ ὑμέτερόν αὐτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες κἀθησθε) (2.24; cf. 18.101; *Ex.* 16). Likewise, Demosthenes appears more focused on Athens than Olynthus when he argues that, if Athens does not help Olynthus now, it will be placed in the unhappy position of asking others for help when Philip turns to attack Athens (3.9).<sup>91</sup> Demosthenes’ appeals, grounded as they were in the city’s interests, may well have played a role in convincing the Athenians to send significant military support to Olynthus in several phases.<sup>92</sup> Although Athens had good reason to be angry with the Olynthians for their earlier alliance with the Macedonians against the Athenians, the pursuit of Athenian interests made intervention attractive and overcame any remaining bitterness toward the Olynthians.<sup>93</sup>

Demosthenes shows a similar pragmatism toward what might motivate Athenians to intervene abroad in his *Philippics*, which he delivered over the 10-year period 351 to 341 B.C. The main thrust of these speeches is that Athens must protect its interests (4.12, 51; 6.5; 9.75–6, 10.1, 24) by acting against Philip before it is too late; far better to fight Philip abroad than when he is on Athens’ doorstep (4.50; 9.51). At several points, however, Demosthenes invokes Athens’ tradition of helping wronged Greeks. For example, in his *Second Philippic* Demosthenes flatters his audience when he asserts that Philip knew he could not induce the Athenians to betray

<sup>91</sup> For the Athenian aversion to receiving help from others, see Thuc. 2.40.4; Lys. 2.23; Isoc. 8.139.

<sup>92</sup> On the support, which was sent in three phases, see Philoch. *FGrH* 328 FF 49–51 (= Harding 2008: 154–5), with Cawkwell 1962: 130–40; Carter 1971; Sealey 1993: 137–43; Harding 1995: 112–13; and MacDowell 2009: 238–9; the last phase included 17 triremes, 2,000 Athenian hoplites, and a cavalry force of 300, although these arrived too late to help apparently because of the Etesian winds (D.S. 16.53.2; *Suda* s.v. Κάρανος cf. Dem. 4.31–2). The Athenian commitment of forces was significant but not overwhelming (cf. Harding 112–13; Sealey 142–3).

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Harding 1995: 112: “With astute pragmatism the *dēmos* recognised that it was in Athens’ self-interest to forget the past and send assistance.” When Olynthus ultimately fell to Philip and was destroyed, the Athenians apparently welcomed refugees from Olynthus into their city: see MacDowell 2009: 239 n. 102 and Tod 166, but cf. Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 249.

the common cause of the Greeks in exchange for any favor or profit (6.10) because of their noble tradition of acting for the common good of Greeks, as in the Persian Wars (6.11; cf. 6.7). Demosthenes is markedly less flattering to his Athenian audience in his *Third* and *Fourth Philippics*, however, where he sharply contrasts the current Athenian neglect of other Greeks as they fall before Philip with the noble intervention of earlier Athenians for fellow Greeks.

In the *Third Philippic*, Demosthenes chastises his fellow Athenians, along with other Greeks, for standing by and doing nothing as Philip reduces Hellenic cities one by one (9.22, 28–9, 34). He asserts that in prior times, Greek states had always banded together against the current Greek state in power to assist those wronged by it, and Athens has special reason to take risks and act boldly because of its ancestral traditions (74). In his *Fourth Philippic*, Demosthenes is even more pointed, focusing his criticism on Athenians for their failure to help the wronged. Early in this speech, for example, he asserts “what we do is insufficient to protect any of the ones being wronged” (ἔστι δὲ ταῦτ’ οὐδένᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων σῶζειν δυνάμενα) (10.3), and then proceeds to list the states that Philip conquered when they were “neglected and overlooked” (ἐαθέντα καὶ παροφθέντ’, 10.8) by Athens. Later, Demosthenes rebukes his audience:

ἔξεσθητ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐφ’ ἧς ὑμᾶς οἱ πρόγονοι κατέλιπον, καὶ τὸ μὲν προῖστασθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ δύνανται συνεστηκυῖαν ἔχοντας πᾶσι τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις βοηθεῖν περιέργον ἐπέισθητ’ εἶναι καὶ μάταιον ἀνάλωμ’ ὑπὸ τῶν ταῦτα πολιτευομένων... (10.46; cf. 39, 50, 74)

Men of Athens, you have deserted the post in which your ancestors left you; you have been persuaded by the men in public life who advocate such things that to be preeminent in Greece and to help all those being wronged by possessing a standing force is a superfluous task and an idle expense.

Although this and similar appeals suggest that Demosthenes believes the ideal of assisting the wronged may help rouse his audience to action, the fact that they have not done so up to this point – as Demosthenes frequently asserts in speaking of Philip’s many conquests to date (e.g., 4.35; 10.8–10; cf. 1.9) – makes one wonder how central helping other Greeks really is to his Athenian audience.<sup>94</sup> Indeed, Demosthenes himself carefully hedges by stressing that any other course of action will be devastating for Athenian interests. Thus, for example, Demosthenes asserts that, even if some god could guarantee that Philip would not in the end march against Athens, it would be disgraceful for Athenians and unworthy of their ancestral

<sup>94</sup> On the city’s numerous allies that fell to Philip, see Hunt 2010: 190–2.

traditions to abandon all the other Hellenes to enslavement; but he hastens to add that the more the Athenians allow him to extend his power, the stronger and more formidable an enemy they will find him in war (10.26). Here and elsewhere in this speech, Demosthenes emphasizes that if Athens neglects helping others, it will suffer in the end (10.10, 46–7, 57, 74). When Athens joined with other Greeks to confront Philip at Chaeronea in 338 B.C. probably in part due to Demosthenes’ persistent harangues, there is little reason to doubt that it did so primarily to protect itself and its interests.

This survey suggests that when Demosthenes argues before the Athenian Assembly concerning the need for intervention abroad, he invokes at times the ideal that Athens should aid those who have been wronged, but he does not present helping the wronged as an unqualified imperative. Instead, he subordinates this ideal to the city’s strategic objectives abroad: helping fellow democrats like the exiled Rhodians to undercut Athens’ oligarchic foes; fighting Philip around Olynthus so as not to be forced to confront him on Athenian territory; and interrupting Philip’s city-by-city conquest of Greece before he reaches Athens. To judge from Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches, Athenian decision making is based more on expedience than idealism. Demosthenes presents a more romantic vision of Athenian values and decision making in his *On the Crown*, in which he offers an idealized view of the behavior of Athens and Demosthenes as advisor to it as he looks back in 330 B.C. on what led Athens to confront Macedon.

### On the Crown: *Rewriting the Past*

Although Demosthenes is careful not to rely too heavily on the ideal of helping the wronged in his deliberative speeches before the Assembly in the years leading up to Chaeronea (338 B.C.), he takes a markedly different approach in his *On the Crown* (330 B.C.) as he reviews and reconstructs this period. When Demosthenes’ longtime political rival and enemy, Aeschines, indicted Ctesiphon on the grounds that his proposal that the people award Demosthenes an honorary crown was illegal, Demosthenes spoke in his defense before an Athenian jury. In his *On the Crown*, however, Demosthenes ranges far beyond the specific charges leveled against Ctesiphon, as he seeks to defend his own role as *rhētōr* in encouraging the Athenians to confront Macedon (cf. Aeschin. 3.49–50). An important part of this personal defense and self-justification is Demosthenes’ insistence that his advice to the Athenians to confront Philip was consistent with Athens’ noble tradition of helping the wronged.



As Demosthenes looks back on the course that led Athens to face Philip at Chaeronea, he minimizes Athenian reluctance to intervene abroad against Philip and the strategic calculations that were so much a part of Athens' deliberations in the years preceding Chaeronea as evident from Demosthenes' own speeches, and emphasizes instead how Athenians were inspired by their tradition of intervening on behalf of other Greeks in defense of freedom and justice.<sup>95</sup> In an encomiastic burst reminiscent of the *epitaphioi* and unparalleled in his deliberative speeches, Demosthenes speaks at length of Athens' tradition of generously extending help to other Hellenes, even its former enemies, when they are in distress (18.95–101).<sup>96</sup> In documenting this history of helping, Demosthenes asserts that the Athenians nobly assisted the Thebans and Corinthians, who had joined in defeating Athens in the Peloponnesian War, against the Lacedaemonians in the Corinthian War (395–386 B.C.):

οὐθ' ὑπὲρ εὐεργετῶν ἐποίουν οὐτ' ἀκίνδυν' ἑώρων. ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ ταῦτα προΐεντο τοὺς καταφεύγοντας ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦς, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας καὶ τιμῆς ἠθελον τοῖς δεινοῖς αὐτοῦς διδόναι, ὀρθῶς καὶ καλῶς βουλευόμενοι. (18.97)

They were not requiting benefits received, and they knew they were taking risks. But they did not on this account desert men who had fled to them. For the sake of honor and glory they willingly encountered those perils – a righteous and a noble resolve!

Likewise, after the Thebans defeated the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra (371 B.C.), the Athenians set aside their long-standing enmity and came to the aid of the Lacedaemonians (18.98), showing all the Hellenes that Athenians overlook even grievous past wrongs and lend support to others “if ever their salvation or freedom is in danger” (ἐὰν δ' ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ἢ ἐλευθερίας κίνδυνός τις αὐτοῦς καταλαμβάνῃ). So too, Athens came to the rescue of the Euboeans despite their former wrongs to Athens, when the Thebans were trying to annex Euboea (357 B.C.) (18.99–100; cf. Aeschin. 3.85–8).

Facing the impossible task of recounting all of Athens' services to the Hellenes, Demosthenes proclaims:

μυρία τοίνυν ἕτερ' εἰπεῖν ἔχων παραλείπω, ναυμαχίας, ἐξόδους {πεζάς, στρατείας} καὶ πάλοι γεγονυίας καὶ νῦν ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἃς ἀπάσας ἡ πόλις τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας πεποίηται. (18.100)

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Yunis 2000: 114: “It does not matter that the burden of the Athenian past may have played no role at all in the formulation of the original policy.”

<sup>96</sup> Low (2007: 201 n. 65) notes the epitaphic parallel.

I pass over 10,000 other instances I could cite, battles by sea, expeditions by land, of ancient date and of our own times, in all of which Athens engaged herself for the freedom and salvation of Greece.

With this glorious tradition in mind, Demosthenes asserts, he could not help but advise the Athenians to assist the Euboeans and Byzantines against Philip (cf. 18.95) (341–340 B.C.) despite their prior wrongs against Athens:

εἴτ' ἐγὼ τεθεωρηκῶς ἐν τοσούτοις καὶ τοιούτοις τὴν πόλιν ὑπὲρ τῶν τοῖς ἄλλοις συμφερόντων ἐθέλουσαν ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τρόπον τινὰ τῆς βουλῆς οὔσης τί ἔμελλον κελεύσειν ἢ τί συμβουλεύσειν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν; μνησικακεῖν νῆ Δία πρὸς τοὺς βουλομένους σῶζεσθαι, καὶ προφάσεις ζητεῖν δι' ἃς ἅπαντα προησόμεθα... (18.101)

Having before my eyes the spectacle of a city in all those great enterprises ready to fight for things beneficial to others, what advice was I to give and what policy to urge when her deliberations in some measure concerned herself. To bear malice, by Zeus, against men who were seeking deliverance? To search for excuses for deserting the common cause?

Viewed in this light, the city's intervention for the Euboeans and Byzantines, although it “in some measure” concerned Athens itself, becomes one more example of the city's noble tradition of helping others.

Demosthenes invokes this same paradigm of Athenian intervention when he turns later in his speech to describe the high principles that led him to advise the Athenians to help Thebes (339 B.C.) in the events leading up to Chaeronea.<sup>97</sup> Re-creating his speech to the Assembly at that time when Philip's troops were menacing Thebes from Elatea (18.174–8), Demosthenes recalls his advice that the Athenians should forget their past enmity with Thebes (18.176) and go out en masse in arms to Eleusis, so that Athens' partisans in Thebes would know that “you are ready to support men who are willing to fight for freedom, and will come to their aid if they are attacked” (τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι βουλομένοις ὑπάρχειθ' ὑμεῖς ἔτοιμοι καὶ βοηθήσετε, ἐάν τις ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ᾖ) (18.177). His advice, he reports, was to follow this up with an embassy to Thebes to offer to come to their aid (βοηθήσειν) at their call (178).

When Demosthenes turns later to elaborate on the city's fateful decision to help Thebes (cf. 18.215) and confront Philip, he once again lays emphasis on the city's noble traditions (18.199–210).<sup>98</sup> Even if the Athenians

<sup>97</sup> Yunis (2001: 161) observes: “these precedents establish the pattern of high-mindedness that will later justify the alliance with Thebes (174–8)... Naturally, D.'s search for precedent ignores the strategic concerns that motivated these earlier Athenian actions.”

<sup>98</sup> Cf. Yunis 2001: 161, 219 and Hunt 2010: 182–3.

had known at the time this would lead to defeat, “the city could not have departed from that policy, if it had any regard for honor, or for our ancestors, or for the days that are to come” (οὐδ’ οὕτως ἀποστατέον τῇ πόλει τούτων ἦν, εἴπερ ἢ δόξης ἢ προγόνων ἢ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος εἶχε λόγον) (18.199). Demosthenes explains that “Through all time no man has ever been able to persuade our city to attach itself to powerful states that act unjustly and thereby win security at the cost of slavery” (οὐδ’ ἐδυνήθη πώποτε τὴν πόλιν οὐδεὶς ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου πείσαι τοῖς ἰσχύουσι μὲν, μὴ δίκαια δὲ πράττουσι προσθεμένην ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν) (18.203).<sup>99</sup> Following the example of Athenian forefathers who bravely fought against the Persians at Marathon, Plataea, Salamis, and Artemesium, the current generation took up the cause of fellow Hellenes against Philip; it was surely not a mistake for them to take on the risk of war for the common cause of freedom and salvation (18.208; cf. 204–5). Successful or not, he asserts, the city’s fallen at Chaeronea carried out the duty of brave men and thereby won honor (18.208; cf. Dem. 60.19–20).

A striking feature of Demosthenes’ appeal in *On the Crown* to the Athenian tradition of helping others is the way he positions himself as the upholder of this tradition in the advice he gave to the city. For example, in speaking of his success in persuading the Athenians to go to the rescue of the Byzantines against Philip, he asks:

ἀλλὰ τίς ἦν ὁ βοηθήσας τοῖς Βυζαντίοις καὶ σώσας αὐτούς; τίς ὁ κωλύσας τὸν Ἑλλησποντον ἀλλοτριωθῆναι κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους; ὑμεῖς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. τὸ δ’ ὑμεῖς ὅταν λέγω, τὴν πόλιν λέγω. τίς δ’ ὁ τῇ πόλει λέγων καὶ γράφων καὶ πράττων καὶ ἀπλῶς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὰ πράγματ’ ἀφειδῶς δούς; ἐγώ. (18.88)

Who sent help to the Byzantines and delivered them? Who prevented the estrangement of the Hellespont at that crisis? You, men of Athens; and when I say you, I mean the city. Who advised the city, moved the resolutions, took action, devoted himself wholeheartedly and without stint to that business? I did.

Demosthenes is careful not to claim that he is personally responsible for the Athenian predilection for helping others (cf. 18.293) but rather seeks credit because he has encouraged the city to follow its best traditions through his speeches and resolutions (cf. 18.302, 305). Indeed, Demosthenes, alone of all the orators, “did not desert the post of patriotism in the hour of peril” (ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς εὐνοίας τάξιν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς οὐκ ἔλιπον) (18.173) but urged the city to take the right and heroic course. In so doing, he provided help to

<sup>99</sup> For the assertion that Athens does not help oppressors, see also Lys. 2.12 and Isoc. 4.53.

the city as an orator should and was instrumental in ensuring that Athens would remain true to its distinguished record of helping others.<sup>100</sup>

When Demosthenes explains in *On the Crown* the Athenian decision to ally with other Greeks and oppose Philip largely in terms of the city’s tradition of helping the wronged, he suppresses the long and uncertain process through which Athenians overcame their reluctance to get involved in the difficulties of other states and the strategic considerations that impelled Athenians to confront Philip. There is a significant gap between this ideal vision of the motivations driving Athenian decision making and the more pragmatic view that Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches urging action against Philip provide. The best explanation for this disjunction is that Demosthenes was highly attuned to Athenian psychology and behavior and knew that Athenians were ultimately pragmatic when evaluating the prospect of intervention abroad but more than ready to embrace, after the fact, a view of the past that highlighted their generosity as a people. Thus, with Demosthenes’ adept oratorical assistance, Athenians could deliberate in a calculated and prudent way about intervention in the Assembly and still believe in looking back on the past that they were a generous people, ready to help the wronged, and that “both individual citizens and the city as a whole must always strive to act in accord with the noblest standards of our tradition” (καὶ γὰρ ἄνδρ’ ἰδίᾳ καὶ πόλιν κοινῇ πρὸς τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν) (18.95). The fact that Aeschines’ prosecution of Ctesiphon failed utterly suggests that Demosthenes was not mistaken in judging the readiness of the Athenians to embrace his ideal image of them as rescuers of the wronged as they reflected on recent history, even if this entailed minimizing the strategic calculations that were at the core of their decision to confront Philip.<sup>101</sup>

This survey suggests that the ideal of “helping the wronged” played a complex role in Athenian rhetoric and decision making in the classical period. On the one hand, it is undeniable that Athenians were drawn to the notion that they were a noble people who were always prepared to intervene on behalf of fellow Greeks in distress and to save them from their oppressors; diverse sources attest to the enduring popularity of this vision of the Athenian people. Interestingly, this ideal of helping others simply because it is the right thing to do and with no thought to personal

<sup>100</sup> For the orator as a helper of the city, see Chapter II.

<sup>101</sup> On the outcome of the trial and the tradition that Aeschines left Athens after his loss, see Wankel 1976: 1.39–40.

risk or benefit is perhaps the closest Athenian sources come to articulating what some moderns would view as a concept of “pure altruism.”<sup>102</sup>

On the other hand, there is little reason to believe that this ideal, which was so attractive to Athenians as a feature of civic ideology, substantially affected their treatment of other states. We find no evidence in historical writers of Athenians rushing en masse to the aid of other Greeks without thought of the risks involved or benefits that might result. In fact, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon all suggest that Athenian helping of other peoples, in practice, is based more on strategic considerations than on compassion. Athenians did, of course, sometimes support their friends and allies, but they did so, for the most part, prudently and carefully and on terms consistent with the pursuit and protection of the city’s interests. The city’s relations with Plataea, its close neighbor and intimate ally, exemplify this: Athens was prepared to provide modest military support to Plataea and to offer a safe refuge for Plataeans in their travails during the Peloponnesian War, but this was the extent of what Athens was willing to do. The evidence of ancient historians concerning Athenian pragmatism in helping others is confirmed by Demosthenes’ deliberative oratory. In his speeches before the Athenian Assembly urging intervention abroad, Demosthenes sometimes invokes ideals of helping others but does not rely on this to win over his audience; instead, he places emphasis on calculations of the city’s interests. This does not stop Demosthenes from idealizing the city’s decision making when looking back on it in *On the Crown*, but this retrospective idealization should not be mistaken for evidence that helping the wronged was central to Athenian foreign policy.

It is doubtful that Athenians differed much from other Greeks in placing their own interests first in interstate relations, but they do seem to have diverged in the emphasis they placed on the claim that helping other peoples was a national trait. We are left with the paradox that Athenians were strongly drawn to a noble ideal of helping others but no more inclined in reality to altruism in interstate relations than was any other Greek state. Whether we view Athenians as Idealists forced to accommodate themselves to a Realist world or as Realists with romantic inclinations, Athenians do not appear to have let helping other states get in the way of pursuing their strategic objectives.

<sup>102</sup> On this concept, see Introduction.

## CONCLUSION

### *Helping and the Athenian Experience*

This study has argued that Athenian attitudes toward helping are central to understanding the Athenian experience. These shaped Athenians' relations with family, friends, and strangers; their view of their obligations as democratic citizens to one another and to their city; their conceptions of the Athenian community; and their collective relations with the peoples of other city-states.

An examination of the evidence suggests, first, that helping among individuals under the Athenian democracy occurred primarily among kin and friends, whose intimate ties and strong expectations of reciprocity encouraged mutual assistance. This was true of the behavior of citizens within the city, where a man's intimates were the most likely persons to extend loans to him in hard times, nurse him when he was sick, and provide support to him in litigation. This may also have been the case with citizen behavior on military campaigns outside the city; although hoplites necessarily collaborated and cooperated with their fellow citizens on and off the battlefield, they depended largely on their intimates for assistance in a rout and for attending to them after battle if they were injured. The priority on helping friends was deeply embedded in social practice and ideals in Athens, and the Athenian democracy does not appear to have altered this significantly. To be sure, the democracy through its diverse institutions and festivals brought Athenians together in a variety of settings where individuals might forge bonds of friendship that could lead to mutual support, but it did not engender a friendship (*philia*) or fraternity among all citizens that would lead to a high level of support among strangers. Athens was sufficiently large that its citizens were not participants in a face-to-face society in which intimacy might lead to mutual support, and democratic ideology did not seek to foster a society in which citizens looked out for one another individually as if members of an extended family.

Democratic ideology, in fact, places more emphasis on citizens leaving each other alone than on their supporting one another. Fundamental to Athenian understandings of proper citizen behavior is that democratic citizens, as free and equal persons, respect one another and refrain from harassing or harming others. This is reflected in the way Athenians conceptualize and idealize *homonoia* (“concord”) from the late fifth century on as a model for social relations under the democracy. *Homonoia* requires citizens to live in peace with one another, perform their civic duties, and collaborate for the common good; mutual interpersonal helping is conspicuously absent from this vision of society. Although Plato envisions an ideal society in which citizens are intimately bound together as brothers and consequently support one another actively, he advances this as an alternative to, and criticism of, the Athenian situation rather than as a reflection of it. Athenians of his day did not embrace such a model of social relations.

Although Athenians did not see it as the responsibility of democratic citizens to help one another as individuals, reciprocal helping figured prominently in their conception of the proper relationship between citizen and city. Citizens were expected to help the city by carrying out basic civic duties as hoplites and, if they were sufficiently wealthy, as performers of public liturgies and payers of the *eisphora*; those who were willing and able – most commonly members of the elite – were meant to help the city in more extraordinary capacities by advising the city in the Assembly as *rhētores* or serving as volunteer prosecutors in the courts. Central to the Athenian understanding of each of these diverse roles was the idea that good citizenship entailed helping the city; one might say, in fact, that for democratic Athenians helping was at the core of patriotic behavior. Athenians pictured the city for its part as helping citizens in a variety of ways: by keeping citizens secure and providing them with the circumstances in which they could prosper, by assisting them through its laws, and by helping them through its law courts.

Indeed, Athenians seem to have been especially attracted to the idea that the city’s popular law courts, which were a central democratic institution, were venues for collective helping of individuals. If Athenians, as individuals, were not inclined to run to the rescue of victims of violence in the streets, litigants constructed law courts as places where jurors, representing the community at large, could rescue victims of wrongdoing with a favorable verdict. In depicting law courts in these terms, litigants promulgated an image of the Athenian community as a helping one that protected individuals from aggressors and malefactors and ensured that free and equal citizens would not suffer injustice or harm at the hands of others, including

the rich and powerful. This vision of the Athenian law courts strikingly emphasizes that they are venues not simply for the enforcement of laws and adjudication of disputes but for collective helping of individuals who merit this assistance.

When we turn from helping in Athens and among Athenians to the question of how far Athenians collectively were willing to help other states militarily, it is particularly important to evaluate Athenian claims of helping the wronged in light of the city's actual record of providing assistance. Athenians were clearly drawn to an image of themselves as heroic and noble rescuers of other Greeks from early times. Yet even the Attic funeral orations, which promote this image of Athenians, provide clues that the actual role of Athenians in interstate affairs may not be so simple: they strain to provide evidence of this generous behavior in historical times, and their claims of the city's other-orientation sit uneasily with their vaunting of Athenian power and prestige. This looks more like a hegemonic discourse that justifies the city's dominance of other Greeks than a neutral account of the city's values and commitment to helping others.

A survey of how contemporary historians portray Athenian support of other states suggests that Athenians were willing to help "kindred" states (the Ionians) and close friends and allies (the Plataeans) up to a point but were careful not to jeopardize their own interests in the process. Athenians were also ready sometimes to help their former enemies but not indiscriminately as their encomiasts claim; rather, they lent assistance when this coincided with the pursuit of their own interests. This picture of Athenian pragmatism in supporting other states is corroborated by Demosthenes' deliberative speeches. In addressing the Athenian Assembly concerning intervention abroad, Demosthenes sometimes invokes Athens' tradition of helping the wrong, but he is careful to base his case for intervention primarily on the pursuit of the city's interests. Although Demosthenes, in looking back on the city's decision to confront Philip at Chaeronea in his *On the Crown*, could lay emphasis on how the city's noble traditions of helping the wronged impelled it to action, his own deliberative speeches before Chaeronea suggest that this was not the case. The orator's appeals to audiences at that time make the case for confronting Philip much more on the basis of the city's interests than on the grounds of helping others.

The picture of Athenian attitudes toward helping that emerges from this study is complex. First, it seems clear that Athenians are at least able to imagine a pure form of helping that is motivated by a desire to help others without consideration of self-interest and that resembles what moderns might label "altruism." This comes across most clearly in Athenian claims



of a noble tradition of helping other Greek states when they suffer wrong simply because this is the just and decent thing to do. This ideal also crops up when politically active individuals, such as Demosthenes and Lysurgus, claim that they serve the city and their fellow citizens with no thought of personal gain. The fact that this ideal appears in both group and personal self-presentation suggests its potential appeal to Athenians. It is difficult, however, to find evidence of this sort of pure helping in practice. As we have noted, the Athenian state does not seem to have based its interstate relations on this principle in any significant way, and we may reasonably doubt that politically active individuals were as purely motivated as they sometimes claimed to be.

More commonly, Athenians view helping as embedded in reciprocal relationships between parties who give help with the expectation of receiving help in return. Although this expectation of a return can be more or less explicit in a particular helping relationship, it is nonetheless ever present. Reciprocal helping, as we have noted, is fundamental to Athenian understandings of the relations of kin and friends, but Athenians do not appear to have viewed it as central to the relations among fellow citizens outside this circle of intimates. Democratic ideology, however, conceptualizes the relation between citizen and city in terms of reciprocal helping and frequently delineates the mutual benefits of this arrangement.

When Athenians frame helping in terms of mutual and reciprocal benefit, they acknowledge the legitimacy of individuals acting in a way that is consistent with their self-interests even as they help others. Indeed, a striking feature of the Athenian discourse of helping is the way that individuals sometimes disclose with candor the personal interests that motivated them to engage in helping. Thus, in the Athenian law courts, a citizen who had performed his military duty or a liturgy might assert that he had helped the city so as to be able to call on jurors for help in return should he ever find himself on trial. Furthermore, a public prosecutor pursuing a personal enemy in court could openly proclaim that he was helping himself and the city through his prosecution. Litigants assume that the jurors judging their suits will also be alert to their own collective interests when considering whether to help a particular litigant with a favorable verdict and thus sometimes urge them to help not only the wronged party but themselves as well through their votes. Similarly, Athenians in the Assembly seem to be comfortable with the idea that in helping other states militarily, they might also be helping themselves. All of this suggests that Athenians tend to view the nature and psychology of helping pragmatically and are ready to acknowledge and accept the legitimacy of self-serving motivations in a decision to help others. Although Athenians do seem to be uncomfortable

with helping that is purely self-interested and thus, in fact, a mere pretense of helping (for example, when a *rhētōr* pretends to be helping the city while actually enriching himself at its expense), they are not generally troubled by helping that is driven largely by self-interest.

A society's attitudes toward helping and its representation of these attitudes reveal a great deal about it. This study has attempted to advance our understanding of helping in an Athenian democratic context. The portrait of Athenians that emerges is of a people drawn to ideals of heroic helping of others while at the same time restrained in their own helping behavior outside the circle of family and friends; of a people more inclined, in keeping with democratic ideology, to help their city than fellow citizens whom they did not know; of a people ready to help other Greeks but only when this was in keeping with the city's strategic interests. If this picture of the role of helping in Athens complicates our view of Athenian values and democratic ideology, it may also bring us closer to understanding the complex nature of the Athenian experience.



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